1963  R. James Woolsey earns his B.A. from Stanford University.

1963-65  Woolsey becomes a Rhodes Scholar and earns his M.A. from Oxford University.

1968  Woolsey earns his LL.B from Yale University Law School, where he is the Managing Editor for the Yale Law Review. After graduating from law school, Woolsey joins the Army as a captain.

1969  Woolsey serves as an advisor with the U.S. Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks I (SALT I) in Helsinki and Vienna.

1970  Woolsey becomes General Counsel to the Senate Committee on Armed Services, where he serves until 1973.

1973  Woolsey enters the private sector, accepting a job as an associate attorney at Shea & Gardner. He works off and on at Shea & Gardner throughout his career when he is not working for the government.

1977  Woolsey is appointed Under Secretary of the Navy, serving until 1979.

1983  Woolsey is appointed by President Ronald Reagan as a Delegate at Large to the U.S.-Soviet Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) and Nuclear and Space Arms Talks (NST) in Geneva.

1992  December  President-elect William J. Clinton announces his nomination of Woolsey as Director of the Central Intelligence for his incoming administration. Clinton indicates that, in restructuring and streamlining the intelligence agency, he would rely not only on Woolsey but also on William J. Crowe Jr., 67, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who is named as the new director of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. Woolsey joined other moderate defense intellectuals in endorsing Clinton in late summer and helped to advise him during the campaign. Clinton describes his decision: “I had met Jim Woolsey, a longtime figure in the Washington foreign policy establishment, in late 1991 at a national security discussion Sandy Berger organized with a diverse group of Democrats and independents with more robust views on national security and defense than our party typically projected. Woolsey was clearly intelligent and interested in the job. After one interview, I offered it to
During his Senate Confirmation hearings, Woolsey expresses skepticism at Congress’s recent proposals for drastic cuts in the intelligence budget. He outlines what he considers to be the contours of the international threats facing the U.S. “Yes, we have slain a large dragon,” he states, referring to the fall of the Soviet Union. “But we live now in a jungle filled with a bewildering variety of poisonous snakes. And in many ways, the dragon was easier to keep track of.” Woolsey also tells the committee that the Clinton Administration plans to review whether economic intelligence gathered by U.S. spy agencies should for the first time be shared with private companies or individuals. “Corporations deserve to understand, as best, as best we can do it, without violating the stricture against disclosing sources and methods how they can defend against intelligence collection against them.” He adds that the Administration’s review will examine the “complexities, legal difficulties [and] foreign policy difficulties” of passing along to private firms important commercial secrets learned in the course of the CIA’s routine spy work. He shares his optimism regarding a Non-Proliferation Center at the CIA & also expresses his inclination to strengthen it. (The New York Times; The Washington Post, 02/03/1993)

On the question of enforcement of a No-Fly Zone which would involve suppression of flights in the geographic area of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Woolsey says that he has “one or two thoughts on that” but prefers to deal with it in executive session. (Testimony before the U.S. Select Committee on Intelligence, Feb 3, 1993)

Woolsey’s nomination passes unanimously out of committee and is quickly and unanimously confirmed by the Senate. (The New York Times, 02/04/1993)

In testimony before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, Woolsey states that Russia has yet to create an effective system for controlling exports of sensitive military equipment and technologies related to the development of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons. While Russian leaders have strongly supported enactment of such export controls, “the lure of large, illegal profits” and “legal, personnel and funding problems” are slowing government efforts to block the spill of Russian arms and military know-how to other nations, he says. On the positive side, the CIA has so far received no “credible reporting” that nuclear arms or significant quantities of weapons-grade nuclear materials have been exported from Russia. He also says that “under current
March

North Korea, in a defiant move against international pressure to inspect its suspected nuclear weapons development program, announces that it is withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty to defend “its supreme interest.” The surprise announcement comes just after the International Atomic Energy Agency had given North Korea a deadline of later this month to accept inspection of two buildings that the United States believes contain evidence of the extent of the bomb project. The abrupt decision, which has taken American officials in Asia by surprise, adds urgency to the Clinton Administration’s biggest security challenge in the region. And it comes just weeks after Woolsey said he believed that North Korea might be only months to a year or so away from producing its first atomic weapon. (*The New York Times*, 03/12/1993)

April

While promising more significant cuts in overall military spending; President Clinton has asked Congress for authority to spend even more money on spy agencies, satellites and other intelligence activities in the 1994 fiscal year than it allotted for 1993. The request is hidden in classified sections of the Defense Department budget, according to sources. The Administration has concluded that at least a short-term increase in the intelligence spending is needed before similar deep reductions can be made in the budgets of the Central Intelligence Agency and other spy agencies. Woolsey had signaled earlier that the Administration would oppose sharp immediate cuts in intelligence spending. But the request for an increase has surprised some lawmakers because Clinton had promised to slash intelligence spending by $7 billion over four years. Administration officials report that nearly all of the new spending is to be devoted to launching spy satellites that can replace several older ones, saving money in the future. (*The New York Times*, 04/15/1993)

A debate emerges within the Clinton Administration about whether to add Pakistan to its official list of nations that support terrorism. The proposed declaration has stirred deep misgivings within the State Department and in Congress because of the danger of a backlash of anti-American feeling in another Islamic country and because the alleged offenses mainly involve support for separatist guerrillas in the disputed Kashmir region. But senior Clinton Administration officials say that Federal law will give them no other option unless Pakistan can present evidence that it has severed its ties to separatist groups that employ terrorism as a weapon. Woolsey has been particularly critical of Pakistan, warning that the country was “on the brink” of the designation. He tells Congress that not only Kashmiris but
Sikh secessionists had “found safe haven and other support” in Pakistan. (*The New York Times*, 04/26/1993)

The Central Intelligence Agency warns dozens of U.S. defense and aerospace companies that French intelligence agents are targeting them for their industrial secrets, and the warnings helped persuade Hughes Aircraft Co. not to exhibit its aerospace equipment at the Paris Air Show in June. The CIA’s information appears to be based in part on a 21-page French government document from about 1990 that outlines the types of 21st-century aerospace and defense technologies in which French companies are interested, say U.S. industry officials. At his confirmation hearings, Woolsey said the proposal for U.S. intelligence agencies to gather foreign corporations’ secrets to share with U.S. firms is “the hottest current topic in intelligence policy.” His predecessor, Robert Gates, decided against the practice. Woolsey told Congress last month that he is reviewing the idea but that it is “loaded with foreign policy and legal difficulties.” A CIA official says the agency’s sharing of information in this case does not signal a new policy, but continues one of tipping off U.S. firms if the U.S. government learns of attempts to compromise their security. (*The Washington Post*, 04/27/1993)

May

The Clinton administration has obtained what it regards as credible evidence that the government of Iraq tried to assassinate former president George Bush three weeks ago, and Clinton’s top advisers are divided on how to respond. President Clinton, who has been briefed on the evidence, dispatched a team of Secret Service and FBI counter-terrorist investigators to Kuwait City, where Bush made a triumphal visit during April 14-16 to celebrate the allied victory in the 1991 Persian Gulf War. During the visit and afterward, the Kuwaiti government arrested 16 people, including 11 Iraqi nationals, and seized hundreds of pounds of explosives and what it described as “special technical equipment.” The Kuwaiti Ministry of Defense has charged that the plotters intended to try three times, if necessary, to kill the former president: first with a remote-controlled car bomb as he arrived at Kuwait City’s airport; then with a second car bomb near a theater where Bush received an honorary doctorate; and finally with a suicide attack by a man who planned to wrap himself in explosives and detonate them next to Bush. White House communications director George Stephanopoulos states, “We take these allegations very seriously. If we determine Iraq was involved in state-sponsored terrorism, the United States will take appropriate action against Iraq.” Administration officials are split on what action to take. Some from the Justice Department favor extraditing the conspirators, while others, such as Woolsey, reportedly are arguing that an attempt on a former president requires direct retribution against the government deemed responsible. (*The Washington Post*, 05/08/1993)
June

Democrats in Congress are preparing to cut more than $1 billion from a White House intelligence budget request. The cuts would leave the nation’s intelligence agencies with only about as much money for next year as they were given by Congress this year. President Clinton had asked for an increase that would have outpaced inflation, contending that the national security requirements in the post-cold war era justified the steeper rise. Congressional officials have said that Woolsey has contended that cuts below the Administration’s request could have “devastating consequences” on the ability of United States intelligence agencies to monitor developments around the world and to assess their significance. But they say Democrats who control the committees with power over the intelligence budgets had reacted with some skepticism to those contentions. (The New York Times, 06/18/1993)

U.S. Navy ships launch 23 Tomahawk missiles against the headquarters of the Iraqi Intelligence Service in what President Clinton calls a “firm and commensurate” response to Iraq’s plan to assassinate former president George Bush in mid-April. The attack is meant to strike at the building where Iraqi officials had plotted against Bush, organized other unspecified terrorist actions and directed repressive internal security measures, senior U.S. officials say. Clinton says he ordered the attack after receiving “compelling evidence” from Woolsey and Attorney General Janet Reno that Bush had been the target of an assassination plot and that the plot was “directed and pursued by the Iraqi Intelligence Service.” (The Washington Post, 06/27/1993)

August

A U.S. intelligence agent is killed in the former Soviet Republic of Georgia by gunmen who fired at his car on a village road outside the Georgian capital, Tbilisi. Fred Woodruff, officially described by local officials as a U.S. diplomat, was the CIA’s bureau chief in Georgia and had been traveling in a car driven by Eldar Gogoladze, the head of security for Georgia’s president and reportedly the head of the intelligence agency as well. Woolsey, who is traveling in Russia, heads to Georgia to pick up Woodruff’s body and escort it back to the U.S. Georgian officials detain three suspects, while Gogoladze is suspended, pending the results of an investigation into the shooting. The media reports that it is unclear whether Woodruff was targeted specifically or whether he was a victim of the increasingly violent crime Georgia has been experiencing recently. (The Washington Post, 08/11/1993; The New York Times, 08/12/1993)

September

The United Nations sends helicopters equipped to detect atomic radiation in an effort to locate any secret nuclear weapons sites in Iraq in the first stage of a stepped-up weapons hunt by the special commission charged with disarming Iraq. At the end of this month, the commission plans to send more than 100 inspectors into the country to begin its biggest combined search yet for prohibited weapons. The United Nations is
particularly concerned that Iraq may still be concealing more than 100 Soviet-built Scud missiles after both Woolsey and Defense Secretary Les Aspin said part of Baghdad’s missile arsenal appears to be unaccounted for. In testimony before the Senate on Feb. 24, Woolsey said the Iraqis “retain missiles, support systems and propellants and are still capable of firing Scud missiles.” The inspectors will also be hunting for undiscovered traces of chemical and biological weapons programs and evidence of a secret underground nuclear reactor that 1992 French intelligence reports indicated may exist. (The New York Times. 09/19/1993)

**October**

In written responses to questions by the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, Woolsey announces that Israel has sold advanced military technology to China for more than a decade and is moving to expand its cooperation with Beijing. “Building on a long history of close defense industrial relations—including work on China’s next generation fighter, air-to-air missiles, and tank programs—and the establishment of diplomatic relations in January 1992, China and Israel appear to be moving toward formalizing and broadening their military technical cooperation,” Mr. Woolsey says. Explaining its assessment, the CIA notes that Beijing and Tel Aviv recently signed an agreement to cooperate in sharing technology in a number of areas, including electronics and space. Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin of Israel is visiting Beijing today to discuss the broadening of Israeli-Chinese ties. The four-paragraph CIA statement to the committee did not say the Israelis had been re-exporting American technology, but that has been a concern for United States officials. (The New York Times, 10/12/1993)

**December**

The head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Hans Blix, declares for the first time today that there was no longer any “meaningful assurance” that North Korea was using its nuclear materials solely for peaceful purposes, although he stops just short of saying that the inspection process had totally broken down because of the North’s refusal to allow regular inspections. These events come just a week after President Clinton offered new inducements to North Korea to allow inspection of its nuclear plants, but North Korea denounced the United States, saying pressure “will produce a very dangerous consequence.” The statement, issued by the Foreign Ministry, came as American and South Korean officials awaited word that North Korea would permit some limited inspections of its nuclear sites in return for talks that could lead to financial aid, the cancellation of a major military exercise in South Korea and eventually diplomatic recognition. “We are fully prepared to safeguard the sovereignty of the country even if the worst event, such as sanctions or war, is imposed upon us,” the statement said. “Our people and people’s army will never yield to anybody’s pressure.” Woolsey draws fire for his comments later in the day on the CNN program “Larry King Live,” where he asserts that North Korea might make good on a threat to
go to war rather than open its nuclear sites to outside inspection. “You can’t rule it out,” he states. “It’s important to keep our powder dry and keep prepared, and certainly the President is doing that.” (The New York Times, 12/03/1993)

1994

January  
In testimony to the Senate Intelligence Committee, Woolsey states that prospects for economic reform in Russia have dimmed in recent months, warning of renewed potential for hyperinflation and instability. He further acknowledges that the Clinton administration is reassessing prospects for Russian democracy and economic renewal following the success of Russian ultranationalists in last month’s parliamentary elections and the departure of two leading reformers from President Boris Yeltsin’s cabinet. “Our fears are greater now because of the movement of some of the reformers out of the cabinet and the concern about spending and inflation,” Woolsey says. He also argues that the principal internal threat to Russia depends on the pace of economic reform. Administration officials fear that continued subsidies to money-losing state industries could “unleash forces that could bring Russia again to the brink of destructive hyperinflation,” as Woolsey puts it. However, Woolsey balances his warning on Russian backsliding with continued support for Yeltsin. “The reformers are not out of the picture, and there is a vigorous debate going on in Russia and some chance that they can, with President Yeltsin, make enough progress over the next few months to have things work out better than our worst fears,” Woolsey states. (The Washington Post, 01/26/1994)

Woolsey also testifies before the Senate Intelligence Committee that “Iran remains determined to maintain its implacable hostility, to eliminate any opposition to its rule, and to undermine our security interests and those of our friends and allies in the region.” He further underscores the impact United Nations sanctions and weapons inspections have had on deterring Baghdad's attempts to rebuild its weapons of mass destruction program. Commenting on Syria and the Middle East peace process, Woolsey says the United States stands "ready to do all we can to help monitor any agreement" reached between Israel and Syria regarding the Golan Heights. (Testimony before the Select Intelligence Committee, Jan 26, 1994)

February  
In what is described as the greatest security breach in U.S. history, President Clinton announces the arrest of Aldrich H. Ames, a senior CIA agent accused of counterespionage for the former Soviet Union and present-day Russia. Woolsey reportedly addresses the entire CIA via the agency’s closed-circuit television, expressing the mixed emotions felt across the agency over discovering a mole inside. (The Washington Post, 02/24/1994)
Woolsey tells the House of Representatives Intelligence Committee that revealing what his agency spends money on would make it easier for adversaries to penetrate the American intelligence apparatus. (Congressional Report, February 22, 1994)

March

Having previously refused to do so upon his appointment as CIA Director, Woolsey has assured colleagues that he is prepared to submit to a routine polygraph examination, fulfilling one of the agency’s longstanding requirements for new employees. The recent arrest of Ames has led to scrutiny toward Woolsey’s refusal to take the test, despite the fact that political appointees are not legally required to do so. The media reports that the exam is looked on as a sort of secret fraternity handshake within the CIA. Robert M. Gates says he volunteered to take it about a year after his appointment as CIA director in 1991 “to maintain the symbolism” of enduring the same hardships as rank-and-file employees. He says other CIA directors also took it. (The Washington Post, 03/09/1994)

Woolsey announces he will appoint a panel of outside experts to review weaknesses in the agency’s counterintelligence and internal security departments exposed by the case of Ames, the CIA officer accused of spying for Moscow. “This case is not an episode or a single incident, but a serious problem that we need to fix,” he states, following a tense, closed-door committee meeting. Woolsey says he would ask Brent Scowcroft, who was national security adviser to President George Bush, Harold Brown, Secretary of Defense under President Jimmy Carter, and Doug Gow, a former chief of FBI counterintelligence, to head a commission staffed largely by officers of the Central Intelligence Agency. But Senator Dennis DeConcini (D-AZ), head of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, expresses doubts that such a commission will effectively change the “culture and mentality” of the CIA. “The cooperative level between the FBI and the CIA, it seems clear to me, hasn’t been very good,” the Senator states. “The culture of the agency is one of protectiveness, rightfully so, one of denial, rightfully so, because of the business they’re in. But when you’re dealing with the law-enforcement agency charged by statute to investigate counterespionage cases, you can’t use that same culture and mentality.” (The New York Times, 03/11/1994)

Woolsey reports that North Korea is developing two new ballistic missiles that could eventually threaten all of Japan, China, Australia, New Zealand and Southeast Asia. The two missiles, which are expected to have a range of more than 1,000 miles and 2,000 miles, have been designated by Western analysts as Taepo Dong-1 and Taepo Dong-2, after the name of the North Korean site where they are under development. Neither has been flown, and officials said they will not be completed until the late 1990s. Unlike North Korea’s new Nodong-1 missile, which has been tested and can reach only South Korea and portions of Japan and China, the new
missiles “could put at risk all of Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia and the
Pacific area,” Woolsey says. “If exported to the Middle East, [they] could
threaten Europe as well.” (The Washington Post, 03/18/1994)

May

President Clinton orders an overhaul of U.S. counterintelligence
operations in a new effort to force cooperation between FBI and CIA
investigators searching for foreign spies who have penetrated the U.S.
government. Bureaucratic battling between the FBI and the CIA has been
partly blamed by FBI officials and members of Congress for the
government’s failure to detect Ames’s spying years earlier. The
administration has vowed to eliminate the longstanding interagency
disputes over spy-catching turf. The directive transfers key operational
responsibilities for counterspy probes to the FBI and orders that an FBI
official be appointed director of the policy-setting center for the first four
years. An earlier draft of the order was modified last week at the CIA’s
insistence to say that chairmanship of the center, which initially was to
rest permanently with the FBI, rotate every two years between the CIA,
FBI and military intelligence agencies after the first four years. The
provisions were endorsed publicly by Woolsey and FBI Director Louis J.
Freeh, who acknowledged in congressional testimony that spy-catching by
their agencies has been hampered by friction. (The Washington Post,
05/04/1994)

June

Despite the verification problems, the CIA and the American military urge
the Senate today to ratify a new treaty banning chemical weapons, saying
that it would deter other nations from manufacturing poison gas, and that
Washington plans to phase out its chemical weapons. The endorsement by
the intelligence agency and the American military is expected to bolster
Senate support for the treaty, which was concluded during the Bush
Administration after years of negotiation. “The chemical weapons
problem is so difficult from an intelligence perspective that I cannot state
that we have high confidence in our ability to detect noncompliance,
especially on a small scale,” Woolsey tells the Senate. Yet he still argues
that the treaty would be a step in the right direction in acting as a deterrent
to some countries. “One question you might want to consider,” Mr.
Woolsey told the panel, is whether the treaty “will act as a deterrent for
some states who might otherwise have initiated or retained chemical

During the hearing on International Organized Crime and Nuclear
Security, Woolsey tells a Congressional Committee that Russian
organized crime has quickly become an international menace, and it is
important for the United States to understand the complex role of Russian
organized crime, the strength of its capabilities, and the extent of its
influence on the evolution and development of public life and institutions.
He added that it cannot be ruled out that organized crime groups will be
able to obtain and sell nuclear weapons or weapons grade materials as a target of opportunity arises. The hostile states such as Iran, Libya, and North Korea may try to accelerate or enhance their own weapons development programs by attempting to acquire weapons of mass destruction or weapons-grade material through organized crime groups. Woolsey adds that the possibility of organized crime groups gaining access to nuclear weapons and materials has profound national security implications for the United States. The inherent difficulties of dealing with an essentially criminal target that affects our national security interests are compounded in Russia—a country that is still undergoing a radical transformation as it comes to grips with the staggering problems left in the wake of over 70 years of communism. Woolsey calls the post-cold war era the “Era of Anarchic Proliferation,” where the danger of breakdown of legitimate authorities in many nations becomes even more alarming than the cold war itself. (Congressional Record, June 27, 1994)

*July* Woolsey, in what the media call an unusually forceful manner, pledges to change the CIA’s culture and structure, comparing the nation’s spies to “a fraternity” of old boys in which “once you’re initiated, you’re considered a trusted member for life.” In a speech at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Woolsey compares accused mole Ames to Benedict Arnold, calling him “a malignant betrayer of his country who killed a number of people who helped the United States and the West win the cold war.” Those agents, members of Soviet and Eastern European intelligence and military services, “died because this warped, murdering traitor wanted a bigger house and a Jaguar,” he states. To try to prevent future betrayals, Mr. Woolsey promises to “strip bare and to evaluate” the agency’s operations directorate, which runs espionage missions overseas and is the most secretive of the CIA’s divisions. And he vows that the agency’s spies and senior officers would be held to new standards of ethics and accountability. (*The New York Times*, 07/19/1994)

*August* In a further conflict between Congress and the CIA, an unprecedented investigation into the secret spending practices of the nation’s most highly classified spy agency is under way, following the Senate Intelligence Committee’s belated discovery that the agency was building a $350 million headquarters outside Washington without the panel’s full knowledge. On orders from the White House, the National Reconnaissance Office, which manages the nation’s spy satellites, is being investigated by its two parent departments, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Pentagon. In a public hearing, the Intelligence Committee will ask Woolsey and the Deputy Secretary of Defense, John M. Deutch, why it was not fully informed about the cost of the headquarters. Behind closed doors, questioning will continue into how the reconnaissance
office, a small, ultra-secret group of military and civilian officials, spends roughly $6 billion a year. An effort to disclose the bottom line for intelligence spending was defeated last month in the House after the White House opposed it. Nothing about the National Reconnaissance Office—other than its name and mission, which were declassified less than two years ago—is a matter of public record. So secret is the office that the hundreds of millions of dollars for building its new headquarters were buried too deeply in the Pentagon’s classified “black budget” to be spotted by the handful of senators who oversee the nation’s intelligence agencies, according to the senators. (The New York Times, 08/10/1994)

A classified 1992 study found that half of the Central Intelligence Agency’s white female case officers reported experiencing sexual harassment and more than half of the black respondents reported racial harassment at the agency, according to a court filing by a case officer who is suing the agency for discrimination. The “Glass Ceiling” study, which has never been released, found that female case officers tolerated harassment by male colleagues “in order to be accepted,” according to excerpts included in the suit. The plaintiff in the lawsuit, who uses the pseudonym “Jane Doe Thompson,” was a member of the “Glass Ceiling” panel and one of the few case officers who by 1986 had reached the GS-15 level. In addition, the filing comes at the same time that more than 100 other female case officers are negotiating with CIA lawyers to reach a settlement that would prevent their instituting a broad class action discrimination case in federal court against the agency’s operations directorate, the covert side of the agency. Meanwhile, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence plans to take up these issues in hearings scheduled for later this month. At that time the panel will have Woolsey and other intelligence agency heads in for a follow-up session on last year’s inquiry into barriers to minority advancement in the intelligence community. (The Washington Post, 09/07/1994)

Having concluded that the Central Intelligence Agency cannot ably chart its course in the post-cold-war world, Congress is creating an independent commission to rethink the agency’s role and review its continued existence in its present form. The commission will have the broadest possible mandate to propose changes in the structure, the power and the budget as well as the very existence of the CIA and the nation’s 11 other military and civilian intelligence agencies. “The place just needs a total overhaul,” says Senator Arlen Specter, a Pennsylvania Republican who served six years on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and will be its senior Republican in January. “We are spending a lot of money on the CIA, and there have been doubts for years as to whether we are getting our money’s worth.” Over the past eighteen months, several Congressional committees have prodded Woolsey, who by statute serves
both as the head of the CIA and the chief executive of all American intelligence agencies, to take bold steps to restructure the intelligence community. A consensus has emerged that the world had changed so much since the CIA was created in 1947 to help contain Communism and prevent a nuclear Pearl Harbor that Woolsey had to overhaul the structure of American intelligence. Concluding that he would not, the committees put the provision for the commission into the $28 billion bill that authorizes all the classified spending on intelligence. (*The New York Times*, 09/28/1994)

Woolsey in his keynote address at the Washington Institute’s annual policy conference says that “Iran is the world’s leading state sponsor of terrorism. The Iranian government did not create the violence in Egypt, Algeria, or Lebanon, but it does everything in its power to strengthen the hand of extremist forces, to increase the carnage, and to upset any progress toward political reconciliation within these countries or peace between them and their neighbors.” Woolsey adds that “our biggest concern is in countering Iran’s aggressive pursuit of development of WMDs. In addition, Iran continues to manufacture and stockpile chemical weapons. We suspect that Iran is also hiding a biological weapons program as well.” (*Keynote address at the Ninth Annual Policy Conference, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Sept. 23-25, 1994*)

*October*  
Woolsey denies CIA’s role in setting up a Haitian paramilitary group that terrorized supporters of exiled President Jean-Bertrand Aristide.  
(*Congressional Report*, October 7, 1994)

*November*  
The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence issues a scathing, 116-page report on the Aldrich Ames case, as well as critical assessment of the CIA’s capacity to investigate itself. It describes a series of wrong turns, blind alleys and dead ends the investigation followed from 1985, when Ames first sold secrets to the Soviet Union, until this February, when the CIA career officer was arrested. To deceive the intelligence agency, Soviet spies fed phony information to the agency, which swallowed most of the red herrings. The report argues that the agency’s own self-deception—its behavior as “a bureaucracy which was excessively tolerant of serious personal and professional misconduct among its employees enabled Ames. According to the Committee, there was "gross negligence" -- both individually and institutionally—in creating and perpetuating the environment in which Ames was able to carry out his espionage activities for nine years without detection. The Committee’s members also unanimously criticize the current director, Woolsey, for failing to dismiss, demote or suspend anyone now serving with the agency for the failures to detect Ames. (*The New York Times*, 11/02/1994)
Ending a tumultuous year dealing with one of the largest breaches of national security in the nation’s history, Woolsey resigns as Director of the CIA. President Clinton accepts the resignation “with regret,” praising Woolsey as “a staunch advocate of maintaining an intelligence capability that is second to none.” Although there had been rumors for months that Woolsey was to leave, White House aides say the decision came as an unwelcome surprise to Clinton a week before the new Republican-controlled Congress convenes. “The president already has enough to face in the coming year without now having to add the burden of searching for a new CIA director,” an aide states. He adds that there has not yet been any serious consideration of a successor, despite the circulation in past months of names of several possible candidates. They include former senator Warren B. Rudman (R-NH), vice chairman of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board; Deputy Defense Secretary John M. Deutch; and departing Rep. Dave McCurdy (D-OK), a former chairman of the House intelligence committee who recently has criticized Clinton’s political performance. *(The Washington Post, 12/29/1994)*

**1996** Woolsey, testifying before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on the topic of ballistic missiles, underlines the primary importance of a vigorous program for theater defense (Navy Upper Tier and THADD) and also the importance of a sound program to move toward some type of national defense. Woolsey defers for the time being the question whether the U.S. should consider withdrawing from the ABM Treaty. “With an appropriately firm negotiating approach to the Russians and with adequate funding for our own BMD programs, we should be able to accommodate our needs within the Treaty for a time if it is appropriately interpreted and, possibly, modified.” On the question of moving towards a limited national defense cooperatively with Russia, Woolsey tells the Committee that if the U.S. could “reach agreement on returning to something very similar to the ABM Treaty’s original 1972 form (permitting two sites, not one, in each country), a thin national defense against most threats other than a large attack by Russia would be made substantially easier.” *(Testimony before Select Senate Committee on Intelligence, Dec. 4, 1996)*

**1998** Woolsey joins a bipartisan independent commission, headed by former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, to assess potential intercontinental threats to the U.S. as well as the need for a national missile defense system. The panel, whose official name is the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, unanimously concludes that “rogue nations” could develop and deploy ballistic missiles for an attack against the U.S. with “little or no warning.” The commission singles out North Korea, Iran and Iraq for scrutiny. “We judge that Iran now has the technical capability and resources to demonstrate an ICBM-range ballistic missile” similar to a North Korean model, its report asserts. However,
senior intelligence officials stood by their longstanding estimate that no country besides Russia and China, which already have ballistic missiles, could field long-range rockets before 2010, with the possible exception of North Korea. These officials argue that the commission had examined the same information available to government analysts but, rather than calculating the relative certainty of the available information like the government officials did so, the panel assumed the worst about what was not known for a particular country’s missile program, and drew its conclusions from these assumptions. (The New York Times, 07/16/1998)
TIMELINES

- James Woolsey News Timeline, prepared by B.J. Bloom, Miller Center of Public Affairs, University of Virginia, 02/08/2008; edited by Rajat Rana, Miller Center of Public Affairs, University of Virginia, 1/05/10.

- Timeline of the Clinton Presidency, prepared by Robbie Robinson, Miller Center of Public Affairs, University of Virginia, 05/30/2002.

SELECTED WRITINGS AND PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY JAMES WOOLSEY


• *Middle East Affairs: Hearing before the U.S. Senate Select Intelligence Committee*, (1994) (statement of R. James Woolsey, Director, CIA)

• *Russian organized crime: Hearing before the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence*, (1994) (statement of R. James Woolsey, Director. CIA)


• *Ballistic Missile Defense: Hearing before the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence*, (1996) (statement of R. James Woolsey, Director, CIA)


DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY


• “Indiana Jim and the Temple of Spooks,” The Economist, 03/20/1993.


KEY ISSUES IN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

CIA’s Changing Role in Post Cold War

Iraq

Russia and the Former Soviet Union


Pakistan

North Korea

Corporate Espionage

Aldrich Ames and CIA Reform


Joining the Administration

- How did you come to meet Bill Clinton? What were your early impressions of him?
- Characterize your experience in the Clinton Administration compared to your previous tenures in government under the Nixon, Carter, and Reagan Administrations. How did your previous positions help prepare you for the job of Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)?
- Why do you think you were chosen to be the Director of the CIA as opposed to another position within the Administration?

Director of the Central Intelligence Agency

- Discuss your appointment as Director of the CIA. Did you have any discussions with Clinton about his expectations of you in this role? What did you do to prepare yourself for this job?
- How was the Office of Director of the CIA organized during your tenure? Was this different than under your predecessor or from previous administrations?
- What did you understand to be the broad military and security strategy for the Clinton Administration? Did this mark a departure from previous strategies? How did these policies change over time?
- How often did you meet with the President? What were your early impressions of Clinton’s grasp of national security and intelligence? Did these impressions change over time?
- With whom did you work most closely on the Clinton foreign policy team? Evaluate your relationships with other senior officials on the foreign policy team and with key members of the White House staff.
- Discuss your interactions with major White House offices (Legislative Affairs, Communications, Political Affairs, etc.) and executive departments (State, NSA, Defense, etc.).
- Describe your interactions with Congress, particularly the early discussions on the CIA budget. Did the President ask you to publicly take a certain position on Congress’s proposed cutbacks on the intelligence budget, or do you feel you had independence on this issue?
- How was the discussion on budget cuts related to other discussions about reforming the CIA? Discuss the differences in perceptions between you and the intelligence community versus Congress over the way the end of the Cold War affected US national security.
- Describe the Aldrich Ames case. Characterize its impact on the CIA as well as the impact on Congressional reform proposals for the CIA.
- What was the relationship between the CIA and FBI like when you began as Director of the CIA? Did this change over time? Discuss the interagency relationship in light of the Aldrich Ames investigations.
• What did you see as the biggest national security threats to the US in your tenure at the CIA? Discuss the intelligence community’s assessment of Russia and Eastern Europe, North Korea, Pakistan, and Iraq.
• You described economic/corporate espionage as the “hottest topic in intelligence” during your Senate confirmation hearings. Discuss proposals for corporate espionage and how they were evaluated both within the intelligence community and by Congress.
• Do you think the media accurately portrayed the pivotal issues during your tenure as Director of the CIA? Assess the news coverage of the conflict between the CIA and Congress, the debates on the budget and CIA reform, and the Aldrich Ames case.
• Discuss your resignation. What were your main reasons for resigning as the Director of the CIA? Were you personal reasons for resigning accurately portrayed in the media?

**The Clinton Presidency in Retrospect**

• What do you consider your greatest accomplishments as Director of the CIA during the Clinton Administration?
• What were the strengths and weaknesses of the Clinton Administration in the realm of national security and intelligence? How would you rate the President as a strategic thinker?
• Comment on President Clinton as a foreign policy leader.
• How should the Clinton Administration be viewed by future historians? What is the legacy of President Clinton’s foreign policy?