EDWARD M. KENNEDY ORAL HISTORY PROJECT

Interviewer’s Briefing Materials
Robert Bates Interview, 05/08/2007, 07/26/2007

Robert A. Martin, Research Director

Miller Center Documents¹
• Robert Bates Fact Sheet.
• School Desegregation Overview Memo.

Secondary Source Materials

Oral History Interviews

¹ These are original documents created by Miller Center researchers for the Edward M. Kennedy Oral History Project. Please acknowledge credit for any use of these materials.
• Ralph Neas interview, Kennedy Oral History Project, Miller Center, University of Virginia, 01/26/2006.
• Edward Brooke interview, Kennedy Oral History Project, Miller Center, University of Virginia, 08/16/2006.
• Mary Frackleton interview, Kennedy Oral History Project, Miller Center, University of Virginia, 07/08/2005.
• Marty Nolan interview, Kennedy Oral History Project, Miller Center, University of Virginia, 09/14/2006.
• Gerard Doherty interview, Kennedy Oral History Project, Miller Center, University of Virginia, 10/10/2005.
• Burt Wides interview, Kennedy Oral History Project, Miller Center, University of Virginia, 02/02/2007.

Positions w/ EMK:
- Legislative assistant in EMK’s Senate office
- Also served in EMK’s 1980 campaign as a minority liaison (in D.C., unclear if he served in campaign nationally as well)

Other positions:
- Before joining EMK’s staff: Census Bureau and Office of Economic Opportunity
- After leaving EMK’s staff in 1977, worked for Mobil Oil as a lobbyist in D.C. (where he maintained contact with EMK and his staff, occasionally working with Peter Parham, Bates’ successor on EMK’s staff)
- Served as an advisor to Jesse Jackson’s 1984 campaign; responsibilities included coordinating campaign issues and research efforts, and to broaden range of issues; (EMK announces he’s not running in ‘84 campaign in Dec. 82; Bates starts w/ Jackson in 1983?)

Issues that Bates worked on for EMK:
- Minority issues in Massachusetts
- 1970s anti-busing legislation in Boston; his responsibilities included working with black constituents in MA to ease fears about busing children to South Boston; (Bates was touring Boston schools with EMK in 1974 when Barnicle reportedly convinces EMK to attend rough ROAR rally)
- Urban issues
- Bates specifically traveled with EMK to Memphis in 1969 one year after MLK had been shot (Bates responsible for deciding whether it was safe for EMK to speak as planned)

Issues that came up during this time with EMK:
- 1969 Philadelphia plan
- 1969 Haynsworth nomination
- 1970 Carswell nomination
- 1970 VRA extension (18-year old minimum voting age)
- 1970 Indian education bill/1971 Indian Education Act
- 1970 Mental Retardation & Developmental Disabilities Act
- 1971 Rehnquist nomination
- 1972 ERA
- Title IX of 1972 Education Amendments
- 1973 Rehabilitation Act
- 1975 VRA extension (language minorities)
- 1975 Older Americans Act extension/Age Discrimination Act
In both 1974 and 1975, Congress passed laws containing amendments that restricted the ability of courts and the Department of Housing, Education, and Welfare to order the busing of students for the purpose of racial desegregation in public schools. While Dole consistently supported anti-busing measures and opposed efforts to dilute them, EMK stood firm against any sort of anti-busing provision throughout this period, breaking with several fellow Northern Democrats and large segments of his urban, working class constituency.

In the early 1970s, a series of federal court decisions found that racially imbalanced schools impeded the civil rights of minority students. As a result, courts began to order the racial integration of public schools, sometimes requiring the racial breakdown of each school to match that of the school district as a whole. To achieve this goal, courts often required students to be bused into schools whose racial profile was considered to be reflective of racial discrimination. In addition, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) had the ability to terminate federal school funds to enforce busing or other desegregation plans under Title IV of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, but the White House had rarely used this tool. Busing occurred most often in large, ethnically segregated school systems, including those in Boston, Cleveland, and Richmond. Busing was met with a fair amount of opposition, particularly among Southerners and the Northern working class.

On March 26 and 27, 1974, the House passed two anti-busing amendments to the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) extension bill (HR 69), declaring that:

- All public schoolchildren were entitled to an equal educational opportunity and a child’s neighborhood was the basis for his public school assignment; the failure of a school district to attain a racial or gender balance of students would not constitute a denial of equal educational opportunity.
- All federal courts and agencies would be prohibited from ordering long-distance busing of children to end school desegregation.

In the Senate, Senator Edward Gurney (R-FL) sponsored an ESEA amendment proposing an all-out ban on busing, claiming, “Busing is spreading like a cancer through every part of our country.” Gurney’s amendment was narrowly tabled 47-46. Siding with traditional civil rights senators such as Jacob Javits (R-NY), Claiborne Pell (D-RI), Philip Hart (D-MI), Walter Mondale (D-MN), and Edward Brooke (R-MA), the only black U.S. senator, EMK provided continual criticism of the Gurney amendment and voted to table the bill; Dole voted against tabling. A more dilute amendment proposed by Senator Birch Bayh (D-IN) was subsequently adopted. Key anti-busing provisions in the Senate ESEA bill (S 1539) included:

- Bayh amendment: Prohibited court-ordered busing unless all other alternatives were found inadequate and unless it was found that both districts involved had practiced segregation.
• Dole amendment: Prohibited Department of Justice interference in segregated schools before allowing the school to voluntarily adopt a corrective plan.

While the House amendment completely forbade busing, the Senate amendment allowed courts to order busing beyond districts next to a student’s home if doing so was required to guarantee the student’s civil rights. Conferees agreed on a busing compromise with the following provisions:

• Allow courts to determine when extensive busing was necessary.
• Allow courts to terminate a busing order if it determined the school district was no longer violating the civil rights of its students.
• Prohibition on the use of federal funds for busing to overcome racial imbalance, except for impact aid designated for handicapped children or the educationally disadvantaged.

On August 21, 1974, President Gerald Ford signed HR 69 into law (PL 93-380). In September 1974, EMK was chased off the speaker’s stand into a nearby federal office building at an anti-busing rally in Boston, where he had sought to calm a crowd of disgruntled parents. Most of the protesters came from solidly Democratic, Irish, and pro-Kennedy neighborhoods, and were angry at EMK’s vote that helped narrowly defeat the anti-busing amendment in May. In April 1975, EMK was jeered and jostled by busing opponents after giving a speech at a school in Quincy, Massachusetts. And in September 1975, the birthplace of John F. Kennedy in Brookline, Massachusetts was defamed with graffiti (“Bus Teddy”) and damaged by fire in an apparent act of protest against busing. EMK still refused to hedge his support for school desegregation.

In November 1974, Congress also attached three diluted Senate anti-busing amendments to the 1975 HEW appropriations bill (HR 15580).

• Prohibition on the use of federal funds for busing to overcome racial imbalance. This provision was intended to close loopholes that surfaced in the ESEA conference bill, but it was likely to have little impact because so few federal funds were used for such purposes.
• The second and third amendments prohibited the use of federal funds to force any school already desegregated to: (a) bus school children; (b) abolish schools; and (c) require attendance at any school against the choice of the student’s parents. The House language would have required these amendments to apply to all schools.

In the fall of 1975, anti-busing proponents in the Senate tried to rally support for a constitutional amendment to ban court-ordered busing. It was believed that a constitutional amendment was the only way to end “forced” busing because legislation prohibiting the courts from doing so would probably be found unconstitutional. Four constitutional amendments were proposed:

• S J Res 29, by Senator William V. Roth (R-DE) would amend the constitution to bar the transportation of students on the basis of race, color, national origin, or sex. Similar amendments were proposed by Dewey Bartlett (R-OK) and John Tower (R-TX).
A broader amendment, offered by William Lloyd Scott (R-VA), would forbid the assignment of students to schools and the assignment of local, state, and federal government employees on the basis of race.

None of the proposals for a constitutional amendment was successful, and on September 3, the Senate tabled 42-35 a Dole amendment to the State, Justice, and Commerce appropriations bill that would have prohibited the use of Department of Justice funds to intervene in any court suit seeking to require forced busing (EMK voted to table the bill). However, on September 26, the Senate passed an HEW appropriations bill (HR 8069), to which it attached three anti-busing amendments that were not included in the House bill. EMK was the only Northern Democrat to oppose all three amendments. These amendments were:

- **Biden amendment (1):** Prohibited HEW from threatening aid cutoffs to require school systems to assign students or teachers on the basis of race. EMK voted against; Dole announced for. Senator Joseph Biden (D-DE) introduced his amendment as a counter to an unsuccessful amendment by Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC) that would have forbidden HEW to force local schools to classify students by race, thereby depriving HEW of key information used to assess whether a school was guilty of segregation practices.
- **Biden amendment (2):** A more legally explicit version of Biden’s first amendment sought to assure Northern liberals that Biden’s first amendment would not weaken HEW’s other discrimination remedies. EMK voted against; Dole in favor.
- **Byrd amendment:** Prohibited HEW from threatening aid termination to force school systems to bus students beyond the school closest to the student’s home that offered the courses sought by the student. EMK voted against; Dole against.

Debate over the Senate’s anti-busing amendments stalled HR 8069 in conference for two months. Ultimately, both Biden amendments were dropped and the Byrd amendment was retained. Nobody spoke against the bill; Brooke said he would withhold his opposition in the interests of enacting the appropriations bill. Ford vetoed the bill on December 19, claiming that it was too expensive, but Congress voted to override the veto in January 1976, enacting HR 8069 into law (PL94-206)
**Presidential Politics Timeline (Excerpted)**

*Prepared by Rob Martin and Ethan Sribnick*  
*Miller Center, University of Virginia, 09/05/2005*

**1978**

*April*  
In a meeting at the White House, EMK and Carter reach an agreement on the general principles of NHI and aim for passage of legislation no later than 1980. *(The New York Times, 04/07/1978)*

*May*  
A Gallup poll finds that Democrats favor EMK over Carter by 13 points as the presidential nominee in 1980. *(Clymer, p. 268; The New York Times, 05/07/1978; The Boston Globe, 05/12/1978)*

*June*  
EMK criticizes the NHI plan favored by Carter’s economic advisors as inadequate. *(The Washington Post, 06/10/1978)*

*July*  

*September*  
In an ABC News-Harris survey, EMK pulls ahead of Carter 40 to 21 percent amongst Democrats and Independents for the 1980 Democratic presidential nomination. Many analysts speculate that EMK will not enter the race unless another prominent Democrat has already challenged the sitting president. (“Chapter 3: Why Do You Want to Be President”)

*December*  
In a speech at the Democrats’ midterm convention in Memphis, EMK assails Carter for proposing cuts in domestic spending while increasing spending on defense. “Sometimes a party must sail against the wind,” EMK argues, as he pledges his support for “decent quality health care” for all Americans. “We cannot heed the call of those who say it is time to furl the sail.” Following his performance, rumors begin that EMK will challenge Carter for the 1980 nomination. EMK continues to deny that he will run. *(Clymer, pp. 276-277; The New York Times, 12/10/1978; The Washington Post, 12/10/1978)*

**1979**

*February*  
With “Draft Kennedy” movements continuing to pick up steam across the country, EMK meets with family and advisors at his home in McLean, Virginia to discuss whether to challenge Carter in 1980. The meeting includes Steve and Jean Kennedy Smith, Joe Kennedy, Paul Kirk, David Burke, Richard Burke, Carey Parker, Larry Horowitz, Arthur Schlesinger, John Seigenthaler and Ted Sorensen. (“Chapter 3: Why Do You Want to Be President”)
March  EMK meets with Carter at the White House on the 21st to give his “tentative support” to Carter’s re-nomination in 1980. (Clymer, p. 279; The New York Times, 06/14/1979)

May  Carter, on the advice of his Attorney General Griffin Bell, refuses to appoint Archibald Cox to the First Circuit Court of Appeals. EMK had strongly supported Cox’s appointment. (Clymer, p. 281)

EMK unveils a comprehensive “womb-to-tomb” NHI plan for all Americans and calls for Carter’s support. The plan is unveiled in the Senate Caucus Room, where JFK and RFK had each launched their bids for the presidency. EMK staffers tell reporters that the plan is meant to pressure Carter to move on NHI – not to signal an EMK presidential campaign. (Newsweek, 05/28/1979)

EMK meets with family and advisors at Stephen and Jean Kennedy Smith’s New York apartment to discuss whether to enter the 1980 presidential election. Concerns are reportedly raised concerning Chappaquiddick and EMK’s relationship with Joan, who is living separately in a Boston apartment and recovering from alcoholism. (Laurence Leamer, The Kennedy Women, New York: Villard Books, 1994, pp. 704-705; Clymer, p. 283-284)

June  At a White House dinner with members of Congress, Carter says, “If Kennedy runs, I’ll whip his ass.” EMK replies, “If I were to run, which I don’t intend to, I would hope to win.” (Clymer, pp. 280-281; The Washington Post, 06/13/1979)

Carter unveils his $24 billion national health care plan, which is to be phased-in over time and tied to inflation. EMK charges that the plan falls short of meeting the needs of the American people. Some commentators argue that Carter’s and EMK’s proposals are very similar and that EMK’s plan is only more ambitious because he is not constrained by federal budget problems. (The New York Times, 06/24/1979; Newsweek, 05/28/1979)

July  In a televised speech, Carter discusses “a crisis of confidence” as a critical problem facing the nation. Carter’s address, quickly dubbed the “malaise” speech, leads to a short-term increase in his popularity. The firing of four cabinet members three days later, however, renews public doubts about Carter. (Clymer, pp. 283-284)

August  Carter sends a message to EMK through Doherty signaling that, if EMK enters the race, Carter will not drop out early like LBJ in 1968. (“Chapter 3: Why Do You Want to Be President”)

Late Summer  EMK decides to challenge Carter for the 1980 Democratic presidential nomination. Before making a final decision, EMK had first addressed his children’s concern for his safety and his concern for a campaign’s impact on his wife, Joan. EMK arranges for his aide and close friend, Larry Horowitz, to talk
with his family. Horowitz convenes a panel of medical experts to determine whether the campaign would put an undue strain on Joan. They find that Joan’s health should not be a deterrent to EMK’s candidacy. (Clymer, pp. 283-284; Leamer, pp. 704-705)

**September**

On the 7th, EMK informs Carter at a White House lunch that he will run for president. (Clymer, p. 284; *The New York Times*, 09/12/1979)

EMK announces that Joan and Rose Kennedy no longer object to his running for president in 1980. (“Chapter 3: Why Do You Want to Be President”)

**Fall**

EMK sends Smith and Doherty to Chicago to secure Mayor Jane Byrne’s support in EMK’s bid for president. (“Chapter 3: Why Do You Want to Be President”)

**October**

On the 20th, EMK and Carter appear together at the dedication of the John F. Kennedy Library in Boston. (Clymer, pp. 289-290)

On the 29th, EMK authorizes the formation of “Kennedy for President,” an exploratory committee to be headed by Stephen Smith. Kirk will serve as national campaign director for overall campaign planning. Carl Wagner, the senior EMK political aide who had replaced Kirk on EMK’s staff in 1978, is named national campaign director for field operations. Rick Stearns, an experienced Democratic field operative, will specialize in delegate selection. Steve Robbins will conduct candidate scheduling. Other campaign members will include Morris Dees, an Alabama civil rights lawyer, former EMK press secretary Richard Drayne, current EMK press secretary Thomas Southwick, and speechwriter Robert Shrum. (Clymer, p. 291; *The New York Times*, 10/30/1979)

**November**

On the 4th, EMK’s interview with Roger Mudd is broadcast on *CBS Reports*. EMK fails to provide clear answers to questions on Chappaquiddick, his relationship with his wife, and why he wants to be president. The reaction to the interview in the press is very negative. (Clymer, pp. 285-287, 291; *The Washington Post*, 11/07/1979; *Wall Street Journal*, 11/09/1979)


**December**

EMK draws heavy criticism during the hostage crisis for suggesting that the deposed shah “ran one of the most violent regimes in the history of mankind.” (*The New York Times*, 12/04/1979) Both Democrats and Republicans attack EMK’s comments as showing support for Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. EMK responds that his remarks were not meant to weaken Carter’s efforts to gain safe release of the hostages. (Clymer, p. 295)
On the 20th, Joseph Crangle, the Erie County Democratic chairman, joins Kirk and Wagner as a national campaign director. Crangle will take over many of Kirk’s duties at headquarters while Kirk travels with EMK. *(The New York Times, 12/21/1979)*

On the 28th, Carter withdraws from a debate with EMK and California Governor Edmund G. “Jerry” Brown, Jr. *(Clymer, pp. 289-299)*

1980

**January**

EMK attacks Carter’s grain embargo on the Soviet Union as a weak action that will punish U.S. farmers. *(The Washington Post, 01/06/1980)*

On the 21st, Carter wins the Iowa caucuses with 59 percent of precinct delegates. EMK comes in second with only 31 percent of the delegates. Despite the extent of the loss, EMK pledges to continue his campaign. According to Gwirtzman, EMK briefly considers dropping out but then decides to cut expenses and to sharpen his differences with Carter. *(Clymer, pp. 300-301)*

On the 29th, EMK gives a speech at Georgetown University that reveals a change in campaign strategy. In addition to attacking Carter’s foreign policy towards Iran and the Soviet Union, EMK emphasizes more liberal themes such as wage-price controls and regulation of oil. EMK’s return to liberal themes is reportedly an attempt to justify EMK’s challenge to Carter, and was worked out by Smith, Kirk, speechwriters Robert Shrum and Carey Parker, and policy advisers Jan Kalicki and Peter Edelman. *(Clymer, p. 301; The New York Times, 01/30/1980)*

**February**

Carter defeats EMK in the New Hampshire primary on the 26th. Democratic National Committee (DNC) Chairman John C. White calls Dudley, the principal organizer of EMK’s campaign there, and congratulates him on the campaign. White continually makes attempts to mend fences between the Carter and EMK campaigns, and calls EMK campaign aides after each primary or caucus to congratulate them and discuss the importance of party unity. *(The New York Times, 02/27/1980, 06/03/1980)*

**March**

On the 1st, Smith announces that the struggling EMK campaign will dispatch some of its Washington staff to Illinois and New York, where EMK will face his next two primary challenges against Carter. Wagner and Paul Tully will run the campaign in Illinois, and will be joined by Ron Brown, John Howes, and Southwick. Drayne will oversee the press operation in New York. Kirk will be traveling with EMK all the time, as will old hand Eddie Martin. Smith also announces that former Governor of Wisconsin Patrick Lucey will serve as the Washington-based spokesman for the campaign. *(The Washington Post, 03/01/1980)*
On the 4\textsuperscript{th}, EMK wins the Massachusetts primary but loses to Carter in Vermont. \textit{(The New York Times, 03/05/1980)}

Carter wins the Illinois primary on the 18\textsuperscript{th}, taking 155 delegates to EMK’s 11. Commentators speculate that Chicago Mayor Jan Byrne’s endorsement may have been a liability for EMK. EMK’s chief delegate counter, Rick Stearns, tells EMK that he cannot win enough delegates in the remaining primaries to take the nomination. (Clymer, pp. 303-304; \textit{The New York Times, 03/19/1980})


\textbf{April}

On the 1\textsuperscript{st}, Carter wins a landslide victory in Wisconsin. Brown subsequently withdraws from the race. \textit{(The New York Times, 04/02/1980)}

On the 22\textsuperscript{nd}, EMK edges out the Pennsylvania primary. (Clymer, p. 309)

\textbf{May}

EMK wins the District of Columbia primary but loses in eleven states. EMK offers to release his delegates if Carter will agree to a debate. (Clymer, p. 310)

On the 2\textsuperscript{nd}, DNC Chairman White declares the party’s presidential contest resolved and says he will direct DNC efforts under the assumption that Carter will be the nominee. EMK’s campaign challenges White’s assertion that the contest is resolved and calls for White’s resignation. \textit{(The New York Times, 05/02/1980)}

\textbf{June}

On the 3\textsuperscript{rd}, the final day of primaries, EMK wins in New Jersey, California, South Dakota, New Mexico, and Rhode Island. However, Carter’s victories in Ohio, West Virginia, and Montana clinch the nomination. (Clymer, p. 312; \textit{The New York Times, 06/05/1980})

During a White House meeting on the 5\textsuperscript{th}, EMK tells Carter that he would consider releasing his delegates if Carter would agree to a debate. Carter tells EMK he would have the opportunity to present minority planks at the convention. After the meeting, EMK declares that he is still “a candidate for the nomination.” \textit{(The Washington Post, 06/06/1980)} Carter reportedly decides the next day to agree to a debate with EMK, but is talked out of it by his aide Charles Kirbo. (Clymer, pp. 313-314)

\textbf{August}

EMK meets with Representative John B. Anderson (R-IL), who is running as an independent, to ask if he would drop out were EMK to win the nomination. \textit{(The Washington Post, 08/08/1980)}

At the Democratic National Convention, EMK loses a procedural vote that would have permitted delegates to switch their vote on the 11\textsuperscript{th}, effectively ending his campaign. On the 12\textsuperscript{th}, EMK gives a rousing speech defending the liberalism of the Democratic Party and calling for a $12 billion jobs program. While Carter
refuses to support this plank, he announces an economic recovery program that would create new jobs. Subsequently, EMK announces that he will work for the re-election of the president and formally releases his delegates. (Clymer, pp. 316-318; Newsweek, 08/25/1980; The New York Times, 08/16/1980)

In his first speech after the convention on the 21st, EMK urges the American Federation of Teachers to support Carter. After some wrangling, the union agrees to EMK’s request. (The New York Times, 08/22/1980)

On the 25th, EMK meets with Carter at the White House and announces his support for the president’s new economic program. EMK also agrees to campaign for Carter. (The Washington Post, 08/26/1980)

September
Aides to EMK and Carter negotiate for EMK to make approximately six campaign appearances on behalf of the president. EMK’s campaigning is expected to help Carter in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and New York, which are all industrial states where EMK has strong support. EMK also agrees to appeal to Mexican-Americans to support Carter in Texas and to join Carter at a fundraiser in Los Angeles. In exchange for these appearances, Carter will urge Democrats to help EMK pay off his campaign debt. (The New York Times, 09/12/1980)

October
EMK makes several television and radio ads in support of Carter and campaigns for him throughout the month. (The Washington Post, 10/16/1980)

November
On the 4th, Ronald Reagan defeats Carter in the presidential election. Carter wins only 42 percent of the popular vote and 49 electoral votes. (Clymer, p. 319)

1981
Horowitz replaces Richard Burke as EMK’s chief of staff after Burke suffers a nervous breakdown. EMK instructs Horowitz, until he hears otherwise, to proceed as if EMK is going to run for president in 1984. (Clymer, p. 328, 338)

EMK sets up the Fund for a Democratic Majority to raise money for Democratic candidates for Congress.

1982

February
EMK attends a Democratic National Committee fundraiser at the Waldorf-Astoria in New York with other Democratic presidential contenders, including former Vice President Walter Mondale, Senators Gary Hart and John Glenn, and Governor John Y. Brown, Jr. (Clymer, p. 338; The New York Times, 02/02/1982)

June
EMK is the closing speaker in the national midterm Democratic conference in Philadelphia. Interrupted by cheers and applause nearly 60 times in 35 minutes, he touches on the issues that the conference policy statements have established for the campaign, including Social Security, women’s rights, the environment, and a
nuclear weapons freeze. He also emphasizes the unity of the Democratic Party. *(The Washington Post, 06/28/1982)*

**September**

EMK’s new media advisor, Michael Kaye, launches a series of campaign ads featuring longtime friends of EMK talking about how the Senator has dealt with tragedy in his life. *(The New York Times, 09/26/1982)*

**October**

The *Wall Street Journal* reports that EMK has hired new staff, including Bill Carrick, a Democratic official from South Carolina, Ranny Cooper, director of the Women’s Campaign Fund, and Dick Sklar, a San Francisco political activist. *(Clymer, p. 338; Wall Street Journal, 10/05/1982)*


In his last radio address before the election, Reagan states that his economic policies are working and simply need time. EMK responds for the Democrats from the home of a recently unemployed General Motors worker in Massachusetts. He argues that Reagan’s economic policies are ineffective, and accuses the Administration of having a secret plan to cut Social Security after the election. *(The Washington Post, 06/28/1982)*

**November**

Polls in New Hampshire show that EMK’s new ads have reduced people’s concerns about his character. EMK’s advisors see this as a major breakthrough in terms of the 1984 presidential election. *(The Washington Post, 10/08/1982)*

EMK defeats Shamie in the general election with 61 percent of the vote. Some argue the margin of victory signals EMK’s viability as a presidential candidate in 1984. *(Congressional Elections 1946-96, p. 127; The Boston Globe, 02/03/1982)*

EMK meets with family members in Hyannis Port over Thanksgiving to make a final decision about the 1984 presidential race. Present at the meeting are EMK’s children, Kara, Teddy, Jr., and Patrick, as well as Stephen and Jean Kennedy Smith, Patricia Kennedy Lawford, and his nephews, Joseph P. Kennedy II and Stephen Smith, Jr. Horowitz organizes the session. Following his children’s wishes, EMK decides not to run. Robert Shrum prepares a withdrawal statement. *(Clymer, p. 3-8)*

**December**

EMK formally announces that he will not run for president in 1984. While polling data indicates that he could win, EMK says he does not want to put his family through the stress of a campaign. *(The Washington Post, 12/02/1982)*