EDWARD M. KENNEDY ORAL HISTORY PROJECT

Interviewer’s Briefing Materials
Walter Mondale Interview, 03/20/2006

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Miller Center Documents

- Walter Mondale Timeline.
- Walter Mondale Senate Service.
- Open Housing Overview Memo.
- Indian Education Overview Memo.
- Vladivostok Pact Overview Memo.

Secondary Source Materials


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1962

November  Edward M. Kennedy (EMK) is elected to fill his brother John F. Kennedy’s Senate seat.

1964  Walter Fitzgerald Mondale takes over Vice President Hubert Humphrey’s Minnesota Senate seat as a Democrat.

1966  Mondale successfully runs for Senate against Robert A. Forsythe.

Congress reverses its two-year tradition of pro-civil rights legislation and rejects the Johnson administration’s Civil Rights Act of 1966. Among other provisions, the bill would bar all racial discrimination in the sale and rental of housing. The House passes a modified bill after twelve days of debate. However, once in the Senate, the bill fails to a filibuster. Senate Minority Leader Everett Dirksen (R-IL) leads opponents of the bill in attacking the open housing provision as unconstitutional. In September, Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D-MT) finally calls to kill the bill after the failure of two cloture votes to limit debate on the motion to consider the bill. EMK and Mondale voted for cloture both times. The failure of the bill was a stunning setback for the Johnson administration, which had been warned by civil rights leaders in late 1965 that a fair housing bill might generate fatal political opposition. (1966 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1966, pp. 450-472, 898)

1967

February  On the 15th, Johnson proposes to Congress the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1967, a key provision of which is a prohibition on housing discrimination based on race, religion, or national origin. However, the ban is diluted from Johnson’s 1966 proposal, as it is phased in over three years. The third stage, effective January 1, 1969, would include all housing except for noncommercial dwellings owned by religious organizations. If the plan encounters hostility in Congress, proponents will consider dropping this third stage as a compromise. The Senate Judiciary Committee, chaired by civil rights foe James O. Eastland (D-MS), holds the only hearings on the Civil Rights Act of 1967, and the bill is never reported. Mansfield indicates that prospects in 1967 are no better than 1966, and House Minority Leader Gerald Ford (R-MI) continues to express serious reservations about open housing legislation. (1967 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1967, pp. 774-775)
March

Mid-month, Senate proponents of the administration’s civil rights bill split it into separate measures: equal employment opportunity; state jury reform; federal jury reform; federal protection for civil rights workers; and open housing, the latter of which is introduced by Mondale and a bipartisan group of twenty-one other senators. The Senate does not pass the measure in 1967. (1967 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, p. 775)

September

On the 11th, the Senate rejects an amendment by John Williams (R-DE) that would restrict the collection of voluntary campaign contributions by labor unions. EMK and Mondale object to the amendment, fearing that it would restrict the activities of union political arms. (1967 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, pp. 568-569)

1968

Mondale is assigned to the Special Committee on Aging, on which EMK also sits.

January


February

Along with Senator Edward Brooke (R-MA), the only African-American Senator, Mondale on the 6th introduces the open housing legislation as an amendment to HR 2516, the House-passed civil rights protection bill that was introduced in the Senate this same month. Mondale’s amendment is identical to the administration’s 1967 proposal, with the exception of an exemption for owner-occupied dwellings housing up to four families. (1968 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, pp. 156-157)

On the 20th, a majority of senators vote for cloture 55-37 to limit debate on the open housing bill, demonstrating an unexpected level of support, and on the 21st, the Senate rejects 34-58 a motion to kill the bill. EMK and Mondale vote in favor of cloture and against killing the bill. Dirksen opposes the bill in both votes, attributing Mondale’s success as the result of “irritation and a desire to get settled this business.” A second cloture motion is defeated 56-36 on the 26th before a compromise is reached with Dirksen on the 28th and Mondale kills his own bill to allow debate on the compromise. EMK and Mondale had voted in favor of the second cloture motion, and both vote to kill Mondale’s amendment. The compromise bill exempts single-family, owner-occupied housing if it was sold or rented by the owner, and covers about ten percent less housing than the Mondale amendment. (1968 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, pp. 157-160, 3-S)

March

After one defeated cloture motion, the Senate on the 4th finally votes to limit debate on the Dirksen compromise, and the bill is passed 71-20 with amendments
on the 11th. One of the amendments is an EMK-supported provision that applies criminal penalties to individuals transporting firearms or who instruct others in the use of a firearm to be used to cause civil disorder. Some criticize the amendment for being too broad. EMK and Mondale vote in favor of the final bill, but Mondale votes against EMK’s amendment. (1968 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, pp. 7-S, 9-S)

April
The House accepts Senate changes to HR 2516 on the 10th, and the bill is signed into law on the 11th. (1968 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, p. 152)

December

1969
Mondale is assigned to the Labor and Public Welfare Committee and the Select Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs. EMK also serves on both committees.

January

At the end of the month, EMK takes on the chairmanship of the Labor and Public Welfare Committee’s Special Subcommittee on Indian Education in order to complete an inquiry on Indian education needs begun last year by his late brother, Robert F. Kennedy (RFK). (The Washington Post, 01/31/1969)

February
Senator Barry Goldwater (R-AZ) and consumer advocate Ralph Nader tell EMK’s Subcommittee on Indian Education that Indian school boards should be created to run the federally-financed schools administered by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA). (The Washington Post, 02/25/1969)

March

On the 27th, Commissioner of Indian Affairs Robert Bennett tells the Subcommittee on Indian Education that Indian leaders oppose removing Indian education programs from his agency. Bennett agrees with Mondale, who has been
particularly critical of the BIA, that locally elected boards and parental participation in Indian schools are desirable objectives, but says it is not the policy of the BIA to force local school boards onto tribes that do not want them. (*The Washington Post*, 03/28/1969, 04/13/1969)

**April**

On the second weekend of the month, one year after RFK was scheduled to leave on a tour of remote and poverty Eskimo villages in Alaska, EMK leads a congressional delegation on a similar trip as Chairman of the Subcommittee on Indian Education. He is accompanied by Senators Harold Hughes (D-IA), Henry Bellmon (R-OK), George Murphy (R-CA), William Saxbe (R-OH), Ted Stevens (R-AK), and Mondale, as well as Rep. Howard Pollock (R-AK), staff assistants, and members of the press. (*The Washington Post*, 04/06/1969)

On the 11th, one day into EMK’s tour of Alaska, angry Republicans Murphy and Bellmon withdraw from the delegation, claiming that EMK’s tour of Alaskan villages is an “overarranged” political junket. Saxbe does not release a statement, but flies back to Washington, commenting in Chicago that the subcommittee “circus” was a humiliating experience for the Eskimos. Saxbe says he does not blame EMK, but subcommittee staffers who “want to Americanize” the Eskimos. Stevens resists GOP pleas to leave the delegation, and praises the publicity of the trip, claiming that it will draw attention to the situation. EMK calls the departure of Murphy, Bellmon, and Saxbe “regrettable” and comments, “The problem of Indian education, health, and lack of opportunity knows no partisanship.” (*The Washington Post*, 04/11/1969, 04/13/1969)

On EMK’s tour of Alaska, he is told by Eskimos that the BIA is doing an inadequate, unimaginative job managing native schools. Eskimo leaders make repeated requests that the BIA hire and train bilingual teachers, build regional high schools so that children do not have to travel hundreds of miles from home to go beyond the 8th grade, and help with health, housing, and jobs. (*The Washington Post*, 04/13/1969)

**July**

Following an appreciation party held for former members of RFK’s campaign staff, EMK drives his car off a bridge at Chappaquiddick, Massachusetts on the 18th. Mary Jo Kopechne drowns in the accident. EMK does not report the accident for nearly nine hours. Commenting on the political implications of the accident, Mondale later notes, “He took a lot of us with him, because there were no other stars in the sky.” (Clymer, p.149)

**November**

Flanked by Senator Peter Dominick (R-CO) and Mondale, EMK offers sixty recommendations of the Subcommittee on Indian Education. The committee’s report is dedicated to RFK, whose widow, Ethel, is present at the press conference. The Labor and Public Welfare Committee never reports legislation incorporating these recommendations. (*The Washington Post*, 11/13/1969)
May

On the 15th, the Senate Interior and Insular Affairs Committee, which has jurisdiction over the BIA, reports a resolution that would allow the Department of the Interior to contract with state and local education agencies to build or acquire classrooms and other facilities near Indian reservations; specify equal standards of education for Indian and non-Indian students, and encourage boarding schools to be eliminated from the Indian education program at the earliest possible date. The bill is opposed by the Nixon administration. (1970 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., p. 953)

On the 19th, the Indian education bill is passed by voice vote without debate. The House does not take action on the bill this year. (1970 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, p. 953)

August

On the 4th, the Senate adopts conference legislation on an employment compensation extension bill. Senators Jacob Javits (R-NY), Richard Schweiker (R-PA), Saxbe, Mondale, and EMK unsuccessfully try to defeat the conference report, hoping that sending the bill back to conference will result in a provision for the coverage of farm workers. Mondale, who is Chair of the Subcommittee on Migratory Labor, had previously succeeded in extending coverage to migratory workers as well. (1970 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1970, pp. 291-293)

1971

January

On the 21st, EMK loses his second bid for Majority Whip 31-24 to Senator Robert Byrd (D-WV) in a secret vote. When determining whether or not to challenge EMK, Byrd calculated that he could have 28 votes, just enough to win, provided that his dying mentor Senator Richard Russell (D-GA) was still alive. Russell dies just four hours after Byrd wins the election with three more votes than he had anticipated. Most of the potential presidential nominees, including Senators Birch Bayh (D-IN), and George McGovern (D-SD), Muskie, and Hughes, release statements claiming that they voted for EMK. (The New York Times, 01/22/1971)

February

On the 25th, EMK and fifteen other senators introduce the “Indian Education Amendment.” Mondale is a leading cosponsor and remarks that the bill “puts Indian education into the hands not of Indian experts but of expert Indians.” (1971 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1971, p. 583; Clymer, p. 185)

August

On the 3rd, the Labor and Public Welfare Committee unanimously reports an aid-to-education bill that includes provisions from the 1969 report on Indian education, such as providing for Indian participation in planning with federal funds, an amendment to the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) funding educational opportunities for Indian children, and establishing a Bureau
of Indian Education within the Office of Education to take over administration of Indian education programs from the BIA. (*1971 Congressional Quarterly Almanac*, p. 585)

On the 6th, the Indian education provisions are deleted by unanimous consent from the aid-to-education bill before it is passed 51-0. It has been agreed that these provisions will be introduced as a separate bill to be referred directly to the Interior and Labor and Public Welfare committees. EMK and Mondale do not vote on the aid-to-education bill. (*1971 Congressional Quarterly Almanac*, pp. 587, 32-S) The same day, the Indian Education Act is introduced as a separate bill. (*1971 Congressional Quarterly Almanac*, p. 622)

*October*

On the 8th, the Senate approves the Indian Education Act 57-0 without the provision creating a National Board of Indian Education. Several tribes had opposed the provision as fragmenting the BIA. Most of the bill’s provisions apply to the seventy percent of Indian children attending public schools, rather than the thirty percent attending BIA schools. EMK calls the bill a culmination of the work of the Special Subcommittee on Indian Education. EMK and Mondale vote in favor. The House takes no action on the bill in 1971. (*1971 Congressional Quarterly Almanac*, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1971, pp. 622-623, 40-S; Clymer, p. 185)

On the 28th, a “sizable coalition of senators, governors, mayors, and private organizations” unite around a welfare plan that would give more money to the poor and more tax relief to state and local government. Eighteen senators, led by Senator Abraham Ribicoff (D-CT), introduce legislation to bring minimum income to a welfare family in line with the government’s poverty guideline income. This legislation is proposed as an alternative to the Nixon welfare bill. EMK and Mondale are not among the eighteen, but reportedly support the legislation. (*The Washington Post*, 10/29/1971)

1972


*September*

On the 20th, the Senate passes legislation authorizing $5.2 billion over 1973-1975 for the establishment of health maintenance organizations (HMOs) to improve the nation’s health care system by providing pre-paid comprehensive health programs. The legislation, which was introduced by EMK in March, includes a Mondale amendment to provide federal funds to organizations otherwise not eligible under the bill if they are involved in projects to establish HMOs in rural areas. Mondale and EMK vote in favor of the bill. (*1972 Congressional Quarterly Almanac*, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1972, pp. 773-774)

*November*

Mondale is reelected to the Senate, defeating Phil Hansen.

1973

April


July

On the 30th, the Senate passes 82-8 a bill (S. 372) limiting campaign expenditures and contributions and repealing the “equal time” provisions of the Federal Communications Act. EMK and Mondale vote in favor. Senate Minority Leader Hugh Scott (R-PA) and EMK unsuccessfully try to attach provisions for public funding of congressional elections, but their amendment is tabled. EMK and Mondale vote against tabling. Mondale introduces a successful amendment requiring disclosure of names and professions of contributors of more than $100. EMK votes in favor of Mondale’s amendment. (*1973 Congressional Quarterly Almanac*, pp. 744, 748, 53-S, 54-S, 56-S)

Also in 1973, EMK and Rep. Wilbur Mills (D-AR) introduce a bill in Congress calling for a system of comprehensive, universal national health insurance on behalf of a reform advocacy group called the Committee for National Health Insurance, which is organized by the United Auto Workers (UAW) and the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO). However, due to massive opposition, it never makes it out of EMK’s Senate health subcommittee. (Herbert D. Rosenbaum & Alexej Ugrinsky, ed., *The Presidency and Domestic Policies of Jimmy Carter*, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994, p. 794)

November

Frustrated by the lack of action in the House, EMK leads a group of nine senators, including Mondale and Scott, in attaching a broad rider containing S. 372 provisions to HR 11104, a key bill to raise the debt ceiling that is due to expire shortly. The rider includes provisions for the establishment of a Federal Election Campaign Fund; partial public financing of presidential and congressional major party candidates; limiting the use of nonfederal funds for federal campaigns; and the establishment of a matching grant system by which candidates in presidential primaries could receive up to $7 million in spending before the candidate was nominated if they could raise an equal amount in private contributions of less than $100 per person. The matching grant system is the idea of Schweiker and Mondale; other parts of the rider come from legislation proposed by Senators Alan Cranston (D-CA), Robert Stafford (R-VT), Philip Hart (D-MI), Adlai Stevenson (D-IL), and Charles McC. Mathias (R-MD). The House agrees to vote on the debt rider provisions affecting presidential elections if the provisions for congressional elections are dropped, and the bill is sent back to the Senate to be re-worked accordingly. (*1973 Congressional Quarterly Almanac*, pp. 752-754)
December Back in the Senate, S. 372 is caught in a filibuster by Senator James B. Allen (D-AL). The Senate lets the debt limit expire, awaiting two cloture votes. When a motion to kill the bill is made by Wallace Bennett (R-UT), EMK says audibly to Mondale, “I think it’s better this way, Fritz.” Bennett’s motion is defeated, but the Senate eventually passes the bill on the 3rd without any campaign finance provisions after Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D-MT) and Minority Leader Hugh Scott switched positions and supported the dropping of the rider. *(1973 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, pp. 754-755)*

1974

April On the 11th, the Senate passes campaign finance reform legislation setting contribution and spending limits for candidates in federal elections and provides public financing for presidential elections. EMK claims that the Federal Elections Campaign Amendments of 1974 will remove the influence of big money and will return integrity to campaign financing. Two days earlier, an amendment introduced by Senators Robert Taft (R-OH), Pete Domenici (R-NM), Hubert Humphrey (D-MN), J. Glenn Beall (R-MD), Stevenson, Cranston, and Mondale that would establish a mixed public/private system of general election campaign financing was tabled 66-23. After offering two amendments to the Stevenson amendment that would limit the amount of private financing it would permit, EMK voted to table the amendment. EMK claims that the Stevenson amendment removed “one of the most essential parts of the whole campaign reform proposal.” *(1974 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1974, pp. 611, 622, 20-S)*

May On the 20th, the Senate passes legislation extending the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, also altering myriad programs in the original bill. The legislation includes an EMK amendment that reinstates a provision for special grants to poor urban and rural areas, and a Mondale amendment that revises the provision authorizing special grants to states exceeding the national effort index for financing public education. Also adopted by voice vote is an EMK amendment to make certain Indian organizations eligible as sponsors of teacher-training programs for Indians. *(1974 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, pp. 441, 463, 467)*

September On the 19th, the fourth cloture vote on consumer protection agency legislation fails by two votes, killing the bill. Ribicoff, Mondale, and EMK are key proponents. *(1974 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, pp. 307, 313)*

On the 23rd, EMK removes himself from presidential contention. In the wake of Watergate there have been stories published in *The Boston Globe* and *The New York Times* on EMK’s lack of candor about Chappaquiddick. He announces it now “in order to ease the apprehensions within my family about the possibility of my candidacy, as well as to clarify the situation within my party.”
In the first half of the month, Mondale travels to the U.S.S.R. as a potential presidential candidate. Mondale meets with Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, and a number of ministers and local officials. Mondale has brought himself up to speed on strategic arms issues with the help of former Henry Kissinger staffer David Aaron, and spends a considerable amount of time discussing arms reduction. Mondale tells the Soviets that new Soviet missile deployments or emigration shortfalls could spell the end of trade, and indicates that the Strategic Arms Limitation talks (SALT II) at Vladivostok should extend beyond quantitative ceilings to qualitative restrictions on newer, more destructive technologies. The Soviets give him no substantive response, and Mondale is unable to meet with Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, who claims to be indisposed in his preparations for the Vladivostok arms control summit with U.S. President Gerald Ford. (The Washington Post, 11/18/1974, 11/22/1974)

In accordance with the first Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I), U.S.-Soviet disarmament talks have continued for the past two years, resulting in a breakthrough on the 24th at Vladivostok, U.S.S.R. between Ford and Brezhnev. At the meeting, both sides agree to a basic framework for the SALT II agreement, including equal aggregate limits on nuclear delivery vehicles (2400), equal aggregate limits on multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV) systems (1320), and limits on new types of strategic offensive arms.

After spending a year probing his presidential prospects, Mondale declares, “I found I did not have the overwhelming desire to be President which is essential for the kind of campaign that is required.” He also famously remarks that the idea of spending another whole year in Holiday Inns was appalling to him. (Lasky, p. 181)

On the 12th, Mathias, Mondale, and EMK introduce a resolution expressing broad support for the Vladivostok arms control agreement, yet calling for Ford to push for lower ceilings. Vladivostok has been met with extreme disapproval from Senator Henry Jackson (D-WA), who calls the U.S. and Soviet long-range bomber and missile ceilings in the pact “astonishingly high.” Soviet leaders express surprise and dismay at the negative reaction to the pact in Washington. Thus far, the Ford administration has planned to submit the pact as a majority agreement requiring a majority vote in both houses. However, the Mathias-Mondale-EMK resolution asks the administration to submit the pact as a treaty, which would require a two-thirds Senate vote. (The New York Times, 12/13/1974, 01/30/1975; The Washington Post, 12/29/1974)

On the 26th, Mathias announces that Secretary of State Kissinger has quietly modified the Vladivostok text in order to avoid a congressional battle. Mathias
has been in negotiations with Kissinger, and says that he, Mondale, and EMK intend to re-introduce their resolution in January. *(The Washington Post, 12/29/1974)*

On the 12th, at the National Press Club in Washington, Georgia Governor Jimmy Carter formally announces his candidacy for president.

**1975**

*January*  
On the 17th, Mathias, Mondale, and EMK re-introduce their resolution expressing support for Vladivostok but pressing Ford to lower weapons ceilings. The three senators believe that the resolution, worked out between Senate staffers and State Department officials, is important because it could bolster domestic political support for détente; pre-empt and weaken Jackson; and support those in the Ford administration who believe that the final SALT II treaty must encompass force reductions or meet Senate opposition. Mathias states that he and his colleagues are exploring new constitutional forms for expressing the will of the Senate without binding the president. Kissinger “welcomes” the resolution. *(The New York Times, 01/18/1975)*

On the 29th, Ford tells American negotiators to work out a formal arms control deal with the U.S.S.R. according to the principles established at Vladivostok last year. According to administration officials, Ford has rejected congressional calls to reduce the ceiling on offensive nuclear weapons in the lead-up to the formal talks in Geneva, yet officials also claim that Mathias, EMK, and others have reached an agreement with Kissinger whereby they would support a final agreement if negotiations are undertaken immediately afterward to lower ceilings and curb weapons development. Kissinger is said to believe that the Geneva negotiations will be difficult and should not be complicated to lower ceilings beyond levels agreed to at Vladivostok. *(The New York Times, 01/30/1975)*

*June*  
On the 26th, the Senate passes 94-0 compromise housing legislation that includes a Mondale amendment to include jobless homeowners in the program and an EMK amendment requesting that the Department of Housing and Urban Development process applications for a loan program to aid development of housing for the elderly. *(1975 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1975, pp. 431-432)*

**1976**

*June*  
On the 10th, Senator Gaylord Nelson (D-WI), Mondale, and EMK introduce their own “reform” amendments to a current tax reform bill under debate, claiming that the tax code and existing legislation under debate does not do enough to close loopholes for the wealthy. *(1976 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1976, p. 50)*
July  
On the 1st, the Senate passes 88-0 legislation developing an allocation scheme for advanced training of doctors in medical specialties. EMK is a leading supporter, and in order to avoid a floor fight, he even allows a compromise provision by Javits that would require medical schools to reserve a given percentage of their residencies in training hospitals for primary care. The Javits amendment passes 51-5, with EMK voting in favor and Mondale against. (1976 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, pp. 525, 531, 51-S)

At the last day of the Democratic National Convention in New York on the 15th, EMK visits the Massachusetts delegation to tell them to support Carter. While there, he also praises Mondale as the vice presidential pick, calling him “a good friend of mine.” (Clymer, p. 248)

August
On the 6th, the Senate passes legislation 49-22 to reform the tax code. Liberals claim that loopholes for the wealthy still exist. EMK votes against the legislation; Mondale does not vote. (1976 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, pp. 51, 69-S)

On the 31st, Mondale rails against the Ford and Nixon administrations for their “scandalous” records on arms sales and suggesting that a special session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission be convened. He goes on to say that “even a good agreement based on Vladivostok will not put much of a dent in the arms race” because of the high ceilings in the agreement and a lack of qualitative restrictions. (The New York Times, 08/31/1976)

November
Carter defeats Ford in the presidential election. Mondale is elected vice-president.

1977

April
James R. Schlesinger, Carter’s energy adviser, presents the National Energy Plan which is to be the administration’s response to the ongoing energy crisis. Rather than embracing outright deregulation of natural gas prices (a campaign promise), it creates a complex formula for interstate gas price control. An even more intricate system for oil pricing is proposed. The idea is to raise energy prices without having to deal with the politically explosive issue of price decontrol. However, Mondale has serious reservations about the plan. Among other things, he fears the reaction from organized labor, an essential constituency for the administration. Mondale, along with several others, urges Carter to delay the announcement of the plan to allow for further consideration of the pricing apparatus. Carter ignores the advice and appears in Congress ninety-one days after Inauguration where he outlines the most sweeping energy proposal in U.S. history. (Gary M. Fink and Hugh Davis Graham, eds., The Carter Presidency: Policy Choices in the Post-New Deal Era, Lawerence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1998, pp. 168-169)

September Carter responds to questions about Mondale’s power in his administration by stating that Mondale has played a crucial role in the SALT II talks. Carter says that he always consults Mondale before National Security Council meetings on the subject, although “when we get into negotiations with Gromyko on SALT, Fritz doesn’t intrude unless I ask him. But I also turn to him and ask if he has anything to add.” When Carter entered office, he placed a renewed emphasis on SALT II with a comprehensive interagency review and further negotiations based on the Vladivostok accord. The U.S. made two proposals to the Soviets in March 1977, both of which the USSR rejects based on its understanding of the Vladivostok accord. Further high-level meetings are held in Washington and Moscow from 1977 to 1979. (*The Washington Post*, 09/29/1977)

November Califano finally provides Carter with numerous national health insurance alternatives. Bourne and Stuart Eizenstat negotiate with EMK to obtain a compromise. (Rosenbaum, p. 794)

1978

July After meeting with Carter to discuss the national health care bill, EMK calls a press conference to denounce the administration’s proposal and announce he will introduce his own bill. (Charles O. Jones, *The Trusteeship Presidency*, Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1988, p. 164; Rosenbaum, p. 795)

October EMK starts holding hearings on deregulating the trucking industry. Carter simultaneously is working on the same issue, but is being opposed by the American Trucking Association and the Teamsters Union. The Carter administration subsequently agrees to work with EMK on the issue. (Haas, p. 71)

November On the 10th, Carter signs the NEP into law. Critics charge that the legislation has been changed drastically from its original form and no longer represents a redirection of the nation’s energy policy. EMK urges a veto, denouncing the legislation as an invitation to the oil companies to gouge the public. (Fink, pp. 167-68; Haas, p. 71)

December The moderate success of the NEP is soon eclipsed by the turbulence in Iran alongside OPEC’s announcement on the 17th that it will raise oil export prices by 14.5% during the coming year, leading many to call for new energy policies.
The Democrats gather in Memphis from the 8th to the 10th to hold their midterm conference. Carter’s long opening speech draws polite applause, whereas EMK draws cheers with a fiery, albeit indirect, attack on the administration’s emphasis on military spending at the expense of programs for the poor. Observers conclude this is an early warning signal of EMK’s challenge in 1980. Speaking in Carter’s defense, Mondale warns the Democrats that unless they support the president’s austerity measures, inflation will sweep them from office in 1980. (Haas, p. 79)

1979

January

EMK assembles a coalition of industry-associated groups to support deregulation of the trucking industry. He sponsors the administration’s bill and testifies on its behalf. By July 1980, Carter signs the bill into law. (Haas, p. 73)

Carter presents the fiscal budget for 1980 to Congress, calling for sharp cuts in domestic spending such as programs on housing and jobs, as well as Medicare and Social Security in order to curb inflation. The budget also contains a 3% increase in military spending. EMK is highly critical and accuses Carter of being insensitive to the poor and not responsive to traditional Democratic concerns. (Haas, p. 95)

March


On the 19th, Carter conducts a day-long meeting at Camp David on the urgent energy situation. (Fink, p. 168)

April

Carter addresses the nation to introduce a second round of energy policy initiatives, stating that he will phase in the gradual decontrol of oil prices beginning on June 1 with all controls to be lifted by September 31, 1981. EMK calls the move “an unnecessary self-inflicted wound.” Unfortunately for Carter, energy prices and inflation continue to rise throughout May and June. Average gasoline prices increase by 55% from January to June 1979. (Fink, pp. 170-171)

May

EMK introduces a comprehensive labor-backed health insurance bill. (Gillon, p. 255)

Mondale reportedly considers not running with Carter for reelection because of private reservations he has about some of Carter’s policy choices. (Richard Harwood, ed., The Pursuit of the Presidency 1980, Washington, D.C.: The
July

On the 4th, Mondale writes a memo to Carter responding negatively to several drafts of the energy speech he has seen. He warns Carter against blaming the American people and argues for an inspiring, optimistic we-can-do-this tone as opposed to sounding “too much like an old scold and a groucher.” (Horowitz, pp. 94-96)

On the 15th, Carter performs his “Energy and National Goals” speech, later dubbed the “crisis of confidence” speech or the “malaise speech.” According to Haas, EMK takes issue with the negative tone of the speech, allegedly leading him closer to challenging Carter in 1980. (Haas, p. 117; Horowitz, p. viii)

The initial boost in the polls generated by the speech is supplanted by disapproval as Carter initiates a clumsy shake-up of his Cabinet by asking everyone to resign so he can accept some of their resignations. (Horowitz, pp. 25-27)

September

On the 7th, EMK informs Carter at a White House lunch that he will run for president. Later, when EMK and Mondale discuss EMK’s decision to enter the race, Mondale reportedly replies, “I don’t intend to leave voluntarily…. This is going to get rough, and I’m sorry about it.” Gillon relays the following quote from an interview with Mondale: “Ted, I’m sorry for you and I’m sorry for us and I’m sorry for the Democrats, because I’ve been through so many of these fights. As civil as you and I think this is going to be, it won’t. We don’t intend to leave voluntarily. You wouldn’t. And the Republicans are going to benefit from this.” Mondale later notes: “Kennedy and I had worked together for twenty years. The task of having to turn on an old friend and having him turn on us and to tear the party apart was terrible.” (Clymer, p. 284, 288; Gillon, p. 270; The New York Times, 09/12/1979)

EMK announces that Joan and Rose Kennedy no longer object to his running for president in 1980, signaling his likely entrance into the race. (“Chapter 3: Why Do You Want to Be President?”)

November

On the 4th, militant Iranian students seize the American Embassy in Teheran and take sixty-three Americans hostage.

Later that same day, Roger Mudd’s interview with EMK is broadcast on CBS Reports. Carter had reportedly been upset with CBS for giving EMK unequal airtime. However, the reaction to EMK’s performance in the press is very negative after EMK fails to provide clear answers to questions on Chappaquiddick, his relationship with his wife, and why he wants to be president. (Clymer, pp. 285-287, 291; The Washington Post, 11/07/1979; Wall Street Journal, 11/09/1979)


**December**

EMK draws heavy criticism during the hostage crisis for suggesting that the deposed shah “ran one of the most violent regimes in the history of mankind.” (The New York Times, 12/04/1979) Both Democrats and Republicans attack EMK’s comments for indicating support for Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. EMK responds that his remarks were not meant to weaken Carter’s efforts to gain safe release of the hostages. (Clymer, p. 295)

In mid-December, Mondale warns Carter that they might lose Iowa to EMK. (Clymer, p. 296)

On Christmas Day, the U.S.S.R. invades Afghanistan. The crises in Afghanistan and Iran create a “rally around the flag” effect, boosting Carter’s ratings. Carter decides to not campaign and reverses his earlier decision to debate EMK. Mondale is made the administration’s campaigner, but he refuses to act the role of “heavy.” He never criticizes EMK personally and does not discuss Chappaquiddick. Throughout the spring, Mondale performs the brunt of the campaign duties and receives rave reviews for it. According to one White House aide, “He’s the greatest surrogate in history. To a large degree, our political success has been due to him.” (Gillon, p. 276)

**1980**

EMK and Mondale publicly differ over Carter’s decision to impose a grain embargo on the U.S.S.R. after the invasion of Afghanistan, stating “A weak foreign policy can’t be redeemed by suddenly getting tough on farmers.” Even though Mondale privately agrees with EMK, he goes after him for “engaging in politics of the moment.” EMK keeps criticizing Carter, and Mondale at one point replies that supporting Carter once the decision had been made is “the patriotic route to take.” When asked by a reporter whether he is accusing EMK of being unpatriotic, Mondale replies, “I’ve said what I’ve said.” (Clymer, p. 300; Gillon, p. 274; Haas, p. 112)
January

On the 21st, Carter wins the Iowa caucuses with 59 percent of precinct delegates. EMK comes in second with only 31 percent of the delegates. Despite the extent of the loss, EMK pledges to continue his campaign. (Clymer, pp. 300-301)

On the 29th, EMK gives a speech at Georgetown University that reveals a change in campaign strategy. In addition to attacking Carter’s foreign policy towards Iran and the Soviet Union, EMK emphasizes more liberal themes such as wage-price controls and regulation of oil. EMK’s return to liberal themes is reportedly an attempt to justify EMK’s challenge to Carter. Throughout the spring, Mondale counters by repeatedly invoking Hubert Humphrey to contrast with EMK’s liberalism and to refute EMK’s charges that the Carter administration is not progressive enough. (Gillon, p. 276; Clymer, p. 301; The New York Times, 01/30/1980)

February

Carter defeats EMK in the New Hampshire primary on the 26th. Democratic National Committee (DNC) Chairman John C. White calls Dudley Dudley, the principal organizer of EMK’s campaign there, and congratulates him on the campaign. White continually makes attempts to mend fences between the Carter and EMK campaigns, and calls EMK campaign aides after each primary or caucus to congratulate them and discuss the importance of party unity. (The New York Times, 02/27/1980, 06/03/1980)

March

EMK assails the Carter administration for voting for a United Nations Security Council resolution on the 1st rebuking Israel for establishing settlements in Jerusalem and on the West Bank. When Mondale mentions Carter’s name the next day at a Young Israel banquet, the crowd boos. (Clymer, p. 306)

On the 4th, EMK wins the Massachusetts primary. Carter wins in Vermont. (The New York Times, 03/05/1980)

Carter wins the Illinois primary on the 18th, taking 155 delegates to EMK’s 11. Commentators speculate that Chicago Mayor Jan Byrne’s endorsement may have been a liability for EMK. (Clymer, pp. 303-304; The New York Times, 03/19/1980)


April


On the 22nd, EMK edges out Carter in the Pennsylvania primary. (Clymer, p. 309)

May

EMK wins the District of Columbia primary but loses in eleven states. EMK offers to release his delegates if Carter will agree to a debate. (Clymer, p. 310)
On the 2\textsuperscript{nd}, DNC Chairman White declares the party’s presidential contest resolved and says he will direct DNC efforts under the assumption that Carter will be the nominee. EMK’s campaign challenges White’s assertion that the contest is resolved and calls for White’s resignation. \textit{(The New York Times, 05/02/1980)}

\textbf{June}

On the 3\textsuperscript{rd}, the final day of primaries, EMK wins in New Jersey, California, South Dakota, New Mexico, and Rhode Island. However, Carter’s victories in Ohio, West Virginia, and Montana clinch the nomination. \textit{(Clymer, p. 312; The New York Times, 06/05/1980)}

During a White House meeting on the 5\textsuperscript{th}, EMK tells Carter that he would consider releasing his delegates if Carter would agree to a debate. Carter tells EMK he would have the opportunity to present minority planks at the convention. After the meeting, EMK declares that he is still “a candidate for the nomination.” \textit{(The Washington Post, 06/06/1980)} Carter reportedly decides the next day to agree to a debate with EMK, but is persuaded against it by Mondale and Charles Kirbo. \textit{(Clymer, pp. 313-314)}

\textbf{July}

On the 1\textsuperscript{st}, Carter signs EMK’s major legislative success of the year, the trucking industry deregulation bill, into law. EMK is invited to the White House and they appear together in public for the first time all year.

\textbf{August}

At the Democratic National Convention, EMK loses a procedural vote that would have permitted delegates to switch their vote on the 11\textsuperscript{th}, effectively ending his campaign. On the 12\textsuperscript{th}, EMK gives a rousing speech defending the liberalism of the Democratic Party and calling for a $12 billion jobs program. Carter rejects EMK’s specific plan but announces his own economic recovery program to create new jobs. Subsequently, EMK announces that he will work for the re-election of the president and formally releases his delegates. \textit{(Clymer, pp. 316-318; Newsweek, 08/25/1980; The New York Times, 08/16/1980)}

On the 25\textsuperscript{th}, EMK meets with Carter at the White House and announces his support for the president’s new economic program. EMK also agrees to campaign for Carter. \textit{(The Washington Post, 08/26/1980)}

\textbf{September}

Aides to EMK and Carter negotiate for EMK to make approximately six campaign appearances on behalf of the president. EMK’s campaigning is expected to help Carter in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and New York, which are all industrial states where EMK has strong support. EMK also agrees to appeal to Mexican-Americans to support Carter in Texas and to join Carter at a fundraiser in Los Angeles. In exchange for these appearances, Carter will urge Democrats to help EMK pay off his campaign debt. \textit{(The New York Times, 09/12/1980)}

\textbf{October}

EMK makes several television and radio ads in support of Carter and campaigns for him throughout the month. \textit{(The Washington Post, 10/16/1980)}
November  Reagan defeats Carter on the 4th.

1982  EMK aides work with aides to Mondale to tilt the nominating rules away from outsiders. (Clymer, p. 4)

November  EMK calls Mondale on the day after Thanksgiving to let him know of his decision not to run for the Democratic presidential nomination. EMK jokes that after campaigning with Mondale in Boston in the fall, EMK knows he can’t beat him. Mondale inherits most of EMK’s support. Some polls show as much as a fifteen point boost following EMK’s withdrawal. (Clymer, p. 7; Gillon, p. 316)

1984  Mondale seeks EMK’s endorsement after he wins the Iowa caucus, but EMK remains neutral until it is clear Mondale has the delegates to win the nomination. EMK later gets involved to prevent a challenge of the rules at the convention by Hart and the Reverend Jesse Jackson. (Clymer, p. 359)

June  On the 25th, EMK endorses Mondale in St. Paul, MN, stating, “He has been there for two decades at the center of the long struggle in our generation for civil rights and social justice.” (Clymer, p. 360)

July  At the Democratic National Convention in San Francisco EMK introduces Mondale. He goes on to campaign for Mondale that fall. (Clymer, p. 360)

Mondale’s acceptance speech quotes Harry Truman: “A President cannot always be popular…. He has to be able to say yes and no, and more often no to most of the propositions that are put up to him by partisan groups and special interests who are always pulling at the White House for one thing or another.” (Fink, p. 22) Mondale chooses Rep. Geraldine A. Ferraro (D-NY) as his vice presidential candidate, the first female candidate on a major presidential ticket in American history. When Mondale loses to Reagan he returns to private practice with the Minneapolis law firm Dorsey & Whitney.


1998  Mondale serves as U.S. Representative to Indonesia.

2002  Mondale takes over the late Paul Wellstone’s Senate campaign at the age of 74, losing narrowly to St. Paul Mayor Norm Coleman (R-MN).
OPEN HOUSING

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From 1966 to 1968, Mondale was a key ally of the Lyndon B. Johnson administration in its battle to get open housing legislation passed by Congress. While there is less evidence of direct EMK participation in these legislative initiatives, EMK always voted on the side of the administration. Open housing legislation was finally passed in 1968.

In 1966, Congress reversed its two-year tradition of pro-civil rights legislation and rejected the Johnson administration’s Civil Rights Act of 1966. Among other provisions, the bill barred all racial discrimination in the sale and rental of housing. The House passed the bill after twelve days of debate, during which it heavily modified the open housing provision as follows:

- One to four family homes were to be exempted from the discrimination ban.
- An amendment by Rep. Charles Mathias (R-MD) would permit a real estate agent to follow the written instructions of an exempted homeowner, even if discriminatory.

However, once in the Senate, the bill fell to a filibuster. Senate Minority Leader Everett Dirksen (R-IL) led opponents of the bill in attacking the open housing provision as unconstitutional. For the successful 1964 and 1965 civil rights legislation, a coalition of Northern Democrats and Republicans had united to vote for cloture; in 1966, this coalition had disintegrated, possibly due to the nature of the civil rights movement that year, which had become somewhat violent and appeared to lack clear goals and direction. In September 1966, Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D-MT) finally killed the bill after the failure of two cloture votes to limit debate on the motion to consider the bill. EMK and Mondale voted for cloture both times. The failure of the bill was a stunning setback for the Johnson administration, which had been warned by civil rights leaders in late 1965 that a fair housing bill might generate fatal political opposition.

In February 1967, Johnson proposed to Congress the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1967, a key provision of which was a prohibition on housing discrimination based on race, religion, or national origin. However, the ban was diluted from Johnson’s 1966 proposal, as it was phased in over three years.

- The first stage of the ban, effective with enactment, would cover federally assisted housing, about three to four percent of homes. This ban on discrimination was already in effect from a 1962 executive order given by President John F. Kennedy.
- The second stage, effective January 1, 1968, would incorporate dwellings sold by someone other than their occupant and dwellings for five or more families, a provision roughly equivalent to that in the 1966 bill passed by the House. This would increase the bills coverage to thirty to forty percent of homes.
- The third stage, effective January 1, 1969, would include all housing except for noncommercial dwellings owned by religious organizations. If the plan encountered hostility in Congress, proponents considered dropping this third stage as a compromise.
The Senate Judiciary Committee, chaired by civil rights foe James O. Eastland (D-MS), held the only hearings on the Civil Rights Act of 1967, and the bill was never reported. Mansfield indicated that prospects for the passage of housing discrimination legislation in 1967 were no better than 1966, and House Minority Leader Gerald Ford (R-MI) continued to express serious reservations about open housing legislation. In mid-March, Senate proponents of the bill split it into separate measures: equal employment opportunity; state jury reform; federal jury reform; federal protection for civil rights workers; and open housing, the latter of which was introduced by Mondale and a bipartisan group of twenty-one other senators. The Senate did not pass the measure in 1967.

In January 1968, Johnson presented his annual civil rights message to Congress, requesting that five measures be enacted: open housing, civil rights protection, enforcement powers for the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and reform of state and federal jury selection procedures. Most observers were not optimistic about the prospects for the passage of open housing legislation. Along with Senator Edward Brooke (R-MA), the only African-American Senator, on February 6th, Mondale introduced the open housing legislation as an amendment to HR 2516, the House-passed civil rights protection bill that was introduced in the Senate that same month. Mondale’s amendment was identical to the administration’s 1967 proposal, with the exception of an exemption for owner-occupied dwellings housing up to four families. On February 20th, a majority of senators voted for cloture to limit debate on the bill, demonstrating an unexpected level of support, and on the 21st, the Senate rejected 34-58 a motion to kill the bill. Dirksen opposed the bill in both votes, attributing Mondale’s success as the result of “irritation and a desire to get settled this business.” A second cloture motion was defeated 56-36 on the 26th before a compromise was reached with Dirksen on the 28th and Mondale killed his own bill to allow for debate on the compromise.

The compromise bill exempted single-family, owner-occupied housing if it was sold or rented by the owner, and covered about ten percent less housing than the Mondale amendment. After one defeated cloture motion, the Senate on March 4th finally voted to limit debate on the Dirksen compromise, and the bill was passed with amendments 71-20 on March 11th. One of the amendments was an EMK-supported provision introduced by Senator Russell Long (D-LA) that applied criminal penalties to individuals transporting firearms or who instruct others in the use of a firearm to be used to cause civil disorder. Some criticized the amendment for being too broad. EMK and Mondale voted in favor of the final bill, but Mondale voted against the firearms amendment.

The House accepted the Senate amendments to HR 2516 on April 10th, and the bill was signed into law on April 11th, 1968.
After the assassination of RFK, an early champion of Indian education issues in the Senate, EMK assumed RFK’s chairmanship of the Labor and Public Welfare Committee’s Special Subcommittee on Indian Education to oversee the completion of a comprehensive study of Indian education issues. By the time EMK became Chairman in January 1969, the committee had already compiled some 2500 pages of testimony from nationwide hearings on educational opportunities for 150,000 Indian children on and off federal reservations.

As hearings continued during the spring of 1969, disagreement emerged over the proper role of the federal Board of Indian Affairs (BIA), which directly managed Indian schools funded by the federal government. Critics such as Ralph Nader, Senator Barry Goldwater (R-AZ), Mondale, and EMK expressed concern that Indian populations did not have enough input into their educational system, and suggested that BIA authority should be devolved to Indian school boards. The BIA fired back, claiming that most tribes did not want Indian school boards, fearing that they were unprepared for the responsibility. The hearings culminated in a well-publicized congressional fact-finding mission to poor Alaskan Eskimo villages in April 1969. The bipartisan mission was led by EMK, who was accompanied by Senators Harold Hughes (D-IA), Henry Bellmon (R-OK), George Murphy (R-CA), William Saxbe (R-OH), Ted Stevens (R-AK), and Mondale, as well as Rep. Howard Pollock (R-AK), staff assistants, and members of the press. One day into the mission, Murphy, Bellmon, and Saxbe refused to continue, claiming that the visit was an orchestrated political junket. During the visit, Eskimo leaders told the delegation that the BIA was doing an inadequate, unimaginative job managing native schools, and made repeated requests that the BIA hire and train bilingual teachers and build regional high schools so that children would not have to travel hundreds of miles from home to go beyond the 8th grade.

In November 1969, the Subcommittee on Indian Education released its report, which was dedicated to RFK, and sixty recommendations. At the press conference, EMK was flanked by Senator Peter Dominick (R-CO) and Mondale. However, because the BIA was not within its jurisdiction, the Labor and Public Welfare Committee did not report legislation incorporating these recommendations. Rather, in May 1970, the Interior and Insular Affairs Committee reported a resolution that would have:

- Allowed the Department of the Interior to contract with state and local education agencies to build or acquire classrooms and other facilities near Indian reservations.
- Specified equal standards of education for Indian and non-Indian students.
- Encouraged boarding schools to be eliminated from the Indian education program at the earliest possible date.

The bill was opposed by the Nixon administration, but it was passed by voice vote. The House took no action on the bill in 1970.
In February 1971, EMK, Mondale, and thirteen other senators introduced the “Indian Education Amendment,” and in August, the Labor and Public Welfare Committee attached similar Indian education provisions to an expansive aid-to-education bill. These included:

- Incentives for Indian participation in planning that employed federal funds.
- An amendment to the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) to provide funds improving educational opportunities for Indian children.
- The establishment of a Bureau of Indian Education within the Office of Education to take over administration of Indian education programs from the BIA.

The aid-to-education bill was unanimously approved by the Senate under the condition that the Indian education provisions were deleted from the aid-to-education bill and reintroduced separately. The separate bill, called the Indian Education Act of 1971, was approved 57-0 in October 1971 without the provision establishing a Bureau of Indian Education. Some Indian groups had opposed this provision, fearing fragmentation of the BIA. Thus, the legislation primarily affected the 70% of Indian students attending public, rather than BIA, schools. Both EMK and Mondale voted for the legislation, and EMK called the bill a culmination of the work of the Special Subcommittee on Indian Education. The House did not act on the Senate bill in 1971.
1973-1974 Senate Campaign Finance Reform Bills
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In February 1972, President Richard Nixon signed the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) into law. FECA contained the following key provisions:

- The retention of an “equal time” requirement of the Communications Act of 1934 (note: the Senate version of FECA contained a repeal of “equal time,” but it was dropped in the conference report).
- Limits on the amount of advertising money that could be spent by congressional and presidential candidates to ten cents per eligible voter.
- More stringent requirements for public disclosure of campaign spending and contributions.

Partially motivated by the Watergate scandal, in July 1973 the Senate passed by an 82-8 vote S. 372, which contained the following key provisions:

- Limiting all campaign spending for federal elections to twenty-five cents per eligible voter.
- Repealing radio and television “equal time” requirements for presidential and vice-presidential candidates.

EMK and Senate Minority Leader Hugh Scott (R-PA) unsuccessfully tried to attach provisions for public funding of congressional elections, but their amendment was tabled; Mondale voted against tabling. In addition, Mondale introduced a successful amendment requiring the disclosure of names and professions of contributors of more than $100; EMK voted in favor of Mondale’s amendment. EMK and Mondale voted in favor of the final bill.

The House Administration Elections Subcommittee held hearings on S. 372 during the fall of 1973 at a sluggish pace, and subcommittee chairman John Dent (D-PA) and committee chairman Wayne Hays (D-OH) made it clear that they intended to rewrite the bill. Hays was strongly against the public financing of campaigns. Frustrated by the lack of action in the House, in November EMK led a group of nine senators, including Mondale and Scott, in attaching a broad rider containing S. 372 provisions to HR 11104, a key bill to raise the debt ceiling that was due to expire shortly. The rider included provisions for:

- Establishment of a Federal Election Campaign Fund.
- Providing 15 cents per eligible voter for each major party candidate in a presidential election; 15 cents per voting age constituent or $175,000, whichever was greater, to major party Senate nominees; 15 cents per voting age constituent or $90,000, whichever was greater, to major party House nominees.
- Sharply limiting the use of nonfederal funds for federal campaigns and provide that they be channeled through state or national parties.
- Establish a matching grant system by which candidates in presidential primaries could receive up to $7 million in spending before the candidate was nominated if they could raise an equal amount in private contributions of less than $100 per person.
The matching grant system was the idea of Senator Richard Schweiker (R-PA) and Mondale; other parts of the rider came from legislation proposed by Senators Alan Cranston (D-CA), Robert Stafford (R-VT), Philip Hart (D-MI), Adlai Stevenson (D-IL), and Charles McC. Mathias (R-MD).

The House agreed to vote on the debt rider provisions affecting presidential elections if the provisions for congressional elections were dropped, and the bill was sent back to the Senate to be re-worked accordingly. However, in the Senate the bill was caught in a filibuster by Senator James B. Allen (D-AL). The Senate let the debt limit expire, awaiting two cloture votes. When a motion to kill the bill was made by Wallace Bennett (R-UT), EMK said audibly to Mondale, “I think it’s better this way, Fritz.” Bennett’s motion was defeated, but the Senate eventually passed the bill in December without any campaign finance provisions after Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D-MT) and Scott switched positions and supported the dropping of the rider.

In April 1974, the Senate passed the Federal Elections Campaign Amendments of 1974, campaign finance reform legislation setting contribution and spending limits for candidates in federal elections and providing public financing for presidential elections. An amendment to the bill introduced by Senators Adlai Stevenson (D-IL), Robert Taft (R-OH), Pete Domenici (R-NM), Alan Cranston (D-CA), Hubert Humphrey (D-MN), J. Glenn Beall (R-MD), and Mondale that would establish a mixed public/private system of general election campaign financing was tabled 66-23. After offering two amendments to the Stevenson amendment that would limit the amount of private financing it would permit, EMK voted to table the amendment. EMK claimed that the Stevenson amendment removed “one of the most essential parts of the whole campaign reform proposal.” EMK lauded the final bill as removing the influence of big money and returning integrity to campaign financing.

The 1974 FECA amendments included provisions for:

- Contribution limits of $1000 per individual for each primary, runoff, and general election, and an aggregate contribution of $25,000 to all federal candidates annually; $5000 to candidates per organization per election, with no aggregate limit on contributions to party organizations supporting federal candidates.
- Spending limits of $10 million for presidential primaries; $20 million for the presidential general election; $100,000 for Senate primaries or 8 cents per eligible voter; $150,000 for Senate general elections or 12 cents per eligible voter; $70,000 each for House primaries and general elections.
- Voluntary public financing of presidential general elections, for which major party candidates automatically qualify; matching funds for presidential primaries; and the establishment of the Presidential Election Campaign Fund.

The Vladivostok Pact was an early breakthrough during the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II) between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. that began in November 1972. The goal of SALT II was to replace the SALT I Interim Agreement, a five-year plan covering major aspects of strategic weaponry, with a long-term comprehensive treaty providing broad limits on strategic offensive weapons systems.

During the second week of November 1974, Mondale traveled to the U.S.S.R. as a potential presidential candidate. Mondale met with Soviet premier Alexei Kosygin, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, and a number of ministers and local officials. Mondale had brought himself up to speed on strategic arms issues with the help of former Kissinger staffer David Aaron, and spent a considerable amount of time discussing arms reduction. Mondale told the Soviets that new Soviet missile deployments or emigration shortfalls could spell the end of trade, and indicated that the SALT II talks at Vladivostok should extend beyond quantitative ceilings to qualitative restrictions on newer, more destructive technologies. The Soviets gave him no substantive response, and Mondale was unable to meet with Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, who claimed to be indisposed in his preparations for the Vladivostok arms control summit with U.S. President Gerald Ford. Brezhnev had met with EMK the prior spring.

On November 24, 1974 at Vladivostok, USSR, Ford and Brezhnev agreed to a basic SALT II framework that would impose the following restrictions through 1985:

- 2400 equal aggregate limit on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, such as intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers.
- 1320 equal aggregate limit on multiple independently-targeted re-entry vehicle (MIRV) systems, which allow the mounting of multiple nuclear weapons onto one warhead.
- A ban on the construction of new land-based ICBM launchers.
- Limits on deployment of new types of strategic offensive arms.

Soviet leaders expressed surprise and dismay at the negative reaction to the pact in Washington. The most ardent critic of the pact was Senator Henry Jackson (D-WA), who called the U.S. and Soviet long-range bomber and missile ceilings in the pact “astonishingly high.” On December 12th, 1974, Senator Charles McC. Mathias (R-MD), Mondale, and EMK introduced a resolution expressing broad support for the Vladivostok arms control agreement, but calling for Ford to (1) push for lower ceilings, and (2) submit the pact as a treaty, which would require a two-thirds Senate vote. The Ford administration had initially planned to submit the pact as a majority agreement requiring a majority vote in both houses. Mathias stated that he and his colleagues were exploring new constitutional forms for expressing the will of the Senate without binding the president. The three senators believed that the resolution, worked out between Senate staffers and State Department officials, is important because it could:

- Bolster domestic political support for détente.
• Pre-empt and weaken Jackson.
• Support those in the Ford administration who believe that the final SALT II treaty must encompass force reductions or meet Senate opposition.

On December 24th, 1974, Mathias, who had been negotiating with Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, announced that Kissinger had quietly modified the Vladivostok text in order to avoid a congressional battle. On January 17th, 1975, Mathias, Mondale, and EMK re-introduced their December 1974 resolution. In late January 1975, however, Ford told American negotiators to work out a formal deal with the U.S.S.R. according to the principles established at Vladivostok, rejecting congressional calls to reduce the ceiling on offensive nuclear weapons. Kissinger was said to believe that the Geneva negotiations would be difficult and should not be complicated by lowering ceilings beyond those levels agreed to at Vladivostok. However, administration officials claimed that Mathias, EMK, and others had reached a deal with Kissinger whereby they would support a final agreement if negotiations were undertaken immediately afterward to lower ceilings and curb weapons development. When formal SALT II negotiations resumed in Geneva in early 1975, the most fundamental disagreements between the two parties were the classification of cruise missiles and the Soviet bomber known as “Backfire.”

As he entered the realm of presidential politics, Mondale remained involved in the SALT II talks. In August 1976, Mondale railed the Ford and Nixon administrations for “scandalous” records on arms sales and suggested that a special session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission should be convened. He went on to say that “even a good agreement based on Vladivostok will not put much of a dent in the arms race” because of the high ceilings in the agreement and a lack of qualitative restrictions. When President Jimmy Carter entered office in 1977 with Mondale as his vice-president, Carter placed a renewed emphasis on SALT II with a comprehensive interagency review and further negotiations based on the Vladivostok accord. The U.S. made two proposals to the Soviets in March 1977, both of which the U.S.S.R. rejected. Further high-level meetings were held in Washington and Moscow from 1977 to 1979. When asked in 1977 about Mondale’s power in his administration, Carter noted that Mondale had played an important role in the SALT II talks.

A SALT II deal was eventually reached in June 1979, although the treaty was never ratified by the Senate. In addition to qualitative restrictions, such as a ban on heavy mobile ICBM launchers, the SALT II Treaty would have provided for the following numerical limits:

• 2400 equal aggregate limit on the number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, as agreed at Vladivostok, but this number was to be lowered to 2250 by the end of 1981.
• 1320 equal aggregate limit on total number of launchers of MIRVed ballistic missiles.
• 820 equal aggregate limit on launchers of MIRVed ICBMs.

In January 1980, President Jimmy Carter requested that the Senate Majority Leader delay consideration of the treaty in light of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Although the treaty remained un-ratified, each party was individually bound to the terms until it had made its intentions clear not to become a party to the treaty. In 1980, Carter announced that the U.S. would comply with the treaty’s provisions, and the Soviets made a similar statement.