KENNETH L. ADELMAN TIMELINE
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1979

*December*  The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) decides to pursue the “two-track” policy. In response to a build-up of Soviet SS-20 intermediate-range nuclear missiles, NATO will deploy U.S. Pershing II missiles and cruise missiles in Europe beginning in 1983, but will also seek negotiations to eliminate intermediate-range forces (INF). NATO’s
concern is that with a monopoly or vast superiority of intermediate-range forces, the Soviet Union could undermine the credibility of U.S. nuclear guarantees to Europe which would then result in a political de-linking of the U.S. and Europe. ("Arms Control: The U.S. Perspective" U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda, USIA Electronic Journal, Vol. 2, No. 3, August 1997 <http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/0897/ijpe/pj3chron.htm>, 08/18/2003)

1980

Adelman agrees to have his name published as part of a list of Reagan's foreign policy advisers. (The Atlantic Monthly, July 1983)

Adelman works on the transition team, focusing on appointments at the Departments of State and Defense. Due to his contacts with Rumsfeld, Cheney, Kirkpatrick and others, he finds himself in the middle of the intra-Republican battle for influence in the Administration, especially regarding Carlucci's nomination as Deputy Secretary of Defense. (The Atlantic Monthly, July 1983)

1981

January

Adelman flies to West Germany as the representative of the Reagan Administration along with former President Carter to greet the newly released Iran hostages. (The Atlantic Monthly, July 1983)

Secretary of State Alexander Haig asks Adelman to become Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs. Eugene Rostow approaches Adelman about joining the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) as Deputy Director. Frank Carlucci at Defense and Richard Allen at the National Security Council (NSC) extend open invitations, and Jeane Kirkpatrick, Adelman's former professor at Georgetown, asks him to join her at the UN. Adelman turns them all down and returns to his think tank job at Stanford Research International. (The Atlantic Monthly, July 1983)

April


November


1982

November

Adelman accompanies Donald Rumsfeld on a trip to Europe to explain U.S. opposition to the U.N. Law of the Sea Treaty. The mission is

1983

January

Adelman is nominated to be Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) on January 12th, after its current Director, Eugene Rostow, is suddenly fired. (The Atlantic Monthly, July 1983)

Adelman appears before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for his first confirmation hearing. Heeding advice that the one way to have a confirmation hearing go badly is to say too much, Adelman gives restrained answers. The news broadcasts focus on his repeated answer of “I don’t know” in his introductory comments to the exclusion of his later answers. This emboldens opponents of the nomination to try and force Reagan to withdraw Adelman from consideration. (The Atlantic Monthly, July 1983)

February

Adelman acquits himself well at his second hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 3rd. But the day of the hearing, a report surfaces that during an interview two years earlier, Adelman had claimed that all arms control agreements were a “sham” and that they were done to placate U.S. allies and the U.S. public. The original source of these comments was a reporter, Ken Auletta, who had given his notes to another reporter, Richard Reeves. Reeves then released the information to Senator Cranston (D-CA) of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, as well as other media sources. (The Atlantic Monthly, July 1983)

On February 16th, Senator Cranston reads the comments from the Reeve article to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in order to solidify opposition to Adelman. The Committee then votes to postpone the final vote for an additional week as they do not yet think they have enough votes to reject Adelman. (The Atlantic Monthly, July 1983)

Adelman releases a statement on February 17th, saying he does not remember making the comments, does not remember being interviewed by Auletta, did not ever see the original article, and if he had, he would have denied that the quotes reflected his views then or now. (The Atlantic Monthly, July 1983)

Also on the 17th, Auletta turns over his notes to Marilyn Berger of ABC News, who questions the reporter that evening. (The Atlantic Monthly, July 1983)
Auletta releases his notes to other reporters on February 18th. He also begins to negotiate an arrangement with the Foreign Relations Committee staff under which he would agree to testify if subpoenaed.


The staff of the Senate Foreign Relations committee examines Auletta’s notes on February 23rd, the night before the committee will have both Auletta and Adelman testify. They find that the notes, unlike the column, quoted Adelman as endorsing “real reductions” in nuclear weapons. The offending word “sham” appeared to have been written first as “shame.” (*The Atlantic Monthly*, July 1983)

On February 24th, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee recommends rejection of Adelman as ACDA director by a 9-8 vote. Instead of bottling it up in committee they decide to send the issue to the full Senate, where Democrats hope to turn the confirmation into a debate on Reagan’s arms control policies. (*Reuters*, 02/26/1983, *The Atlantic Monthly*, July 1983)

March

Another crisis for Adelman’s confirmation erupts on March 14th, when the contents of a letter written to Adelman by Ambassador Ed Rowny, an arms negotiator in the Reagan Administration, with suggestions for appointments, firings, and highly critical job evaluations is leaked. Despite having set up a system to divert all potential personnel issues to a neutral party, some Senate Foreign Relations Committee members speculate that Adelman may have been deceiving them when he testified that he was not planning a purge of ACDA staff and that he had made no personnel decisions. (*The Atlantic Monthly*, July 1983)

The Foreign Relations Committee asks Adelman to hand over the letter from Rowny. Adelman complies and provides additional material. (*The Atlantic Monthly*, July 1983)

On March 23rd, in defiance of an Administration request, the Committee votes to release the memo, with the names blocked out. Thinking that this would exonerate him, Adelman is disappointed to see the news media reports that evening talk about the Committee being mislead and there being a credibility problem. (*The Atlantic Monthly*, July 1983)

The Senate begins its Easter break without having acted on the Adelman nomination. It is reported that Democratic Senators are going home to their districts to see how much of a grass-roots “buzz” the allegations have made. If the public is incensed, they will fight to reject the nomination. (*The Atlantic Monthly*, July 1983)
April

After finding that the public and the press outside of Washington, D.C. is not following the Adelman story, Senate Democrats, led by Paul Tsongas (D-MA), agree not to filibuster the nomination in exchange for the Senate Republican leadership promise of three full days of debate on foreign policy and the Administration’s arms control policies. After getting this concession, Democrats realize they can not mount a frontal assault on the Administration’s foreign policy, because it will push the liberal Republicans, who are needed to block the Adelman nomination, to support their party’s position. Instead, much of the debate focuses on the more restrained issue of what the standards of competence ought to be for deciding the nomination, and how much the President’s prerogative should matter. (The Atlantic Monthly, July 1983)

On April 14th Adelman is confirmed as Director of ACDA by a full Senate vote of 57-42. (The Atlantic Monthly, July 1983; Reuters, 04/15/1983))

Adelman implies that the U.S. may be willing to abandon deployment of the Pershing II missiles in Europe as an interim solution, provided it led to an equal amount of warheads on both the Soviet and NATO sides. (The Times-London, 04/27/1983)

May

Adelman stresses that both the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) and the Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty (START) negotiations should be concerned with global reductions and not allow missiles to be repositioned in other areas, such as Asia. (The Guardian, 05/14/1983)

June

Adelman announces at a Senate Foreign Relations Committee meeting that the U.S. will deploy its next generation Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), the MX, unless the U.S.S.R gets rid of its largest land-based nuclear missiles. (The Times – London, 06/22/1983; The Globe and Mail, 06/22/1983)

At a meeting of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Adelman announces that the US and the U.S.S.R have resumed low-level talks on a proposed treaty to ban chemical weapons. The primary focus of the talks is on verification. (Financial Times, 06/29/1984)

November

The U.S. begins the deployment of the ground launch cruise missiles (GLCM’s) and the Pershing II missiles in Western Europe. (1987 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, p. 138)

Soviet arms control negotiators at Geneva walk out on the talks, stating that their return is indefinite. (1987 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, p. 138)
1984

July Adelman leads a delegation of arms control specialists to Beijing, where they discuss issues ranging from nuclear non-proliferation, to Soviet installation of intermediate range missiles in Asia. The purpose of the mission is not to advance any negotiations, but rather to brief the Chinese government on current U.S. arms control policies. (The Washington Post, 07/07/1984)

September After receiving signals from the Soviets that Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko’s upcoming Washington visit indicates a willingness to consider resuming arms talks, Adelman announces that the U.S. will make it as easy as possible for the Soviets to get back to “real negotiations.” (The Dallas Morning News, 09/22/1984)

In spite of Foreign Minister Gromyko’s silence on the matter as he leaves Geneva, Adelman comments that he sees a softening in the Soviet opposition to on-site inspections, which is a matter of critical importance to the Administration. (Associated Press, 09/30/1984)

October In a speech to joint meeting of Dallas-area World Affairs Councils and Rotary Clubs, Adelman places the blame for the lack of arms control progress on Soviet leadership changes and the U.S.S.R.’s unwillingness to accept the deployment of U.S. missiles in Europe, despite their own deployment of SS-20’s. He further argues that improvement in arms control is likely for several reasons. First, the bad feeling generated by the missile deployment will dissipate. Second, the leadership of the Soviet Union will stabilize after several rapid leadership changes in recent years thus allowing a new leader to exercise a firmer grip on policy-making. Third, the modernized U.S. strategic forces may convince the Soviets that arms reductions are the only economically viable option. Finally, a likely Reagan reelection will not force the process to begin again from square one. (The Dallas Morning News, 10/04/1984)

November In an interview with The Wall Street Journal, Adelman outlines his views of what the U.S. should attempt to achieve in talks with the Soviets. In addition to explaining the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) or “Star Wars” to the Soviets, Adelman advocates the possibility of “arms control without agreements.” This approach would focus on substantive measures that each side could take without the difficulties of negotiating a treaty. These ideas preview those in a forthcoming article in Foreign Affairs, which Adelman wrote against the advice of Secretary of State Schultz. (The Wall Street Journal, 11/24/1984)
After the U.S.S.R announces it will end its boycott of arms control talks and agrees to a meeting in January, Adelman denies that the U.S. agreed to consider suspending the deployment of the “Euromissiles” as an incentive to get the Soviets back to the bargaining table. (*Reuters News Agency, 11/24/1984*)

1985

**January**

After being briefed by Reagan, Adelman and the arms control teams prepare to resume talks in Geneva. Reagan appoints Max Kampelman, a Washington lawyer as head of the team as well as the lead negotiator on the space and defensive weapons. Former Texas Senator John Tower will head the strategic weapons negotiations and Maynard Glitman, a career State Department official, will lead the team discussing intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe. (*The Associated Press, 01/06/1985, 01/18/1985; The Dallas Morning News, 01/23/1985*)

Adelman travels to Hungary, Romania and Yugoslavia to brief officials about recent arms talks in Geneva. This strategy of going into the Soviet’s backyard mirrors previous attempts by the U.S.S.R to undermine relations between the U.S. and Western European countries. Adelman reports that the officials he meets with eagerly requested regular briefings. (*The Wall Street Journal, 01/21/1985*)

**February**

Adelman discusses with reporters a recent report outlining Soviet violations of existing arms control treaties. He implies that if the Soviets do not address the issue of compliance more clearly it will seriously affect the outcome of ongoing arms negotiations. (*The Wall Street Journal, 02/01/1985; The San Francisco Chronicle, 02/02/1985*)

**May**

Addressing the World Affairs Council of Northern California, Adelman cites Soviet violations of past treaties, the need for reliable verification, and past Soviet behavior as reasons why the audience should expect years of frustration before seeing any progress on an arms agreement. (*The San Francisco Chronicle, 05/09/1985*)

Senator John Kerry (D-MA) calls for a Senate Foreign Relations Committee meeting to question Adelman about disparaging comments he had made about Congress in a *Boston Herald* interview. The source of the issue is a law passed by the Senate that would limit the ability of the Reagan Administration to test Anti-Satellite (ASAT) weapons. The law would allow testing only if the Administration certified that it is making good-faith efforts in negotiating a treaty governing ASAT weapons. In his interview with the *Herald*, Adelman says, “that certification is bull,” and that “it’s a pain, but we’ll do it if it is the law.” He further questions the
bill asking, “Is Congress a bunch of Lilliputians trying to tie strings around the executive’s hands?” (The Associated Press, 05/31/1985)

**November**

Reagan and Gorbachev meet for the first time at the Geneva Summit. Despite no new progress being made in the ongoing arms talks, the leaders get along well and form a personal relationship that will serve them well in future negotiations. The meeting seems to be the turning point where Reagan decides that Gorbachev is a different kind of Soviet leader, and that they can do business. (1985 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1986, pp. 181-182)

**1986**

**May**

Despite earlier agreeing to scrap two U.S. submarines in order to remain within the limits of the SALT II treaty, Reagan announces that the U.S. will deploy Air Launch Cruise Missiles (ALCM’s) in B-52 bombers, thus violating the unratified treaty. Defense Secretary Casper Weinberger announces that the U.S. is “no longer bound” by SALT II. (The Washington Post, 05/29/1986)

**September**

In a speech to the national meeting of the American Legion, Adelman criticizes Congress for including arms control provisions in recent defense authorization bills. He argues that they are a bad idea at the wrong time and will “pull the rug right out from under” U.S. negotiators in Geneva. He further argues that, “the Congress’ action has sent the Soviet Union a message that they might be better off to count on the action of the Congress to give them something for free, rather than to give up something themselves in negotiations. This is a message of weakness, not of strength.” He goes on to claim that Congress is wanting to have it both ways by desiring a good treaty, but undermining the Administration’s bargaining position with such actions. He argues the timing was particularly bad, since there were indications that the U.S.S.R was on the verge of making concessions at Geneva. (PR Newswire, 09/02/1986)

**October**

Adelman accompanies Reagan to Reykjavik, Iceland, where the President will meet with Gorbachev. Despite attempts by the U.S. to lower expectations, world attention is focused upon the meeting. Reagan’s refusal to bargain away SDI and Gorbachev’s refusal to bargain on anything else unless SDI is on the table leads to little progress at the summit. Initially seen as a failure due to the lack of progress on a treaty, the Reykjavik summit would later be seen as a crucial turning point in the Cold War. (1986 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1987, pp. 459-461)
Secretary of State Schultz, Edward Rowny and Adelman are dispatched by Reagan to various allied capitals to explain the collapse of the Reykjavik INF talks with the Soviet Union. (*The Associated Press*, 10/12/1986)

In a speech to the American Stock Exchange, Adelman says that the inferiority of NATO conventional forces would have to be addressed before the West’s reliance on nuclear weapons could be vastly reduced. This would end the “cheap defense” of Europe. (*The Associated Press*, 10/21/1986)

**November**

A study on the efficacy of arms control commissioned by ACDA in 1985 is released. The report, prepared by researchers at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, finds that arms control agreements have little effect on either levels of armaments, or the level of hostility between the superpowers. Adelman comments that arms control should be seen as just one facet of foreign policy, but not necessarily trump other issues and methods. (*The Washington Post*, 11/05/1986)

In a rare occurrence of publishing a U.S. official’s comments, a Soviet newspaper, *Sovietskaya Rossiya* (Soviet Russia) prints an interview with Adelman, in which he addressed issues such as the Reykjavik meeting, SDI, and human rights. (*The Seattle Times*, 11/13/1986)

Speaking to reporters before delivering a lecture at Princeton University, Adelman says he expects to have more trouble reaching an arms accord with the U.S.S.R after the Democrats take over the Senate in January. He accuses Democrats of handing issues to the Soviet Union on a “silver platter”, rather than making them bargain for gains. He further announces that the Administration will not give up its core positions just to get a deal before Reagan leaves office. (*The Record-Northern New Jersey*, 11/14/1986)

**1987**

**February**

At a news conference Adelman claims that the Soviets are working on their own version of a “Star Wars” missile defense system, and that they have spent ten to fifteen times as much as the U.S. has spent on such a system. (*UPI*, 02/06/1987)

**March**

Commenting on draft proposals for verification of an INF treaty, Adelman says the proposals were sound, but that Gorbachev and the Soviets would find the proposals very demanding, and they were going to have to “swallow hard.” (*The Washington Post*, 03/03/1987)

Adelman announces that the U.S. will drop some of its tough verification demands if the Soviets agree to eliminate all their medium-range missiles.
April

Adelman and a delegation including Secretary of State Schultz travel to Moscow where Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze proposes that the U.S. and U.S.S.R should have a nuclear test swap in order to improve verification techniques. In an official statement Adelman calls the offer a very positive development. Adelman also reassured European allies that the U.S. is not moving toward elimination of all nuclear weapons in Europe. (The New York Times, 04/18/1987; The Washington Post, 04/18/1987)

In an appearance on CNN, Adelman says he expects that Soviet Leader Gorbachev will most likely come to Washington for a summit meeting in the fall. It is hoped that this summit will result in the signing of an INF treaty. (The Toronto Star, 04/19/1987)

July

Adelman announces that he will resign as Director of ACDA in October or wait until after the upcoming summit. In his letter to the President, Adelman says he feels he has accomplished what he set out to do in charting a new course for arms control that dramatically reduces nuclear weapons. “I wanted to leave at a time when everything was coming up roses on the first good arms control agreement we’ve had in ten or fifteen years,” he claims. His plans include writing a syndicated column as well as magazine articles. He also plans to resume teaching a course on Shakespeare at Georgetown University. There are no indications his resignation is related to any policy dispute. (Reuter News Agency, 07/31/1987; Associated Press, 07/31/1987; The Wall Street Journal, 07/31/1987)

August

Adelman credits the Reagan Administration’s firm stance with the Soviets for the expected success of the INF treaty. He notes that the proposal that is close to being signed is nearly identical with the original U.S. offer from 1982 and the Soviets are accepting it now, “lock, stock and barrel.” (The Boston Globe, 08/02/1987)

In a last-minute campaign to get concessions from the U.S., Soviet Arms negotiator Victor Karpov goes on CBS’s Face The Nation, and claims the residual West German missiles and the U.S. “Star Wars” program are serious obstacles to the INF treaty being signed. Responding on CBS, Adelman calls the statement a bluff. (USA Today, 08/03/1987)

September

In an interview conducted while preparing for the upcoming Schultz-Shevardnadze meeting, Adelman cautions the public on over-enthusiasm for arms control agreements. While praising the INF treaty, Adelman says
one of his goals was to reduce the West’s unwarranted enthusiasm for arms control. He claims that the press, public and Congress mistake arms control for peace, and that the two things have little to do with each other. His main concern is that focusing to exclusively on arms control will deflect attention from other aspects of the superpower rivalry that are important. He says that the invasion of Afghanistan and human rights violations say more about Moscow’s true nature than its willingness to remove some nuclear weapons. (The Wall Street Journal, 09/14/1987)

**October**

After agreeing to summit dates in order to sign the INF treaty, Gorbachev tries one more time to get concessions on “Star Wars” from the U.S. At a meeting with the Secretary of State in Moscow, Gorbachev asks Schultz for guarantees that the Soviet interpretation of the 1972 ABM treaty would be honored. Schultz says he can offer no guarantees. Gorbachev allows the meeting to break up, apparently canceling the upcoming summit by saying he would not be comfortable visiting the U.S for a meeting. Three days later Gorbachev reverses himself saying he will attend the summit. Adelman comments that Gorbachev went out on a limb and gave it a good try, but saw his ploy wasn’t working and reverted back to the original plan. (The Dallas Morning News, 10/29/1987)

**December**


REAGAN ADMINISTRATION ARMS CONTROL TIMELINE


1977

January

The U.S.S.R. begins deployment of the SS-20, a modern, mobile, nuclear-armed intermediate-range ballistic missile with three independently targetable warheads and the range to target all of Western Europe.

1979

June

The U.S. and the Soviet Union sign the SALT II Treaty in Vienna, replacing SALT I.

December

Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, President Carter withdraws the SALT II Treaty from Senate consideration. The SALT II Treaty was never ratified.

NATO unanimously adopts a “dual-track” strategy to respond to Soviet deployments of the SS-20. One track calls for negotiating the withdrawal of the missiles or a reduction to the lowest possible level. The second track calls, in the absence of an agreement, for NATO to modernize its INF forces with U.S. ground-launch cruise missiles (GLCMs) and Pershing II intermediate range ballistic missiles, and to deploy them in 1983. NATO will also withdraw a portion of its tactical nuclear warheads, and will retire an existing nuclear weapon for every one deployed.

1980

October

Preliminary Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) talks between the U.S. and the Soviet Union begin in Geneva. The U.S. opening position calls for an equal ceiling on land-based theater nuclear missile systems.

1981

November

President Reagan proposes a “zero option,” where the U.S. will not deploy its planned Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe if the Soviets agree to eliminate their SS-20’s and other INF missiles. The Soviets reject this offer as inequitable since it asks them to destroy missiles already deployed, while the U.S. only need to cancel a future deployment.
Formal INF talks begin, with the U.S. proposing a “global zero” where all INF forces and many short-range missiles would be eliminated.

1982

February
The Soviets counter with a proposal to cap both missiles and nuclear-capable aircraft in Europe, demanding that U.K. and French forces be included in the caps.

June
Acting beyond their instructions, the “Walk in the Woods” proposal emerges between the negotiators that would cap missiles, prevent the Pershing II deployment and also address Soviet deployment of SS-20’s in Asia.

Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) talks begin.

September
The Soviet Union rejects the “Walk in the Woods” package.

1983

March
Reagan announces his intention to commit the U.S. to a research program to study the feasibility of defensive measures against ballistic missiles to maintain peace. The program becomes known as the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) or “Star Wars.”

Reagan announces the U.S. and its allies are willing to accept an interim agreement that establishes equal levels of INF warheads with zero as the ultimate goal.

April
The Soviets reject Reagan’s March offer.

October
The U.S. and its allies agree to maintain NATO's nuclear capability at the lowest level consistent with security and deterrence, and to withdraw 1,400 U.S. nuclear warheads from Europe.

November
The West German Bundestag approves the Pershing II deployment and the U.S. begins deployment the following day. The Soviet delegation walks out of the Geneva arms control talks, announcing that it has discontinued the current round of negotiations and would not set a date to return. The U.S. offers to resume talks whenever the Soviets are willing.

1984

April
The U.S. signs a nuclear trade pact with China after Beijing agrees to join the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and accept IAEA inspection of any exported nuclear equipment and material.
The U.S. and U.S.S.R. agree to enter into new negotiations, the Nuclear and Space Talks (NST), concerning offensive nuclear arms, defense and space issues.

1985

January
The U.S. and U.S.S.R. resume arms control talks at a summit meeting in Geneva. The INF talks resume under the umbrella of the NST agreement. Also ongoing will be START and negotiations on space weapons.

March
In Geneva, the U.S. restates its current position that it will accept equal interim INF forces as part of a process of working to zero. General Secretary Gorbachev announces a moratorium on INF missile deployments in the U.S.S.R.

START talks resume under the NST umbrella. The Soviets insist on limits on SDI before progress can be made on strategic arms.

June
In reaction to the use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq War, the U.S., Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Australia and the ten European Community countries establish the Australia Group to develop a system of export controls on precursor chemicals required to manufacture chemical weapons.

August
Eight members of the South Pacific Forum sign the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty, or the Raratonga Treaty, establishing a nuclear-free zone in the southern Pacific.

September
During the START talks, the Soviets propose a 50 percent reduction in missiles, a cap on warheads and limits on basing modes.

October
During a visit to Paris, Gorbachev announces a counter proposal that would freeze US and Soviet INF deployments at their current levels, followed by the deepest possible reductions. He also commits to phasing out the older SS-4 missiles and to remove some SS-20’s from combat status.

November
At the INF talks, the U.S. responds with a call for equal numbers of missiles (a freeze would leave the Soviets with double the number of missiles as the U.S. and its allies), restrictions on INF missiles in Asia and appropriate constraints on short-range missiles so that INF reductions do not result in an arms race in this category.
In the START talks, the U.S. counters the Soviet proposal with a much more technically complex set of proposals with differing limits on various types of missiles, reentry vehicles, platforms and throw weights.

**December**
North Korea formally accedes to the NPT and agrees to open a new 30-megawatt research reactor facility to IAEA inspections and safeguards.

**1986**

**January**
Gorbachev calls for complete nuclear disarmament by the year 2000, including all missiles in Europe.

**February**
The U.S. ignores Gorbachev’s January proposal as it would leave the Soviet Army dominant in Europe or require massive build-up of NATO conventional forces to replace the alliance’s traditional reliance on nuclear weapons for deterrence. Reagan reiterates his zero option, calling for the elimination of all INF missiles in Europe and Asia.

**March**
Verification measures are proposed at the INF talks, and negotiations continue.

**May**
In START talks, the Soviets drop their SDI demand and offer an interim agreement if each side agrees not to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty for fifteen to twenty years.

Despite earlier agreeing to scrap two U.S. submarines in order to remain within the limits of the SALT II treaty, Reagan announces that the U.S. will deploy Air Launch Cruise Missiles (ALCM’s) in B-52 bombers, thus violating the unratified treaty. Defense Secretary Casper Weinberger announces that the U.S. is “no longer bound” by SALT II.

**September**
The Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe adopts an accord, the Stockholm Document, designed to reduce the risk of war in Europe. NATO and Warsaw Pact member nations agree to give each other advance notice of all major military activities.

**October**
Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev meet at the Reykjavik summit in Iceland. Progress is made on Intermediate Nuclear Forces as well as Strategic Arms Reduction talks, but the Soviets insist on linking any agreement to constraints on the U.S. SDI program. Reagan refuses to negotiate on this item, and the talks end without a formal agreement.
1987

**February**
Gorbachev announces he is de-linking INF negotiations from resolution of differences over SDI.

**March**
The U.S. presents a draft INF treaty that reduces INF missile warheads to 100, globally, on each side, with zero in Europe. This reflects an agreement at Reykjavik, but the U.S. prefers a “global zero” outcome.

**April**
The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is established to slow the spread of missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction.

The Soviets introduce a largely similar INF draft treaty, but would also limit INF missiles in the continental U.S.

**June**
The U.S. calls for a “global double zero” position. All INF and short-range missiles possessed by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. would be eliminated.

**July**
Gorbachev indicates that the Soviet Union is prepared to agree to elimination of all INF missiles in Europe and Asia and short-range missiles world-wide.

**December**
At the Washington Summit, the U.S. and the Soviet Union sign the INF Treaty to eliminate all intermediate and short-range land-based nuclear missiles, the first arms control agreement to eliminate an entire class of nuclear weapons. It features an extensive and comprehensive verification regime, including on-site inspections. The treaty enters into force June 1, 1988, and is fully implemented June 1, 1991.

The U.S. and the Soviet Union agree to conduct the Joint Verification Experiment, allowing each side to monitor a nuclear test conducted by the other. The Soviet Union monitors a test August 17, 1988, and the U.S. on September 14 of the same year. The two sides also come closer together on START numbers. The broad outlines of a 50 percent reduction of missiles coupled with limits on warheads and throw-weight are agreed to, but a final agreement will not occur until the Bush Administration.

1988

**January**
The U.S. On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA) is established to carry out the on-site inspection, escort, and monitoring provisions of the INF Treaty. It later becomes responsible for the U.S. inspection activities required under other major arms control agreements.

**May**
The U.S. Senate ratifies the INF treaty by a vote of 93 to 5. The Soviet union ratifies the treaty the following day.
June The INF treaty comes into force.

July The Soviets begin eliminating INF missiles

September The U.S. begins eliminating INF missiles
KENNETH L. ADELMAN SUGGESTED TOPICS
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Joining the Administration
- Discuss your role as a foreign policy advisor during the campaign.
- What role did you play during the transition?
- After initially refusing multiple job offers in the Administration, how did you come to be selected as Deputy Permanent Representative to the U.N.?
- Discuss how your previous experience at the Departments of Commerce and Defense in the Nixon and Ford Administrations shaped your views as you joined the Reagan Administration.

The United Nations
- Discuss your role and responsibilities as Deputy Permanent Representative and your relationship with Jeane Kirkpatrick. What issues occupied most of your time? How did you come by the nickname “The Hit Man”? With whom did you work most closely at the White House?
- Discuss the functioning of the U.S. mission to the U.N. under Kirkpatrick. Her relationship with Secretary of State Haig was strained, yet she also seems to have been able circumvent that relationship at times. What role did the President play in this?
- How successful was the U.S. mission to the U.N. at reorienting that body so that it could be utilized as an effective tool of U.S. diplomacy? Was Reagan able to use the U.N. effectively for purposes of public diplomacy?

Joining the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
- What made you decide to take the position as Director of ACDA? Did you have any forewarning of the difficult confirmation process before it began?
- Discuss your experiences during the confirmation process. How supportive was the Administration?
- The Senate Foreign Relations Committee seems to have decided to use your confirmation process as a opportunity to debate the President’s arms control policies and foreign policy more generally. How successful do you think that effort was? Did the White House feel the need to alter its policies in any way?
- How would you characterize your post-confirmation relationship with Congress generally and the Foreign Relations Committee more specifically?

Arms Control and Summitry
- How responsive was the bureaucracy of ACDA to following the different approach towards arms control that you and the President favored?
- Describe your relationships with the other relevant members of the foreign policy team. With heavy-hitters such as Schultz and Weinberger also advising the President on arms control, and with negotiators like Nitze, Kampelman and others heading negotiating teams, how did this affect the process of you advising the President?
• How did the divisions among Reagan’s foreign policy advisors affect how arms control was pursued? Did internal dissent serve some good in terms of vetting ideas, or did it hinder effective policy-making? How did the President manage this factionalism?

• Describe your role at summits such as Geneva, Reykjavik and Washington.

• In addition to your advisory duties, it appears that you were often the public face of arms control, going across the country and speaking to organizations about the U.S. stance in these issues. If this is true, discuss this role.

• Why did you decide to leave before the end of the Administration?

• Discuss the role you played in the reorganization of the National Security Council with Frank Carlucci? What was your involvement in personnel issues (e.g. managing the advancement of Colin Powell)?

The Reagan Presidency in Retrospect

• What is the legacy of the Reagan administration in arms control?

• How effective was Reagan as a world leader?

• How was Reagan perceived by world leaders and the diplomatic community?

• What were the strengths and weaknesses of the Reagan presidency?

• What features of the Reagan presidency were missed or misunderstood by the press?

• How should the Reagan presidency be viewed by future historians?
TIMELINES

- Kenneth L. Adelman Timeline, prepared by Kelly Erickson, Miller Center of Public Affairs, University of Virginia, 09/10/2003.

- Reagan Administration Arms Control Timeline, prepared by Kelly Erickson, Miller Center of Public Affairs, University of Virginia, 09/12/2003.

SELECTED WRITINGS AND PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY KENNETH L. ADELMAN


THE UNITED NATIONS


JOINING THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY


• “Leery of the Soviets” *Time*, 01/24/1983.


ARMS CONTROL AND SUMMITRY


OTHER ROLES IN THE ADMINISTRATION