President George H.W. Bush
Oral History Project

Briefing Materials

Robert M. Gates
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ROBERT GATES POLICY TIMELINE

1987

February  Reagan nominates Gates to replace Casey as Director of Central Intelligence. Gates accepts the nomination but withdraws shortly thereafter as questions from Iran-contra continue to linger. Gates instead stays on as Deputy Director of Central Intelligence.

1988

November  Secretary of State George Schultz reportedly reprimands Gates for taking a skeptical view of Soviet reforms in an October 14th speech. Spokesman Marlin Fitzwater states that Gates’ cautious approach was “totally consistent” with White House policy. (*Chicago Sun-Times*, 11/09/1988.)

December  Bush appoints Gates as Deputy National Security Advisor. Bush states that Gates “is admirably suited for this key position…. He knows the system, the critical importance of the interagency process for presidential decision-making, and the details of the management of that process.” (*Wall Street Journal*, 12/29/1988) Bush appoints Richard Kerr to replace Gates as Deputy Director of Central Intelligence.

1989

January  Bush issues NSC-1 restructuring the National Security Council on the 20th.

February  Gates gives a speech in which he continues to doubt Gorbachev’s ability to implement reform. “Our view of the Soviet Union cannot be based on the personalities of its leaders but on the nature of the Soviet system itself. We face a deeply entrenched philosophy and system of government that has depended on repression at home and promoted aggression beyond its borders. Gorbachev is challenging some aspects of this system, but even he acknowledges he has not yet significantly changed it.” (*Houston Chronicle*, 02/03/1989.)

Bush signs NSR-3 on the 13th initiating a broad NSC review process to assess U.S. security policy needs in light of the rapidly changing international environment. This "strategic pause" falls under criticism from the press as critics charge Bush is failing to move quickly forward to take advantage of the historic opportunities presented by Gorbachev.

March  The strategic review initiated by NSR-3 is completed by the 14th.
Gates attends an NSC meeting on the 24th to discuss the provision of aid to Eastern Europe.

Bush meets with Gates, Scowcroft, Cheney, and Baker in the Oval Office on the 30th to discuss how the U.S. can move beyond its “strategic pause” and regain the international political initiative. Scowcroft suggests a proposal to eliminate all conventional forces in Europe by 2000 but the group is unable to reach an agreement. Bush says, “If we don’t regain leadership, things are going to fall apart.” *(From the Shadows, 462.)*

**April**

Gates says in a Brussels conference on the 1st that Gorbachev’s reforms had initiated “a tremendous power struggle and purge no less dramatic for the absence of show trials and terror.” Gates therefore urges U.S. allies to “proceed with caution and prudence” because “we cannot make long-term decisions and devise strategies affecting freedom and future that depend on the continued political (or even physical) survival of one man.” *(San Diego Union-Tribune, 04/02/1989)*

Bush gives an important speech at Hamtramck, Michigan on the 17th where he links the provision of economic aid to Eastern Europe with democratic reform.

**May**

Bush meets with Gorbachev from the 10th to 12th. Bush decides to respond to Gorbachev’s arms reduction proposal with a more ambitious proposal to be unveiled at the upcoming NATO summit.

Bush gives his “beyond containment” speech on the 12th.

Gates travels for his first time to the Soviet Union with an interagency delegation and meets with KGB head Vladimir Kryuchkov. Gorbachev, apparently aware of Gates’ skeptical views concerning Soviet reform, suggests that Mr. Gates should be put “out of a job.” *(From the Shadows, 477.)*

Scowcroft proposes another ambitious plan on the 15th to reduce conventional forces in Europe while meeting with Bush, Cheney and Gates. Though Cheney opposes the proposal, Bush calls on the JCS to move forward and flush out the proposal’s details. Cheney presents Bush, Baker, Gates, Crowe, and Sununu with a Defense Department plan to work from at Kennebunkport on the 19th.

On the 22nd Bush decides on a final proposal that calls for the reduction of tanks, armored personnel carriers, and combat aircraft while setting an upward ceiling of 275,000 troops for U.S. and Soviet forces in Europe.
The proposal also includes an accelerated timetable for reductions over the plan proposed by Gorbachev. Bush’s proposed ceiling would have the effect of reducing Soviet forces outside of its borders by 325,000 and U.S. forces by 30,000.

Bush sends Gates and Eagleburger to meet with NATO leaders to gain support for his upcoming proposal. They first meet with Thatcher, from whom they anticipate the strongest resistance. Bush departs for the NATO summit to unveil his proposal on the 28th.

July

Gates writes a memo to Bush on the 18th entitled, “Thinking About the Unthinkable: Instability and Political Turbulence in the USSR,” which provides the White House with its first full examination of the potential implications of future Soviet instability. In it Gates calls for contingency planning should developments in the Soviet Union continue to destabilize.

September

Bush agrees with Gates’ call for contingency planning in his July 18th memo and has Rice initiate a number of studies.

Yeltsin visits the White House on the 12th. While Gates and Rice argue Bush should personally receive Yeltsin, Bush and Scowcroft fear it would be interpreted as a shift away from Gorbachev. Bush takes the middle position and decides instead to “drop in” during Yeltsin’s meeting with Scowcroft, Rice and Gates.


Bush signs NSC-23 on the 22nd calling for U.S. policy to move “beyond containment.”

October

Bush signs NSD-26 on the 2nd calling for the U.S. to continue its policy of cooperation with Iraq. The document states that “access to the Persian Gulf and the key friendly states in the area is vital to U.S. national security.” (Washington Post, 03/17/1991)

A Panamanian coup attempt led by rebel soldiers fails on the 3rd.

The New York Times reports on the 27th that Baker had killed a speech Gates was prepared to give the week before on Soviet reform at a university forum. Baker allegedly felt the speech was too negative. The reports from the press fuel rumors of a White House split over its Soviet policy. White House Spokesman Marlin Fitzwater later confirms the
report but adds that “the President’s policy [towards Gorbachev’s reforms] is we want it to endure.” (*Boston Globe*, 10/28/1989)

**December**

Philippino rebels led by Army Lt. Col. Honasan attempt a coup against President Aquino. Gates’ Deputies Committee works with Quayle to coordinate the U.S. response. Bush orders U.S. warplanes to provide air support for Aquino’s forces on the 1st. After nine days of fighting, the coup attempt fails.

A U.S. soldier is killed in Panama on the 16th after the Panamanian National Assembly declares that it is in a “state of war” with the U.S. The U.S. invades on the 20th.

The Soviet Union announces that its military forces would be withdrawn from Vietnam’s Cam Ranh base. Gates says that he believes it would have a “positive effect” on regional stability and that it would not affect the talks on the future of strategic U.S. military bases in the Philippines. (*Japan Economic Newswire*, 01/19/1990.)

**1990**

**January**

Bush holds a series of national security meetings to set a minimum level of conventional forces needed for the U.S. to maintain in Europe. The first meeting is held on the 4th by the “Gang of Eight.” This group includes Bush, Quayle, Baker, Cheney, Powell, Scowcroft, Sununu, and Gates. Bush and Scowcroft call for bold proposals, as Scowcroft suggests reducing troop levels to 200,000. Despite opposition from Baker, Cheney, and Powell, Bush maintains, “I don’t want to miss an opportunity,” (*From the Shadows*, 486) The group remains divided through several weeks of meetings until Eastern European calls for conventional force reductions help to push the team below 275,000.

Bush sends Gates to Manila to support President Aquino amidst increasing rebel activities. Gates allegedly carries a private message to Aquino to “get your house in order.” (*Star-Tribune Newspaper*, 01/18/1990.) After meeting with Aquino, Gates says, “I will tell him [President Bush] that she is very confident.” (*Japanese Economic Newswire*, 01/18/1990.)

Bush sends Gates and Eagleburger back to Europe on the 29th to discuss the new proposal for conventional force reductions with NATO leaders. Bush makes the proposal to further reduce conventional forces public on the 31st.
**February** Gates heads the interdepartmental European Strategy Steering Group to study NATO strategy and the question of German Unification.

Gates travels to the Soviet Union to discuss, among other issues, German unification and the Two Plus Four framework. Gates meets again with Kryuchkov at KGB headquarters. Gates reports that Kryuchkov appears to have turned against Gorbachev and reform.

**April** Saddam Hussein declares on the 1st that, “by God, we will make the fire eat up half of Israel” should Israel attack Iraqi plants. (Washington Post, 03/17/1991) Pressure begins to build in Congress for the U.S. to cut agricultural sales to Iraq and government-backed Export-Import Bank credits.

Gates convenes a meeting of the Deputies Committee on the 16th to reevaluate U.S. Iraqi policy. They agree on the need to toughen U.S. policy and call for further study on how that could best be accomplished.

**May** Gates leaves Moscow to head a delegation to India and Pakistan on the 19th to encourage a peaceful resolution to the situation in Kashmir.

The Deputies Committee meets again at the end of the month to further question the U.S. policy of cooperation with Iraqi.

Gorbachev travels to D.C. for the U.S.-Soviet summit at the end of the month. Gates accompanies Bush and Gorbachev to Camp David on the 31st.

**June** Rumors appear suggesting Gates is leaving the NSC staff.

Gates writes a memo to Bush on the 6th saying that they might have underestimated Yeltsin at their September 1989 meeting. Yeltsin had been elected President of the Russian Supreme Soviet the previous month. Gates therefore suggests that the Administration avoid making any negative comments about Yeltsin, as Gates believes Yeltsin would likely continue to play a major role in Russian politics for some time.

Gorbachev and Shevardnadze begin to take a harder line concerning German unification. Shevardnadze demands changes in the NATO structure at the Two Plus Four meeting in Berlin on the 22nd as a precondition for Soviet support. Gates’ European Strategy Steering Group begins work studying the changes called for by the Soviets. The group meets continually in the White House situation room from June 4th until the NATO summit in early July to produce a draft NATO summit
declaration. The “intellectual heavy lifting” is done by Zoellick, Blackwill, Zelikow, Rice, and Ross. (*From the Shadows*, 494)

**July**

Gates writes a memo to Bush on the 13th raising concerns over the U.S. policy of tying its support for Soviet reform to Gorbachev. Gates is skeptical of Gorbachev’s ability to survive politically and therefore calls for Bush to “depersonalize” U.S. support for Soviet reform by reaching out to other reformers.

Gorbachev responds positively to the draft and agrees on the 15th to German unification within NATO.

Hussein begins to deploy massive levels of Iraqi troops near the Kuwaiti border. Hussein says that he will not consider military action until Iraqi officials have had a chance to meet with Kuwait at the end of the month to discuss outstanding economic and territorial issues. Arab leaders believe the move is only a negotiating tactic meant to extract political leverage from the Kuwaiti’s at the bargaining table. By the end of the month, though, the CIA announces that limited Iraqi military action is likely.

**August**

State Department Under Secretary Kimmitt convenes a Deputies Committee meeting on the 1st in place of Gates to discuss the Iraqi military deployment. The group agrees that an Iraqi invasion is likely, though they remain unsure how far the Iraqi forces would advance.

Iraqi forces launch a full-scale invasion of Kuwait on the 2nd. Bush sends Cheney, Gates, and Powell to Saudi Arabia to discuss the deployment of U.S. troops with King Fahd. Bush also sends the group to Egypt and Morocco. U.S. policy throughout the crisis would be set largely by the “Gang of Eight” through an informal decision-making process.

An Iraqi oil tanker heading towards S. Yemen on the 20th refuses to yield to U.S. warning shots. Bush meets with Gates, Eagleburger, Cheney, Powell, Sununu, and Scowcroft at Kennebunkport. Powell, Scowcroft, Cheney, and Gates all support hitting the ship. Bush decides instead to wait to give Baker more time to gain Soviet support for an enforcement resolution. Baker reaches an agreement with the Soviets on the 24th, averting the need to use force.

**September**

Bush and Gorbachev meet in Helsinki to solidify Soviet support for joining the U.S. in opposition against Iraq. The U.S. offer at this summit joint sponsorship of the Middle East peace conference.

**November**

The CFE agreement is signed at U.S.-Soviet talks in Paris on the 18th.
The United Nations Security Council passes a resolution on the 29\textsuperscript{th} authorizing “all means necessary” to expel Iraq from Kuwait.

**December** Hussein accepts Bush’s offer to attend talks. Since August 12\textsuperscript{th}, Hussein had attempted to link an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait with an Israeli withdrawal from traditional Arab lands. Gates strongly emphasizes that Baker’s meeting with Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz in Washington the week of the 10\textsuperscript{th} was “not an attempt to have some sort of deal. There may be an incompatible perspective” between the U.S. and Iraq concerning the purpose of the talks. At the same time, Gates insisted that a high-level meeting held at Camp David was “not some council of war.” (*Baton Rouge Sunday Advocate*, 12/02/1990). Gates further adds, “It’s not clear what information gets through to him... Those in his entourage are scared to death of him and don’t want to tell him the bad news.” (*Arizona Republic*, 12/02/1990)

**1991**

**January** Bush decides to seek a congressional resolution authorizing the use of U.S. force in the Gulf. The Senate narrowly passes the resolution 52-47 on the 12\textsuperscript{th}. The UN deadline for the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait passes on the 15\textsuperscript{th}. Bush meets with the “Gang of Eight” on the 15\textsuperscript{th} to sign the presidential directive authorizing the initiation of hostilities.

In accordance with the terms of the congressional resolution, Bush has Gates brief congressional leaders on the initiation of hostilities and provide “written determination” that all efforts to resolve the conflict peacefully had failed. The leaders include Senate Majority Leader Mitchell, Senate Minority Leader Dole, House Minority Leader Michel, House Speaker Foley and House Majority Leader Gephardt. (*Washington Times*, 01/17/1991)

Gorbachev dispatches Soviet troops to the Baltic states to quell calls for independence, resulting in bloodshed. Gates and Rice tell Scowcroft that they believe the U.S. should have taken a stronger line in protesting the Soviet use of force, but Scowcroft is apprehensive.

After more bloodshed in the Baltics, Bush privately threatens in a letter to Gorbachev to cut all aid should the violence continue. Gorbachev sends Ambassador Bessmertnykh to beg Bush not to follow through with the threat, meeting with Bush and Gates in the Oval Office.
February

Gates announces that the U.S. would likely cut the technologies subject to export controls to Eastern Europe by 25% within the next month.

A House subcommittee on commerce demands that the White House disclose the list of companies that had applied for export licenses and sold dual-use technology to Iraq prior to the Kuwaiti invasion.

Gorbachev calls Bush on the 21st to advocate an end to the ground war. Bush has Gates assemble the “Gang of Eight” to discuss how to respond to Gorbachev’s concerns.

U.S.-led forces commence the ground offensive in the Persian Gulf War on the 24th. Bush declares Kuwait liberated on the 27th.

May

Gates announces, “We have no challengers…. Today, no one questions the reality of only one superpower and its leadership.” (Washington Times, 5/08/1991) This marks the first time a White House official discounts the Soviet Union’s superpower status.

DCI William Webster resigns on the 8th amidst rumors that he was being pushed out by White House officials. Bush summons Gates to his cabin on Air Force One to ask him to take over for Webster as DCI. Gates accepts.

Bush officially nominates Gates to succeed Webster as DCI on the 14th. At a press conference, Bush says, “I know Bob Gates, and I know him to be a man of honor.” When asked if he thought Iran-contra would reemerge as an issue, Bush said, “these matters have been discussed. And I have absolutely no qualms whatsoever.” When asked whether Gates would become a Cabinet member and have a role in shaping policy, Bush responded negatively. “I will keep it the way it was when I was there... He will be at the table when... we need the intelligence to make critical decisions on foreign affairs. He will not be a political -- trying to shape policy.” (Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 05/18/1991)

Independent Prosecutor Lawrence Walsh calls Gates to testify before the Iran-contra grand jury as a witness.

Gates announces that the U.S. intends to maintain economic sanctions on Iraq until Hussein is out of power.

General Mikhail Moiseyev, the Soviet Chief of the General Staff visits the U.S. on the 20th. On the 27th, Primakov visits D.C. with Shcherbakov and
Yavlinsky to discuss economic reform and western aid. Bush is advised to ask questions directly to the economic reformer, Yavlinsky.

**June**

Yeltsin is elected President of Russia on the 12th. Yeltsin travels to D.C. on the 20th to meet with Bush.

**July**

Alan Fiers, former head of the CIA’s Central American Task Force, accepts a plea bargain from Walsh in the Iran-contra hearings. Fiers pleads guilty to misdemeanor charges but is granted immunity from more serious counts to testify against Clair George. Fiers testifies that knowledge at CIA regarding Iran-contra was more widespread than previously thought, leading Walsh to reopen further investigation. Rumors circulate that Fiers’ testimony had somehow implicated Gates. The Senate Intelligence Committee announces on the 11th that it would delay Gates’ confirmation hearing until mid-September to allow more time to investigate new leads.

Questions arise concerning Gates’ role in overseeing the National Advisory Council and extending loans to Iraq into 1990. The White House confirms that Gates supported the Iraqi agricultural funding but added that Gates helped to stop an additional $570 million in loans to Iraq in mid-1990 when security issues became an increasing concern.

Former Customs commissioner William von Raab names Gates as the source of a 1988 CIA report on the Bank of Credit & Commerce International, in which Gates calls the BCCI the “bank of crooks and criminals.” This raises questions as to the extent of Gates’ knowledge concerning the illegal activities of the BCCI, as well as the CIA’s past dealings with the bank. (*Time*, 08/05/1991)

**August**

Walsh’s final report on Iran-contra stemming from the Fiers’ testimony is released on the 4th. It does not implicate Gates.

Soviet hard-liners attempt a coup on the 18th. Yeltsin sends a letter to Bush from inside the barricaded Russian parliament building on the 19th asking for help. Gates reads the letter to Scowcroft, who is aboard Air Force One. Scowcroft responds by making a stronger statement to the press condemning the coup. Soviet Ambassador Komplektov meets with Gates to alleviate U.S. fears but is received coldly. Gates convenes a meeting of the Deputies Committee later that day to prepare another strong statement condemning the coup, followed by a second Deputies Committee meeting attended by Bush, Scowcroft and Cheney. The coup attempt fails by the 21st.
The “Gang of Eight” first debates the potential implications of a Soviet collapse in a meeting on the 5th. Cheney strongly argues that a Soviet break-up would be in the interests of the U.S. Baker argues that only a peaceful break-up would be in our interest. Powell comes down in the middle. The group decides to make further proposals reducing nuclear weapons to take the international initiative.

Gates’ confirmation hearings before the Senate Intelligence Committee begin on the 16th. Gates testifies that he believes the “CIA and U.S. intelligence community must change and be seen to change - or confront irrelevance and growing sentiment for their dismantlement.” (*Los Angeles Times*, 04/19/1992.)

Senator Bradley accuses Gates on the 17th of breaking the Hughes-Ryan Amendment during and after the Iran-Iraq War by sharing intelligence reports and possibly other materials with Iraq without explicit presidential authorization. Gates denies the allegations, claiming that “the material that was provided to Iraq was allowed within the context of the law.” (*Boston Globe*, 09/18/1991.) Senator Metzenbaum criticizes Gates for remaining on the sidelines during Iran-contra, labeling Gates a “see no evil, hear no evil” bureaucrat.

Alan Fiers testifies that he believed Gates was among the “universe of people” at CIA that knew about Iran-contra. “I think he got glimpses, snatches, and insights into it, enough so he knew there was a problem,” but also added that, “I have serious reason to doubt Bob Gates had extensive knowledge.” (*The Record*, 09/20/1991)

Former CIA Deputy Director Robert Inman testified that Casey ran the CIA in a highly compartmentalized manner and that it was very likely that Casey had kept Gates “out of the loop.” He therefore said he believed Gates’ testimony that he did not have extensive knowledge.

CIA analyst Charles Allen and Acting director Richard Kerr testify on the 24th that they had raised suspicions concerning Iran-contra to Gates in October 1986. Gates testifies that, though Allen’s suspicions were flimsy, he nonetheless took them to Casey. Gates further defused the allegations by adding that he regretted not pursuing the matter more aggressively.

Walsh drops all charges against North in the Iran-contra investigation, deciding instead to concentrate on the prosecution of Clair George.

Gates learns from Stan Moskowitz, the CIA’s chief of congressional affairs, which several of Gates’ colleagues from the CIA had testified
against him behind closed doors on the 25th. The allegations included charges of “politicizing” intelligence reports concerning the threat posed by the Soviet Union.

Gates accompanies the Bush’s to St. Simons Island in Georgia to prepare to defend himself against the allegations.

*October*

Six former and current CIA employees testify before the Senate Intelligence Committee on the 1st and 2nd. Melvin Goodman, a former CIA division chief in Soviet affairs, testifies that Gates had corrupted the intelligence process under Casey in the 1980s in two major areas. “First, nearly all intelligence issues connected with covert action - that is, the operational commitments that Casey had made regarding Iran, Nicaragua and Afghanistan.” The second area “was his world view on the Soviet Union. That is, the Soviet Union as the source of all U.S. problems in the international arena.” (*Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 10/05/1991.)

Harold Ford, a semi-retired 30 year veteran of the CIA, similarly testifies on the 1st and 2nd that some “of Bob Gates’ pressures have gone beyond professional bounds and clearly constitute a skewing of intelligence - not in the fields of military and strategic issues, but chiefly concerning Soviet political matters and the Soviets the third - and the Third World.” Ford had initially intended to provide neutral testimony but changed his mind upon hearing negative opinions and testimony from other colleagues. (*Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 10/05/1991.)

Several other CIA employees defend Gates’ nomination as DCI. Gates responds to his critics by presenting a 20-point rebuttal of the allegations. He testifies that “a careful review of the actual record of what was published and sent to policy-makers demonstrates that the integrity of the process was preserved. We were wrong at times, but our judgments were honest and unaffected by a desire to please or slant.” Gates also points out that much of the negative testimony provided at the hearings was based on second-hand knowledge. (*Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 10/05/1991.)

At an October 4th press conference, Bush denounces the criticisms leveled against Gates concerning the slanting of intelligence reports as “an outrageous assertion against a very honest man.” Senator Rudman says many of the charges were “McCarthyism, pure and simple.” (*Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 10/05/1991)
The “Gang of Eight” meets again on the 11th to discuss whether the U.S. should support a devolution of power to the Soviet republics. Cheney argues yes. The others take more cautious positions.

Senate Intelligence Committee votes on the 18th to recommend Gates for Senate confirmation 11-4. The four senators opposing Gates are Senators Bradley, Metzenbaum, Hollings, and DeConcini. Senator Boren emerges as one of Gates’ strongest advocates, often citing Gates’ commitment to the Congressional oversight process.

**November**

The Senate confirms Robert Gates as DCI on the 5th by a vote of 64-31, the narrowest margin ever recorded for a DCI Senatorial confirmation. All 31 votes against confirmation were cast by democrats. Gates is sworn in as DCI on the 12th.

In Gates’ first official act as DCI, he orders ten short-deadline national intelligence estimates on prospects for stability in the former Soviet Union.

Bush issues National Security Review 29 on the 15th, calling for 20 government agencies to conduct a “top-to-bottom examination of the mission, role, and priorities of the intelligence community.” The agencies respond by calling for greater attention to be given to environmental problems, health issues, ethnic strife, migration and economic trends, in addition to more tradition aspects of national security. (Los Angeles Times, 04/19/1992.)

**December**

Gates announces that the CIA would begin to place much greater emphasis on the monitoring of nuclear and chemical weapons proliferation, as well as terrorism and narcotics trafficking. Gates also announces that he would set up panels to study how the intelligence budget could be reduced while increasing the role of human intelligence.

Gates warns in testimony before a House subcommittee on the 10th that the former Soviet Union would be stricken by “the most significant civil disorder” since the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution this winter. With the Russian republic set to vote on the pending commonwealth pact the following day, Gates argues “The situation is dangerously unstable... The economy is in a free fall with no prospects for reversal in sight.” (Courier-Journal Louisville, 12/11/1991)
January At a meeting at CIA headquarters on the 14th, Gates announces that he would begin reforms to promote greater openness within the U.S. intelligence community and facilitate coordination with law-enforcement agencies.

Testifying before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee on the 15th, Gates warns that the flow of nuclear scientists from the former Soviet Union to unfriendly states could pose a serious proliferation threat. “The area that causes us the greatest concern, more than a loss of materials or weapons, is this so-called brain drain problem.” (Washington Times, 01/16/1992)

February In a speech before the Oklahoma Press Association convention in Tulsa on the 21st, Gates calls for greater reform of the U.S. intelligence community to end its “overarching attitude toward secrecy.” (Los Angeles Times, 04/19/1992.) Gates announces he will transfer responsibility for reviewing historical documents to the Center for the Study of Intelligence, where there will be a bias towards the declassification of all documents over 30 years old.

Gates calls a secret meeting at the end of the month of 80 senior CIA officials at the Farm, a training facility in eastern Virginia, to discuss the question of CIA reform. The consensus emerging from the meeting calls for a fundamental reexamination of the role and functioning of the CIA in the post-Cold War era.

Amidst calls that the CIA use its intelligence networks to spy on U.S. economic competitors, Gates says in an interview, “That kind of activity could quickly embroil us in an enormous legal hassle... After all, if tax dollars are supporting this activity, why are you helping this industry and not that industry?” (San Francisco Chronicle, 02/18/1992.)

Gates also makes a secret trip to Turkey and the Middle East during the month.

March Vice Admiral Studeman, the nominee for deputy director of Central intelligence, tells the Senate Intelligence Committee during his confirmation hearing that Gates had directed him to go directly to the President should he ever feel the DCI was involved in illegal activities.

April Speaking before a joint hearing of the Senate and House intelligence committees, Gates rejects congressional proposals for radical reform and reduction of the U.S. intelligence community. Gates instead calls for evolutionary changes to adapt to the changing international environment.
Speaking before the Economic Club of Detroit, Gates announces that the Bush Administration has called for increased economic intelligence, reflecting the changing nature of foreign threats posed to the U.S. Gates specifically highlighted the prevention of espionage by foreign governments against U.S. companies, the monitoring of international trade agreements, and the monitoring of foreign technological developments as key intelligence objectives.

**June**
Gates is honored as a “Captain of Achievement” with a Golden Plate at the American Academy of Achievements “Salute to Excellence.”

**August**
A federal judge orders Gates to testify for the defense at the trial of Clair George.

**September**
Gates announces that he would meet with KGB officials in Moscow to discuss the possibility of cooperating with the Russians in areas of joint concern, such as terrorism, drug trafficking, and weapons proliferation.

**October**
Gates travels to Moscow to meet with Yeltsin and Russian intelligence officials. This marks the first time a sitting-DCI has ever visited Moscow. Gates announces that cooperation would be unlikely until the Russians stopped spying on the U.S.

**November**
Following accusations that the CIA had withheld information in the criminal investigation of an Atlanta bank illegally lending money to Iraq, Gates says that changes are needed in the law to allow the CIA to investigate Americans and American companies.

Gates warns in an interview that Iran is buying large amounts of North Korean and Russian military weapons that could pose a threat to the U.S. within three to five years.

**December**
Gates warns that should congressional fervor to cut intelligence spending continue, it could severely the intelligence community’s ability to monitor threats around the world.

Gates announces that Saddam Hussein might personally be behind a series of terrorist attacks on UN officials within Iraq.
ROBERT GATES PRELIMINARY AGENDA

First Session:

Joining and Starting Work in the Bush Administration

- How was Gates selected as Deputy National Security Advisor? What were his primary responsibilities? How did Gates’ experience in intelligence help prepare him for and shape his work as Deputy National Security Advisor? How would Gates describe his working relationship with Scowcroft? With President Bush?

- How did Bush restructure the nation’s foreign policy decision-making machinery upon coming to office? How did the NSC fit into that structure? How did Gates understand the role and function of the NSC? How was the NSC organized under Bush? What role did Gates play in managing the interagency process? Why did Bush restructure the NSC to create the Deputies Committee? What was the purpose of the committee?

- What role did Bush’s “inner circle” play in the foreign policy decision-making process? Who was in Bush’s “inner circle”?

- How would Gates describe a typical day working in the White House as the president’s Deputy National Security Advisor?

Major Policy/Political Work

- Why did Bush decide to begin his administration by “strategically pausing” to conduct the NSC review process? What were the findings of this review process? Did Gates find the review useful? How did it suggest the Bush Administration should respond to Gorbachev's initiatives? How did Gates view the nature, purpose, and viability of Gorbachev’s reforms? Did Gates feel the Soviet Union continued to pose a serious threat to the U.S.? How did his views of Gorbachev and the Soviet Union change over time?

- How was the decision made to move beyond the review process and respond to Gorbachev’s initiatives with a proposal to reduce conventional forces in Europe? Was this a controversial decision in the Administration? What other options for responding to Gorbachev’s initiatives were on the table? What was the purpose of Gates’ and Eagleburger’s trip to Europe to meet with NATO leaders in May 1989? Did their mission meet with much resistance from NATO leaders?

- Why did Baker “pull the plug” on the October 1989 speech Gates was to give on Soviet reform? How did news of Baker’s opposition to the speech get leaked to the press?

- Why did the U.S. decide to intervene in the Philippines in support of President Aquino in December 1989 but only with limited military involvement? What role did Gates and the Deputies Committee play in this decision?
• What role did Gates play in the U.S. decision to invade Panama in December 1989? Why did the U.S. decide not to intervene two months earlier in support of the coup? How would Gates assess the performance of the U.S. intelligence community in helping the president to make these decisions?

• What role did Gates play in the German unification process? What were the biggest obstacles to German unification? What was the purpose of the European Strategy Steering Group? Who was in the Steering Group? How was the issue of NATO reform tied to German unification? How did Gates view the rapid pace of German unification?

• What role did Gates play in shaping U.S. Iraqi policy prior to the invasion of Kuwait? What issues were raised at the Deputies Committee meetings in the spring of 1990 concerning Iraq? Does Gates feel that a better U.S. policy could have prevented the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait? Why was Bush so committed to challenging Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait? Who were the key players involved in U.S. decision-making throughout the conflict? What was Gates’ role in this process? How was the coalition’s goal of expelling Iraq from Kuwait but stopping at the Iraqi border set during the Gulf War?

• How did the Gulf War affect the U.S.’s response to the Soviet crackdown in the Baltic states? How did Bush’s senior advisers feel the U.S. should respond? How was U.S. policy during the Soviet coup made? Why did the Administration continue to tie its support to Gorbachev both before and after the coup?

• Why did the U.S. decide to intervene in places such as Somalia but not the former Yugoslavia? What were the primary criteria driving U.S. decision-making?

Second Session:

Joining and Starting Work as the Director of Central Intelligence

• How was Gates nominated as Director of Central Intelligence? What impact does Gates feel his prior nomination and involvement in the Iran-Contra hearings had on his nomination? Did Gates anticipate such strong opposition in the Senate? What issues did Gates expect would provide major obstacles to his confirmation? Which obstacles did Gates not anticipate? Did Gates feel that any of the allegations leveled against him were particularly unfair? Did Gates feel that any of the criticisms were legitimate? How did the Alan Fiers plea bargain affect Gates’ confirmation process?

• Who were Gates’ biggest supporters in the confirmation process? Who were his biggest opponents? Did Gates fear that the particularly “bloody” nature of the confirmation process would damage his ability to lead the U.S. intelligence community into the post-Cold War era?
• How did Gates understand his responsibilities as Director of Central Intelligence? How did he understand the role and function of the U.S. intelligence community? How did Gates feel this role was affected by the end of the Cold War? How was intelligence policy made in the Bush Administration? Who were the major actors responsible for setting intelligence policy? How did Gates understand the relationship between the analytical and operational arms of the intelligence community? Did Gates find it necessary to address concerns that intelligence reports were being slanted and "politicized?"

• Why did Bush issue NSR-29 calling for a reevaluation of the U.S. intelligence community at the start of Gates’ tenure as DCI? What were the findings of this review? How did Gates feel the intelligence community needed to be reformed? How did Gates feel the end of the Cold War affected the nature of the threats posed to the U.S.? Which issues did Gates believe required greater attention in the post-Cold War era? Which issues required less? How did the end of the Cold War affect the levels of funding provided to the intelligence community?

• How did the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union affect the U.S. intelligence community’s relationship with Russian intelligence? Were any efforts taken to cooperate with Russian intelligence? In which areas did Gates feel the U.S. and Russians shared joint concerns? What did Gates believe was the proper role of intelligence in providing for the nations economic security?

• How did Gates understand the role and value of Congressional oversight? What was the scope of this oversight? What did Gates believe to be the advantages and disadvantages of strong Congressional oversight?

Third Session:

The Bush Presidency in Retrospect

• Which were the most significant issues Gates had to deal with during his tenure as Deputy National Security Advisor? What types of issues tended to occupy most of his time? Which were the most significant issues facing Gates as DCI?

• What does Gates feel was the greatest accomplishment of the Bush Administration? What does he feel was his greatest personal accomplishment? What aspect of the Bush Administration’s foreign policy record would he most like to have changed?

• Which of Gates’ positions did he find most rewarding? Why? In what areas did Gates feel he made the biggest difference? Does Gates feel his tenure as DCI has had any lasting organizational effects? How well does Gates feel the reforms he implemented as DCI have held up over time?
• In light of his tumultuous experience, how does Gates feel the Senate confirmation process should be changed? Does Gates feel that anything positive came out of his Senate confirmation process?

• Was the press’ picture of the Bush presidency accurate? What did the press get wrong?

• How might things have been different had Bush been elected to a second term? What unfulfilled national security goals does Gates most wish the Bush Administration could have continued working towards? How might the Bush Administration have continued working towards its goal of building a “new world order”?

• How should the Bush Administration be viewed by future historians? What is most important for them to know in order to understand the Bush Administration and its place in history?