President George W. Bush
Oral History Project

BRIEFING MATERIALS

John Negroponte
September 14, 2012

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Presidential Oral History Program

MAY NOT BE REPRODUCED OR CIRCULATED
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Negroponte graduates from Yale University, where he was a fraternity brother of President George W. Bush’s uncle, William H.T. Bush, and Porter Goss, who would later serve as director of the Central Intelligence Agency (DCIA) under Negroponte. <em>(The Washington Post, 06/21/2004)</em>&lt;br&gt;After briefly attending Harvard Law School, Negroponte joins the Foreign Service. He goes on to serve in eight different Foreign Service posts in Asia, Europe and Latin America, including a post in Saigon beginning in 1964. Negroponte also works in the Nixon White House on the National Security Council (NSC) staff as director for Vietnam under Henry Kissinger. Negroponte also serves as deputy assistant secretary of state for fisheries and, later, as deputy assistant secretary of state for Far East affairs in the Carter Administration directly under Richard Holbrooke. <em>(The Washington Post, 06/21/2004; <a href="http://maglobal.com">http://maglobal.com</a>)</em></td>
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<td>1985-1987</td>
<td>Negroponte is named assistant secretary of state for oceans and international environmental and scientific affairs.</td>
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<td>1996-1997</td>
<td>Negroponte serves as special coordinator with Panama on negotiations to extend U.S. presence in Panama after 1999.</td>
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2001

March  
Negroponte is named U.S. ambassador to the United Nations (UN). Negroponte had reportedly indicated to Powell in December that he was ready to accept another government assignment. Powell reportedly assured Negroponte that President George W. Bush wanted to emphasize the role the UN would play in foreign affairs. Powell supports Negroponte’s nomination because Powell reportedly believes the press would not be able to drive a wedge between himself and Negroponte, his former deputy in the Reagan White House. Elizabeth Dole had already declined the nomination, reportedly because it would not be a cabinet-level position as it had been under Clinton. Before gaining the nomination, Negroponte first had to interview with President George W. Bush. Negroponte’s controversial tenure as ambassador to Honduras reportedly delays his Senate confirmation, as some Democrats charge Negroponte had not been forceful enough in his protest of human rights abuses in Honduras. (Liebmann, p. 215; The Washington Post, 03/07/2001, 06/21/2004; USA Today, 11/09/2001)

July  
With some Democratic senators continuing to block Negroponte’s nomination, Powell calls Negroponte “one of the most distinguished foreign service officers and American public servants I have ever known.” (USA Today, 07/23/2001) In the seven months the U.S. has been without a permanent representative, the Bush Administration failed to win support for revised sanctions against Iraq. The U.S. was also voted off the UN Human Rights Commission for the first time. James Cunningham has been serving as acting U.S. ambassador to the UN since Richard Holbrooke stepped down in January.

September  
Al-Qaeda launches the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Negroponte is reportedly at the State Department at the time of the attacks. The building is cleared and Negroponte returns home by car to be with his family. (Liebmann, p. 217)

On the 12th, the UN passes Resolution 1368 recognizing the right of self-defense and recognizing terrorist acts as acts of war. (Liebmann, p. 218)

On the 15th, Negroponte is confirmed by the Senate as U.S. ambassador to the UN by a unanimous voice vote and is sworn in on the 18th. (http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov; USA Today, 11/09/2001)

On the 20th, Bush addresses a special joint session of Congress to outline a plan for the war on terror.

On the 28th, the UN Security Council (UNSC) unanimously passes Resolution 1373 pledging cooperation in fighting terrorism and setting up a commission led by the British to monitor cooperation. Negroponte quickly gains wide praise for his work to build international support for the war on terror. (USA Today, 11/09/2001; http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/sc7158.doc.htm)
October  The U.S. launches airstrikes in Afghanistan on the 7th. Earlier that day, Negroponte had requested a UNSC session as required under Article 51 of the UN Charter and announced that the U.S. will exercise its right of self-defense against the Taliban. Negroponte had also reportedly delivered a stern warning to Iraq’s UN ambassador not to take advantage of U.S. involvement in Afghanistan. Some newspapers report that Negroponte had walked into Iraq’s UN mission without an appointment, an allegation Negroponte strongly denies. (Liebmann, p. 218; *The Washington Post*, 1/14/2003)

On the 13th, Bush announces the U.S. intends to withdraw from the ABM Treaty within six months. (*The Washington Post*, 12/16/2001)

On the 26th, Bush signs the Patriot Act into law.

November  The President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (the Scowcroft panel), which has been studying the U.S. intelligence community since May, recommends shifting the National Security Agency (NSA), National Reconnaissance Office, and National Imagery and Mapping Agency from the Pentagon to the CIA director. (*The Washington Post*, 11/08/2001)

Bush meets with General Pervez Musharraf, president of Pakistan, on the 10th in Negroponte’s residence in New York to discuss U.S.-Pakistan relations in the war on terror. (Robert Draper, *Dead Certain*, New York: Free Press, 2007, p. 163)

On the 11th, Bush speaks for the first time before the UN General Assembly to help build international support in the war on terror. Bush also renews his calls for the creation of a Palestinian state and, for the first time, refers to the state as Palestine. (*The New York Times*, 11/11/2001)

December  The UN holds a conference in Bonn, Germany to agree on a governance plan for Afghanistan. The Bonn Process is ratified by the UN and Hamid Karzai is named chairman of the interim government. Defense Department (DoD) officials support a “smaller footprint” to avoid the U.S. being seen as occupiers. (Douglas Feith, *War and Decision*, New York: Harper, 2008, pp. 134, 140)

On the 20th, the UNSC unanimously passes a resolution authorizing a multinational peacekeeping force for Afghanistan under British leadership. Negroponte says it is important the peacekeepers do not interfere with U.S. efforts to round up any remaining al-Qaeda and Taliban forces in Afghanistan. (*CNN*, 12/20/2001)

2002

January  White House official Zalmay Khalilzad and State Department official Ryan Crocker secretly meet with Iranian officials to discuss potential cooperation in operations against Iraq, such as having Iran seal its border to prevent Ba’athist

Bush delivers his State of the Union address on the 29th, which identifies Iraq, Iran and North Korea as the “Axis of Evil.”

**February**  
Negroponte argues for greater training of Afghan security forces to minimize the role of international forces in Afghanistan. Negroponte also calls for greater economic assistance to be given to Afghanistan from the U.S. and international community. (Liebmann, pp. 219-220)

Bush announces on the 7th that Taliban and al-Qaeda detainees will be treated humanely in accord with the Geneva Conventions, but neither are entitled to POW status. However the detainees will be provided with many POW privileges. (*Office of the White House Press Secretary*, 02/07/2002)

**March**  
The U.S. formally withdraws from the 1972 ABM Treaty on the 13th.

Negroponte attends a UN conference on international development in Mexico where Bush announces a 50% increase in U.S. development assistance.

**Spring**  
The UN holds donor conferences to develop a strategy for Afghanistan. The Bush Administration supports the strategy to divide Afghanistan’s main requirements into categories and assign a “lead nation” for each one. (Feith, pp. 153-155)

**May**  
On the 7th, the Deputies discuss UN weapons inspections in Iraq. Bush sides with State to use the UN’s Monitoring Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) to pressure Iraq to disarm its WMD program. (Feith, pp. 300-301)

**June**  
Bush delivers a speech at West Point on the 1st outlining his “Bush Doctrine” on the legitimacy of military preemption.

On the 24th, Bush calls for the creation of an independent Palestinian state.  

**July**  
Negroponte threatens the U.S. will pull out of Bosnia’s peacekeeping force if U.S. personnel do not have immunity from ICC jurisdiction. (Liebmann, p. 237)

On the 26th during a closed UNSC meeting, Negroponte announces that the U.S. will veto any UN resolutions condemning Israel abuses that fail to also condemn Palestinian terrorism. The announcement, which becomes known as the Negroponte doctrine, comes in the wake of a UN investigation of alleged Israeli abuses in the Jenin refugee camp. (Liebmann, p. 235; *Daily News*, 08/02/2002)

**September**  
Bush addresses Congress on the 4th asking for support to take action against Iraq.
At an NSC Principals meeting on the 7th, Bush decides to seek a UN resolution on Iraq and to make the case at an upcoming speech at the UN. Cheney and Rumsfeld reportedly favored bypassing the UN and issuing an ultimatum directly to Iraq, while Powell called for a UN resolution. (Rice, pp. 180-181)

Bush speaks before the UN General Assembly on the 12th, calling for regime change in Iraq and announcing that the U.S. would act alone, if necessary. Powell and Negroponte quickly work on negotiations to build support within the UNSC for a resolution. (Rice, pp. 183-184)

Negroponte is admitted to the hospital for prostate cancer surgery on the 21st. This is reportedly Negroponte’s first break since becoming ambassador one year ago. Negroponte says his “plate has been full” working on the crises involving al-Qaeda, Iraq and the Middle East, while paying courtesy calls to over 150 foreign delegates. Powell had reportedly asked Negroponte if he could postpone the surgery, but Negroponte’s doctors answer no. Negroponte returns to work ten days later. (The Washington Post, 01/14/2003)

October
On the 11th, Congress passes a resolution authorizing military force against Iraq. Bush signs the authorization on the 16th.

November
On the 8th, the UNSC unanimously passes Resolution 1441 giving Iraq a final opportunity to disarm. Negroponte and Powell had been working for over six weeks to build support for a tough resolution. Negroponte credits Bush and Powell for providing critical political muscle. Syria was reportedly the last hold-out. The resolution gives Iraq one month to issue a declaration of its weapons programs and to begin the verification process. (Rice, pp. 183-185; Karen DeYoung, Soldier: The Life of Colin Powell, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006, p. 420; The Washington Post, 01/14/2003)

December
The Bush Administration announces on the 19th that Iraq’s weapons declaration to the UN is in material breach of UN Resolution 1441. Negroponte accuses Iraq of “falling back on omissions, evasions and untruths.” (The Mirror, 12/20/2002) However the Administration says it will let UN weapons inspections play out and continue to work within the UN process. (Daily News, 12/19/2002)

2003

January
In an interview with The Washington Post, Negroponte recollects the lessons of Vietnam when assessing the situation in Iraq. While noting that “it is not for me to decide,” Negroponte says he would prefer a cautious approach and, further adds, regime change has not been “part of the purview of our UN policies.” (The Washington Post, 1/14/2003) Negroponte also credits Hans Blix of UNMOVIC for getting inspections quickly started.
On the 27th, Blix presents his report on Iraq’s weapons program to the UNSC. The report finds that Iraq has not disarmed as required under UN Resolution 1441, but that no evidence of a current WMD program was found. (Rice, p. 185; Feith, p. 352; The New York Times, 01/28/2003)

February

On the 5th, Powell presents the case before the UNSC that Iraq has WMDs. Negroponte and George Tenet, the director of central intelligence (DCI), sit behind Powell during the UN speech. (George Tenet, At the Center of the Storm, New York: Perennial, 2007, pp. 371-375; DeYoung, p. 442; Rice, pp. 199-201)

Blix gives his second UNMOVIC report to the UNSC on the 14th. Rice calls the second report more ambiguous than the January 27th report, which was critical of Saddam’s lack of cooperation with weapons inspectors. Rice later notes that the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency had told her that he did not believe that Saddam had reconstituted his nuclear program. (Rice, pp. 185-186)

On the 24th, the U.S. introduces a second resolution in the UNSC to authorize the use of force against Iraq. The language in Resolution 1441 passed last November regarding the authorization of the use of force was reportedly ambiguous. British Prime Minister Tony Blair, who is facing strong opposition at home to taking military action in Iraq, had come to the White House on January 31st to let Bush know that he would need the second resolution to support the war. Nine votes are needed on the UNSC for a resolution to pass. Powell reportedly believes there is a chance he can get nine or ten votes. In addition to the U.S. and England, the Administration believes it has the support of Spain and Bulgaria, with Mexico and Chile being key swing votes. France, Russia and China oppose the resolution but could possibly abstain and not use their veto power. (Rice, pp. 201-204; The Mirror, 03/14/2003)

Feb.-Mar.

A January 31st NSA memorandum instructing agents to electronically eavesdrop on six UNSC members who are reportedly undecided about the second Iraqi resolution is leaked. (The Times, 03/03/2003)

March

On the 5th, France, Russia and Germany announce they will not let a UNSC resolution authorizing the use of force pass. (Liebmann, p. 227)

On the 10th, the British propose a compromise resolution giving Iraq a short window to pass six tests. Bush had reportedly agreed to Blair’s request for a brief delay before moving forward, but France, Germany and Russia reject the compromise. France renews its pledge to veto any resolution that sets a deadline. (Liebmann, p. 227)

On the 12th, the UNSC passes for the first time a resolution endorsing Palestinian statehood. The U.S. votes in favor of the resolution, just two days before it is set to send General Anthony Zinni to the region in an effort to end a 17-month uprising that has left over 1,300 dead. (Daily News, 03/12/2002)
On the 15th, Chile proposes a 30-day deadline for Iraq, which reportedly gains French support. However the U.S. reportedly opposes the proposal because of concerns regarding the U.S.’s military timetable and the climate in Iraq. (Liebmann, p. 227)

On the 17th, Bush orders Negroponte to withdraw the second resolution at the UN and gives Saddam a 48-hour ultimatum to leave Iraq. In a national address later that night, Bush explains that the UNSC “has not lived up to its responsibilities, so we will rise to ours.” (George W. Bush, Decision Points, New York: Crown Publishers, 2010, p. 253)

On the 19th, Bush gives the order to begin Operation Iraqi Freedom.

**April**

On the 9th, U.S. forces enter Baghdad.

**May**

On the 6th, Rumsfeld announces Paul Bremer will serve as special envoy to Iraq to head the U.S.-led Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), which will oversee reconstruction efforts. Bremer taps Pat Kennedy, who is serving as a deputy ambassador to the UN under Negroponte, to serve as chief of staff for the CPA. (Paul Bremer, My Year In Iraq, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006, pp. 7-9, 40; Terry Anderson, Bush’s Wars, New York: Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 149)

On the 22nd, the UNSC passes a resolution 14-0 to lift the 13-year economic sanctions on Iraq and transfer legal control over Iraq’s oil industry to the U.S. and Britain for one year. A last-minute U.S. compromise also reportedly gives the UN an independent, limited role and keeps open the possibility of UN weapons inspectors returning to Iraq. Russia, France, Germany and China voted for the resolution despite having reservations. Russia, which is due billions in oil contracts from Iraq, reportedly fought an exemption that prevents Russia from collecting on the debts until an Iraqi government is established. The U.S. also faced pressure from Britain for the return of weapons inspectors. The U.S. had introduced the resolution on the 9th. (Daily News, 05/20/2003; The Philadelphia Inquirer, 05/23/2003)

**June**

On the 4th, Bush meets with Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and Palestinian Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas in Jordan to discuss the peace process.

**July**

On the 13th, the CPA appointed 25-member Iraqi Governing Council is announced. It includes members of all Iraqi factions but is predominantly made up of Shiite Muslims and prominent exiles. (The New York Times, 07/13/2003)

**August**

On the 19th, Bremer asks Negroponte’s office to look into bureaucratic problems which were slowing the processing of funds held by the UN for contracts to provide goods and services in Iraq. Bremer has also asked Chief of Staff Andy Card for help with the slow bureaucratic response from agencies like the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) and the Agency for International Development to speed up the funding process. (Bremer, pp. 70, 114, 139; Rumsfeld, p. 511)

On the 19th, a suicide bomber strikes the UN headquarters in Baghdad killing 23, including the chief UN representative to Iraq. (http://www.cfr.org)

**September**

On the 7th, Bush addresses the nation on the war on terror, including Iraq. The president plans to ask Congress for $87 billion for the war on terror and to work on a UN resolution to create a multinational force in Iraq. (Bremer, p. 157)

Negroponte attends Powell’s meeting at the UN with South Korea’s foreign minister, who asks for greater flexibility from the U.S. and other countries attending the multilateral talks with North Korea over its nuclear weapons program. (BBC, 09/26/2003)

**October**

On the 2nd, Chief U.S. Weapons Inspector David Kay reports that the Iraq Survey Group did not find WMDs in Iraq, but did find laboratories for chemical and biological weapons. (http://www.cia.gov)

On the 14th, the U.S. vetoes a UNSC resolution condemning Israel’s security fence as illegal. The vote comes just days after Israel launched airstrikes inside Syria against an alleged terrorist training camp in retaliation for a suicide bombing of a Haifa restaurant. Syria called for the UN to condemn the airstrikes. (The Australian, 10/07/2003, The Jerusalem Post, 10/16/2003)

Negroponte resists UN pressure for an interim government to be quickly installed in Iraq, reportedly arguing that it would not likely improve the security situation. Chile proposes a resolution requiring that a timetable for transition be submitted by December 15th. (Liebmann, pp. 237-238)

**November**

On the 15th, the CPA and the Iraqi Governing Council agree to the governance plan which would transfer sovereignty from the CPA back to Iraq by June 30th, 2004. (Bremer, p. 231)

On the 19th, the UNSC unanimously endorses the “road map” peace plan in the Middle East over Israeli objections. The peace plan was drafted by the U.S., Russia, UN and EU, and was accepted by Israeli and Palestinian leaders last year in Jordan. It calls for Israel and a newly created Palestinian state to peacefully coexist. However, the U.S. attempted unsuccessfully to prevent the vote when it was unable to include harsh language condemning terrorism into the Russian-sponsored UNSC resolution. Israel reportedly fears it will be forced into making unwanted concessions by the resolution. (The Washington Times, 11/20/2003)

**December**

On the 14th, Saddam is captured. (http://www.cfr.org)
January  Negroponte meets with Bremer, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, and Britain’s ambassador to the UN, Jeremy Greenstock, to discuss the timing of the Iraqi elections. (Liebmann, p. 249)

February  On the 6th, Bush announces the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (Silberman-Robb Commission) to investigate intelligence errors in the case of Iraq’s WMDs. (http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov)

March  Bremer convinces the Governing Council to bring in the UN special envoy, Lakhdar Brahimi, to help develop a process to choose an interim government. Bremer continues to face resistance from Ali Sistani, a Shiite cleric who has been demanding direct national elections. (Bremer, pp. 310-311, 315)

Four Blackwater contractors are killed in Fallujah on the 31st. The U.S. launches Operation Vigilant Resolve against the insurgent forces. Bremer brokers a ceasefire in Fallujah, which effectively leaves the insurgents in place in the city. Bremer continues facing resistance from the Mahdi army, Moqtada al Sadr’s insurgent forces, revolting in Najaf, Kufa, Kut, Sadr City, and other southern cities. (Bremer, pp. 310-315; Rumsfeld, pp. 532-538)

April  60 Minutes runs a segment on prisoner abuses at the Abu Ghraib prison. (Donald Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown, New York: Sentinel, 2011, pp. 593-594)

On the 19th, Negroponte is named U.S. ambassador to Iraq. Sovereignty is set to transfer back to Iraq on June 30th, but Bush reportedly has not yet decided whether State or DoD will have ultimate authority over the mission in Iraq. If confirmed, Negroponte will work with the UN to help the Iraqi people elect a national assembly, draft a new constitution, and elect a permanent government. Negroponte’s nomination reportedly signals that the Bush Administration hopes the UN will play an important role in Iraq after sovereignty is transferred back. Negroponte had reportedly volunteered for the position. Robert Blackwill, Paul Wolfowitz and Thomas Pickering were also reportedly considered. Negroponte reportedly agrees to serve in the position for one year. (Bob Woodward, State of Denial, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006, pp. 306-313; Liebmann, pp. 240, 258; The Washington Post, 04/20/2004)

May  Negroponte is confirmed on the 6th as ambassador to Iraq by a 95-3 Senate vote, making him the head of the largest diplomatic mission in U.S. history. A few days later, Bush signs a directive transferring authority from DoD to the State Department over all U.S. government employees in Iraq not under an area military commander. (Woodward, State of Denial, pp. 306-313; Liebmann, p. 241)
Negroponte helps to secure unanimous support on the 8th for UNSC Resolution 1546 endorsing the transition of sovereignty from the CPA to an Iraq interim government by June 30th while continuing international control over security forces in Iraq. The U.S.-British-sponsored resolution was introduced on the 6th. (Liebmann, p. 243)

On the 31st, Bremer and the Governance Team review the candidates for president of Iraq. The position is offered and accepted by Ghazi al-Yawar after Pachachi turns it down. (Bremer, pp. 375-376)

*Early Summer* To help improve military-civil coordination in Iraq, the president invites Negroponte and General George Casey, the new ground commander in Iraq, and their wives, to dinner at the White House. Bremer reportedly had a “strained relationship” with Lt. General Ricardo Sanchez, the former ground commander, who ends his tour in June. (Rumsfeld, pp. 671-672)

*June* Negroponte is sworn-in as ambassador to Iraq on the 23rd, replacing Bremer as the highest ranking U.S. official in Iraq.

The U.S. returns sovereignty to Iraq on the 28th, two days ahead of schedule to minimize chances of insurgent attack. The CPA ceases to exist as the appointed interim government, headed by Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, takes over. Bremer leaves the country immediately and Negroponte presents his credentials to senior Iraqi officials on the 30th. Negroponte reportedly makes security, which includes providing greater military training for the Iraqis and reestablishing the Iraqi government’s authority, his highest priority. Bremer reportedly drew criticism for simultaneously prioritizing reconstruction and economic development along with security, as insurgents would often destroy reconstruction projects as soon as they were completed. Negroponte taps Robert Earle, a public affairs officer in Mexico, as a political adviser in Iraq. Negroponte has Patrick Kennedy, his former deputy at the UN (who has most recently been working for Bremer at the CPA), set up the embassy. Ambassador James Jeffrey oversees the Bremer-Negroponte transition. One of Negroponte’s principal instructions from the State Department upon arriving in Baghdad is to reduce U.S. corruption in Iraq and “get control of the money.” (Liebmann, p. 246) Reportedly $8.8 billion in CPA funds were unaccounted for or misspent. Negroponte also reportedly begins to ease back on de-Ba’athification. He also is quickly credited for letting the Iraqi leaders take the lead, avoiding the temptation to micro-manage the military, and for changing reconstruction strategy, particularly with regards to procurement rules. (Liebmann, pp. 241-256; http://web.ebscohost.com)

*Summer* Negroponte and Casey establish their offices next to each other in Baghdad. Negroponte reportedly establishes a good relationship with the military, working together with Casey to create a “joint campaign plan that for the first time in the conflict fully unified the military, economic and diplomatic strands” of the U.S. effort in Iraq. (Rumsfeld, p. 672) One of Negroponte’s first actions is to shift $3.3
billion of his funds for electricity and water projects to more urgent needs like security. Negroponte and Casey sit down together to write and sign two mission statements as a “symbolic affirmation.” (Liebmann, p. 240) Negroponte begins having weekly dinners with Casey and Allawi. (Woodward, State of Denial, pp. 315-316; Bush, p. 362)

**July**

Tenet steps down as director of central intelligence (DCI). He is replaced by Goss. (Tenet, p. 489)

**August**

U.S. forces encircle al Sadr’s forces around Najaf, which is home to one of Shiite Islam’s holiest shrines. Negroponte has reportedly been calling to step up efforts to eliminate insurgent forces in Iraq prior to next January’s elections. Sistani helps negotiate a truce in which al Sadr’s forces agree to disarm and leave Najaf. The interim government agrees to withdraw U.S. and Iraqi forces from Najaf and not to prosecute al Sadr’s forces, leaving al Sadr free to participate in political elections. U.S. and Iraqi forces are credited with avoiding damage to the mosque, but later are accused of violating the truce and attempting to assassinate al Sadr. Negroponte and Casey deny having any knowledge of the attempt. (Liebmann, pp. 248-249; The New York Times, 08/27/2004)

**September**

The Iraq Survey Group releases its report. It finds corruption in the UN Oil-for-Food program and evidence that Iraq has cheated on UN sanctions, but that Iraq halted its nuclear program and destroyed its chemical weapons in 1991. (Tenet, p. 415; http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/report/2004/isg-final-report/)

Negroponte releases $2.2 billion to the military to reinforce security, expanding the size of the Iraqi security budget and its police force. (Liebmann, p. 241)

**October**

On the 7th, Chief U.S. Weapons Inspector Charles Duelfer issues a report contradicting most pre-war claims regarding Iraq’s WMD program.

On the 22nd, congressional negotiations break down over the bill to restructure U.S. intelligence. It remains unclear if the director of the CIA (DCIA) will be more independent from the new DNI or be placed under DNI control. Under the old system, the DCI held dual responsibilities to head both the CIA and the intelligence community as a whole. (Thomas Fingar, “Office of the Director of National Intelligence,” in Roger George and Harvey Rishikof, eds., The National Security Enterprise: Navigating the Labyrinth, Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, p. 142)

**November**

The CIA station chief in Baghdad reportedly sends a warning that the situation in Iraq is deteriorating. It mirrors the conclusions made by other senior CIA officers visiting Iraq. (The New York Times, 12/07/2004)

Bush orders U.S. troops into Fallujah on the 8th in an attempt to re-take the city from insurgents. Bush had held a videoconference on the 5th with Negroponte,
Casey, and General John Abizaid, the head of Central Command. Negroponte and Casey both argued that retaking the insurgent stronghold was essential to keeping security during the January elections. The last pockets of resistance in Fallujah are neutralized by December. (Scott McClellan, What Happened, New York: Public Affairs, 2008, p. 241; Woodward, State of Denial, p. 359)

Powell announces his resignation, effective January 15th. Rice is named to succeed him.


December

Negroponte authorizes a second budgetary reallocation of $246 million for security in four cities encountering insurgents. A third reallocation provided an additional $225 million for security in Baghdad and $607 million for oil, electric and water facilities. (Liebmann, p. 242)

Negroponte instructs his political adviser Robert Earle to draft a memo to the president assessing the situation in Iraq and analyzing how the U.S. should work with the Iraqi government and international community over the next five to ten years to resolve existing problems. The memo addresses inadequate funding for security and infrastructure, the lack of support from the international community, as well as the complexity of the insurgency and its relationship with Iraqi political leaders. The memo is reportedly not well received by Bush, who would prefer to address problems in a shorter time frame. Rice sends a team to meet with Negroponte the next month. (Robert Earle, Nights in the Pink Motel, Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2008, pp. 147-152; Liebmann, pp. 252-256)

On the 8th, Congress passes the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (the Intelligence Reform Act), which would constitute the largest restructuring of the U.S. intelligence community since 1947. (Fingar, p. 139)

Bush signs the Intelligence Reform Act on the 17th, creating a new director of national intelligence (DNI) to oversee and integrate the nation’s fifteen intelligence agencies. The restructuring had been recommended by the 9/11 Commission to facilitate greater coordination and communication and limit bureaucratic in-fighting within the U.S. intelligence community. Bush argues the restructuring will help “ensure that our intelligence agencies work as a single, unified enterprise.” (The Washington Post, 12/18/2004) In addition to heading the intelligence community, the new DNI will serve as the top intelligence adviser to the president and will have budget authority over the intelligence community. The legislation also creates a National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), which the DNI will oversee. However, the new DNI will not have operational control over the covert and clandestine operations of any of the intelligence community’s

2005

January

On the 5th, Negroponte participates in an NSC meeting by videoconference to discuss whether to postpone the Iraqi elections set for the 30th. Goss favors postponement. There are reportedly concerns that the Sunnis’ will boycott the elections, and that the Sunnis’ reaction to a Shiite government could trigger more sectarian violence. Casey opposes postponement. Negroponte reportedly considers the possibility of postponement but ultimately supports holding them on time, arguing that security would be adequate. Annan and Brahimi at the UN favor postponement, as does the Iraqi prime minister, Allawi. Sistani in Iraq, as well as much of the international community, oppose postponement. Bush decides not to postpone the elections. (Woodward, State of Denial, pp. 370-382)

Iraq holds elections on the 30th to create a National Assembly charged with the task of drafting a new constitution and selecting a three-person presidency council and prime minister. New elections will be held in December once the constitution is ratified by referendum in an October election. The elections are held using party lists and a nationwide constituency as opposed to geographic districts. The election is boycotted by Sunni politicians, which Negroponte later calls his greatest regret as ambassador to Iraq. Sistani’s Shia allies win over half of the 275 seats. The bulk of the remainder of seats go to the Kurdish Alliance and the secular Iraqi group. Negroponte had reportedly fought off a plan to try to limit the size of the Shia victory. The assignment of ministries in the new government is not resolved until after Negroponte steps down next month. (Liebmann, pp. 242, 249, 259; http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov)

Rice sends Ambassador Richard Jones and her counselor, Philip Zelikow, to Iraq to meet with Negroponte. Negroponte reportedly asks Earle to draft a mission statement before the group’s arrival. (Liebmann, pp. 255-256; Earle, pp. 197-200, 209-216)

February

On the 17th, Negroponte is nominated as the first DNI, a cabinet-level position responsible for overseeing the nation’s intelligence community and carrying out intelligence reforms to create a more effective, unified intelligence community. Negroponte later says the focus of the reforms is on information sharing and integration of the intelligence community. In addition to overseeing the reforms, Negroponte will serve as the principal intelligence adviser to the president, set intelligence collection and analytic priorities, establish standards for all intelligence personnel, and oversee the nation’s $40 billion a year intelligence budget. “That’s why Negroponte is going to have a lot of influence,” Bush argues. “He will set the budgets.” (The Washington Post, 2/17/2005) Bush had reportedly come to know Negroponte, who he calls “Ponte,” through weekly calls from Baghdad. Bush selects Air Force Lt. Gen. Michael Hayden, who has headed the
NSA for the past five years, to be Negroponte’s deputy. Reaction to Negroponte’s nomination in the intelligence community is very positive. Khalilzad replaces Negroponte as ambassador to Iraq. (Liebmann, p. 289; The Washington Post, 2/18/2005; The New York Times, 03/11/2005)

On the 18th, Card states that the DNI will take over the production of the President’s Daily Brief (PDB) from the DCIA, as recommended by the Silberman-Robb Commission. Goss, the DCIA, reportedly continues attending NSC and principals committee meetings with the DNI during the initial transition period. (Fingar, pp. 145-147; The Washington Post, 02/19/2005)

Negroponte shifts responsibility for preparing the DNI for NSC meetings from the CIA’s directorate of intelligence (CIA/DI) to the National Intelligence Council (NIC), which the Intelligence Reform Act had shifted from the DCI to the office of the DNI. Previously the CIA/DI had been able to rely primarily on CIA resources in preparing for NSC meetings, but the NIC now reportedly engages analysts from across the intelligence community – both as a practical effect of shifting NSC briefing preparations outside of the CIA, and as a result of intelligence community directives directing intelligence officers to seek input from the best analysts in the intelligence community, regardless of their bureaucratic home. (Fingar, p. 146)

March

On the 31st, the Silberman-Robb Commission releases its final report on Iraq prewar intelligence. It concludes there was a major intelligence failure in Iraq, but policy officials did not politicize Iraq intelligence. Bush had also asked the commission to make specific recommendations on how the new intelligence bill should be implemented. It provides 74 recommendations but raises concerns regarding the DNI’s limited power. (http://www.gpoaccess.gov)

On the 29th, the Silberman-Robb Commission tells Bush that both the CIA’s plan to increase the number of analysts and intelligence operators, and the FBI’s plans to integrate and upgrade its intelligence programs, are inadequate. The CIA has had a slow increase in operation officers, and it needs to re-think the ways it deploys them. The commission says the DNI will need to exert strong leadership to re-address these issues. (The Washington Post, 04/15/2005)

April

Negroponte is confirmed as DNI on the 21st by a 98-2 Senate vote. Negroponte brings in Patrick Kennedy and Mary Margaret Graham, a former CIA station chief in New York, to serve as his deputies, and David Shedd as his chief of staff. Negroponte also brings in Thomas Fingar, who had disagreed with the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) regarding Iraq’s WMDs as the State Department intelligence director, to “make a statement.” (Liebmann, p. 264) Negroponte’s other deputy, Hayden, who had been selected by Bush, works on integrating the various intelligence agencies. One of Negroponte’s first priorities is to strengthen human intelligence and analytic capability. Negroponte reportedly relies on the Silberman-Robb Commission report to help serve as a road map.
commission’s 74 recommendations are implemented. Negroponte begins serving as Bush’s top intelligence adviser his first day on the job, and begins attending the daily intelligence briefing with the president, vice president, chief of staff, national security adviser, and the professional briefer from the PDB staff. When Bush travels, the briefer (but not necessarily Negroponte), travels with the president. (Liebmann, pp. 266, 271; The Washington Post, 4/19/2006; U.S. News & World Report, 11/03/2006)

On the 21st, Goss becomes DCIA under the new Intelligence Reform Act. Negroponte tells the CIA station chiefs around the world to report back to him in matters that include other intelligence agencies. (The Washington Post, 05/13/2005; http://www.portergoss.com)

**June**

An Italian judge issues arrest warrants for thirteen CIA agents on charges of kidnapping, when agents reportedly took Islamic cleric, Abu Omar, from Italy to Egypt. (Jane Mayer, The Dark Side, New York: Doubleday, 2008, p. 314)

On the 27th, Bush rejects a Silberman-Robb Commission recommendation to give the Pentagon more control over covert operations. It will remain with the CIA. (The New York Times, 06/28/2005)

On the 29th, Bush announces the creation of a new FBI national security branch under the control of the DNI, as recommended by the Silberman-Robb Commission, to help change the culture of the FBI to expand beyond its traditional focus on law enforcement. Negroponte had attended a Situation Room meeting with the president earlier that day to discuss the implementation of the report’s recommendations. (http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov; The New York Times, 06/30/2005; U.S. News & World Report, 11/03/2006)

On the 30th, Bush names Admiral Albert M. Calland III to be deputy director of the CIA. (The New York Times, 07/01/2005)

**October**

Eight cases involving CIA interrogators abusing prisoners in Iraq and Afghanistan are reportedly sent to the Justice Department. (The New York Times, 10/23/2005)

On the 5th, Goss announces the CIA will not discipline any current or former agency officials for failures leading up to the 9/11 attacks. (The Washington Post, 10/06/2005)

On the 14th, the CIA announces the creation of a National Clandestine Service. It will carry out the agency’s espionage activities, taking over from the Directorate of Operations, and will coordinate with other agencies, such as the Pentagon and FBI, on its covert and spy activities. (The Washington Post, 10/14/2005)

**December**

On the 16th, the New York Times reports that the NSA has been conducting a warrantless domestic wiretap program of suspected terrorists. The Bush
Administration had reportedly tried to convince the *Times* not to run the story earlier in the month, arranging for a number of senior administration officials to meet with the *Times* at the White House, including Negroponte. (Eric Lichtblau, *Bush’s Law*, New York: Anchor Books, 2008, pp. 204-206)

The ODNI announces the creation of the National Counterproliferation Center to help prevent terrorist groups from acquiring nuclear weapons.

**2006**

**January**

The CIA reportedly begins a polygraph investigation and helps with an FBI probe into a series of unauthorized leaks of classified information. The two specific leaks are about the NSA wiretap program, and the CIA’s secret prisons in a *The Washington Post* article from December. Negroponte and Goss testify before the Senate Intelligence Committee about the leaks on February 2nd. (*The Washington Post*, 02/03/2006, 04/22/2006)

**February**

Negroponte publicly states that Iran is five to ten years away from gaining the ability to produce nuclear weapons. Neoconservatives who would like to keep options open regarding Iran are reportedly upset with Negroponte’s estimate. Negroponte repeats his estimate in several interviews throughout the year. His estimate is supported when a NIE on Iran’s WMD program is leaked to the press in December. (Liebmann, pp. 282-283)

**April**

On the 20th, the CIA fires Mary O. McCarthy after she failed polygraph tests and admitted she had unauthorized contacts with reporters. McCarthy denies she leaked classified information to reporters. (*The Washington Post*, 04/28/2006)

**May**

A memorandum in the Federal Register signed on the 5th proposes that Negroponte be given the power to exempt companies from accurate accounting standards, a power previously only held by the president under the 1934 Securities Exchange Act. (*Business Week*, 5/23/2006)

On the 6th, Goss announces his resignation as DCIA and leaves office on the 26th. Goss is replaced by Negroponte’s deputy, Hayden. Negroponte had reportedly called for Goss to step down as DCIA after several disagreements emerged. Negroponte reportedly wanted the ODNI to take the lead analytical role with the CIA taking lead on human intelligence. He was also reportedly upset with Goss’ lack of cooperation in supplying the NCTC with analysts, as well as Goss’ refusal to fire Kyle Foggio, Goss’ third in command. Silberman and members of the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board had also called for Goss to be removed. (Liebmann, pp. 280-281; *The Washington Post*, 05/06/2006, 01/05/2007)

Negroponte gives a press briefing on the 8th on Hayden’s nomination as DCIA. When asked about the NSA’s controversial domestic surveillance program, Negroponte says, “I wouldn’t call it domestic spying… This is about international
terrorism, and telephone calls between people thought to be working for international terrorism and people here in the United States.” (http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov)

On the 17th, Negroponte releases a list of 30 congressional briefings that have been held since the NSA began its surveillance program after 9/11, which shows that 31 of the 535 voting members of Congress have been briefed. Negroponte says that Bush and Cheney had ordered that briefings be limited to a small number of leaders of the Senate and House and intelligence committees. (Liebmann, pp. 273-274; The Washington Times, 05/18/2006)

June

The U.S. Supreme Court rules against the use of military tribunals in *Hamdan v. Rumsfeld*, ruling that the Geneva Conventions apply to al-Qaeda terrorists. Congress must now pass legislation clarifying the procedures for interrogating prisoners so that the Geneva Conventions can be implemented under U.S. law. (Fox, 09/17/2006; The Washington Post, 07/05/2006)

August

Bush meets with Negroponte and the counterterrorism team at the NCTC in McLean, Virginia on the 15th. (http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov)

September

On the 6th, Bush acknowledges for the first time the CIA’s program of secret detention of terrorist suspects in foreign prisons and the use of harsh interrogation methods to collect intelligence. He defends the CIA’s work as “having saved lives.” (The Washington Post, 09/07/2006) Bush also transfers terrorist suspects from secret CIA prisons to Guantanamo and calls on Congress to pass legislation to create new military commissions to put terror suspects on trial, replacing the old military tribunal system struck down in June. The ruling comes after years of debate between Cheney and Rice over the secret CIA prisons and the practice of holding detainees indefinitely, with Rice opposing both. The issue reportedly came to a head during an NSC meeting Negroponte attended in mid-August. (Elisabeth Bumiller, *Condoleezza Rice: An American Life*, New York: Random House, 2009, pp. 296-298; Fox, 09/17/2006)

In a Washington Post op ed appearing on the 10th, Negroponte asserts that the U.S. is better prepared today to protect the country from terrorist attacks. He cites a better understanding of transnational terror, improved intelligence sharing, and concrete examples such as work now done at the NCTC and the National Security Branch at the FBI. (The Washington Post, 09/10/2006)

In a USA Today op ed appearing on the 19th, Negroponte calls on Congress to pass legislation modeled after Senator John McCain’s Detainee Treatment Act in drafting guidelines for CIA interrogators. (USA Today, 09/19/2006)

October

Bush signs the Military Commissions Act authorizing the new military tribunal system.
North Korea conducts a nuclear test on the 9th.

**November**

On the 10th, Bush meets with Negroponte, Cheney, Rice, Rumsfeld, General Peter Pace, Stephen Hadley, the national security adviser, and J.D. Crouch, the deputy national security adviser. The Administration is reportedly considering several possible strategic changes in its Iraq policy, one of which is to significantly increase U.S. troop levels in Iraq. The president reportedly assigns Crouch to lead an Iraq strategy review group. Negroponte sends David Gordon to represent the ODNI in the meetings. The State Department reportedly initially favors a pull-back of U.S. troops, but the group eventually reaches a consensus: The U.S. should send more troops to help stem the violence and help the Iraqis train their security forces to take over. (Bob Woodward, *The War Within*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2009, pp. 207, 230-236, 244-267; *The Washington Post*, 11/15/2006)

**December**

Bush announces his support for a surge in an NSC Principals meeting on the 15th. (Woodward, *The War Within*, p. 267)

On the 18th, Gates is sworn in as secretary of defense. (http://www.cnn.com)

The UNSC passes a resolution on the 23rd imposing sanctions on Iran for failing to stop its uranium enrichment program. The resolution was passed unanimously, though with some reported difficulty. (Glenn Kessler, *The Confidante: Condoleezza Rice and the Creation of the Bush Legacy*, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2007, p. 239)

**2007**

**January**

At a press conference, Negroponte discusses plans to further improve intelligence sharing, including the sharing of intelligence among our foreign allies. (Liebmann, p. 271)

Negroponte announces his resignation as DNI on the 5th to accept his nomination as deputy secretary of state. With Bush set to announce the new Iraq policy next week, filling the deputy position at State, which has been vacant since Robert Zoellick stepped down, had reportedly been a high priority for Bush. Hadley had called Negroponte in Florida on New Year’s Eve with the job offer. Rice had first talked with Negroponte about accepting the position when it first became available last summer. Negroponte had been reportedly looking forward to moving back to the field, where he had spent most of his career. However, Bush wanted to hold off until the DNI position was filled. The decision was then put on hold until after the mid-term elections when Abizaid turned down the DNI position again. Retired Navy Admiral John McConnell, who had already turned down the deputy DNI position last spring, agrees to replace Negroponte as DNI after Bush and Cheney both appeal to McConnell to leave the private sector. Rice will reportedly focus on Iran and North Korea’s nuclear programs and the Middle East.
peace process. Negroponte will be responsible for all other areas. (Rice, pp. 554-555; Kessler, p. 238; The Washington Post, 1/05/2007, 1/07/2007, 1/29/2007)

U.S. forces launch airstrikes in Somalia against Islamist militias on the 8th.

On the 10th, Bush announces he will deploy five additional brigades, or about 20,000 troops, to Iraq. Negroponte is reportedly not among those calling for the surge, though he remains a strong advocate of a continued commitment to Iraq. (Liebmann, pp. 290-291; CNN, 01/11/2007)

February

On the 13th, the Six-Party Talks yield an important agreement in which North Korea agrees to shut down its nuclear program in exchange for fuel aid and steps towards the normalization of relations with the U.S. and Japan. The Six-Party Talks held between North Korea, South Korea, the U.S., Japan, China and Russia first began in 2003 when North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and took on special urgency following North Korea’s nuclear test last October. (Kessler, p. 238; The Korea Herald, 03/08/2007)

Negroponte is confirmed as deputy secretary of state on the 13th. During his confirmation hearings, Negroponte addressed questions concerning Iran’s nuclear program, escalating hostilities in Iraq, and Latin America. He also said he would support Rice’s idea of “transformational diplomacy” to reshape the State Department for the modern era. This includes plans to shift several hundred diplomats from Western Europe to developing countries – particularly to hot spots in the Middle East and Africa. Bush requests a large budget increase for the State Department to fund the transformational diplomacy, as well as the surge. The increase would fund 254 new positions in countries such as India, China, Indonesia, and Lebanon, 57 new positions in the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, and provide six billion in supplemental funding for Afghanistan, Iraq and Lebanon. (Rice, p. 555; Kessler, p. 60; Liebmann, pp. 288-289; http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov)

Negroponte is sworn in on the 27th. Bush attends the ceremony, reportedly at Negroponte’s request. (http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov)

March

Negroponte meets with Chinese State Counselor Tang Jiaxuan in Beijing on the 4th to discuss issues of mutual concern. (BBC, 03/04/2007)

Crocker replaces Khalilzad as ambassador to Iraq on the 7th.

April

Negroponte and Crouch meets with South Korean officials to discuss bilateral issues and the situation in North Korea, as well as a possible upcoming summit meeting. U.S. and South Korean negotiators had recently reached a historic U.S.-South Korea Free Trade Agreement in Seoul on the 1st. The treaty is signed on June 1st. (The Korea Herald, 04/06/2007)
Bush sends the U.S.-Colombia free trade agreement to Congress on the 7th. The agreement had been signed in November but is not approved until 2011.

On the 13th, a suicide bomber attacks the Iraqi parliament building, wounding 23 and killing 8, including two legislators. The attack is called the worst violation of security to date in Baghdad’s Green Zone. (*The Washington Post, 04/13/2007*)

Negroponte travels to Africa where he meets with officials from a number of countries including Chad, Libya and Sudan to discuss the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, signed in 2005 between the government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement. The Sudanese government denies reports that Negroponte had delivered a strong warning protesting the security situation in Darfur. Negroponte reportedly asks the government of Chad to accept UN troops near the Chad-Sudan border, and General Muammar Khadafì reportedly refuses to meet with Negroponte, holding out for a meeting with Rice. Rice eventually meets with Khadafì in September, 2008, marking the first such meeting with a U.S. secretary of state in 50 years. (*BBC, 04/14/2007, 04/17/2007; Maghreb Confidential, 04/26/2007*)

**May**

Negroponte rejects House proposals to accept high level visits from Taiwanese officials in Washington, D.C., while testifying before a House committee on the 3rd, citing the U.S.’s official “One China Policy.” (*BBC, 05/03/2007*)

Negroponte travels to Ecuador to meet with President Rafael Correa on the 9th to discuss Ecuador’s closing of an airfield used by the U.S. for drug control. The meeting is reportedly “cordial but cold.” (*BBC, 05/12/2007*) Ecuador is reportedly upset that the U.S. changed the site of the upcoming UNITAS exercises from Ecuador to Colombia. Correa confirms that Ecuador will not sign a free trade agreement with the U.S. and is reportedly ambivalent on renewing a 1993 Investments Protection Treaty set to expire this month. Correa also asks the U.S. to extend a drug eradication agreement with Ecuador. (*Liebmann, p. 291; BBC, 05/08/2007, 05/11/2007*)

On the 28th, Crocker meets with the Iranian ambassador to Iraq, the first official diplomatic meeting between the two countries since 1979. (*The New York Times, 05/29/2007*)

**June**

Negroponte travels to Iraq to meet with President Jalal Talabani in Baghdad on the 12th to discuss the political and security developments in Iraq, including the Law Enforcement Plan in Baghdad. (*BBC, 06/12/2007*)

Negroponte represents the U.S. in the fourth round of the China-U.S. strategic dialogue held in the U.S. Bush and Hu Jintao had agreed in 2004 to start holding the regular talks to cover a wide range of issues. (BBC, 01/11/2008)

A free trade agreement with Panama is signed on the 28th, but not ratified by Congress until 2011.

**August**

While attending the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum, Negroponte meets with South Korean officials to discuss the 21 South Korean hostages being held by Taliban insurgents in Afghanistan. Negroponte agrees to rule out military action. (The Korea Herald, 08/03/2007)

After a number of influential Sunni legislators walk out of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s government, Crocker leads an emergency summit to prevent the government from total collapse. Meanwhile, a quadruple truck bombing on the 16th kills more than 250 Iraqis in the bloodiest coordinated attack since the U.S. invasion in 2003. (The New York Times, 08/16/2007)

**September**

Israel bombs a site in Syria on the 6th where it believes Syria is developing a nuclear weapons program. (The Charlie Rose Show, 04/25/2008)

Negroponte travels to Pakistan to meet with Pakistani officials on the 13th to discuss bilateral issues. Negroponte also reaffirms U.S. support for Musharraf, who is under political pressure at home and in danger of losing power in the January elections. Negroponte also urges Musharraf to reach an understanding with leading opposition candidate and former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, whose return from exile had been negotiated through the U.S. Negroponte also stresses the importance of holding free and fair elections. (BBC, 09/13/2007)

**October**

Negroponte meets with the Japanese deputy foreign minister on the 25th to discuss the North Korean issue. The Six-Party Talks have set a time frame for U.S. technicians to enter North Korea and disable its main nuclear facilities. Negroponte also reportedly discusses Bush’s upcoming summit meeting with the Japanese prime minister next month. (The Korea Herald, 10/23/2007)

**November**

Negroponte visits the Cote d’Ivoire on the 10th, according to local reports, to iron out political differences between the two countries regarding the Cote d’Ivoire peace process. Negroponte reportedly says the U.S. would like to see the Ouagadougou Political Agreement implemented. Negroponte also visits Nigeria, where he discusses the possibility of Nigeria sending troops to join peacekeeping forces in Somalia and additional forces to join peacekeepers in Sudan. (U.S. Embassy National Daily Press Review, 11/13/2007; Africa News, 11/14/2007)

Negroponte travels to Pakistan on the 16th to urge Musharraf to lift the state of emergency he declared on the 3rd, to hold free and fair elections in January to restore civilian rule, and to reconsider a power-sharing deal with Bhutto, who is

Several Democratic congressmen appeal to Negroponte to delay the sale of F-16s to Pakistan, scheduled to be delivered in 2010, until democratic rights have been restored. Negroponte reportedly declines on the grounds that it would signal that the U.S. is an unreliable partner in the war on terror. (David Sorenson, “The Arms Transfer Policies of the George W. Bush Administration, in Stephen Cimbala, ed., *The George W. Bush Defense Program*, Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, Inc., 2010, p. 172)

Bush hosts a Mideast peace summit in Annapolis, Maryland on the 27th.

**December**

The House Intelligence Committee announces that it plans to ask Negroponte about his role in the destruction of CIA videotapes of terrorist suspects being interrogated. The committee will also question former CIA directors Tenet and Goss. (*The Financial Post*, 12/13/2007)

Negroponte travels to Iraq to urge parliamentary leaders to reach an agreement on limiting de-Ba’athification and on oil revenue-sharing laws. (Liebmann, p. 295)

**2008**

**January**

On the 13th, Bush travels to Kuwait. In what is hailed as a concrete sign of political reconciliation, the Iraqi parliament on the 14th passes legislation allowing lower-level Ba’ath party officials to hold government positions, while imposing a strict ban on others. (*The New York Times*, 01/13/2008, 01/14/2008)

Negroponte travels to China on the 17th to represent the U.S. in the fifth round of the China-U.S. strategic dialogue in talks with the Chinese deputy foreign minister. Negroponte reaffirms U.S. opposition to Taiwan’s plan to seek UN membership. Other issues on the agenda include Chinese military transparency, human rights, Sudan, North Korea and Iranian sanctions. (*BBC*, 01/18/2008)

Negroponte meets with the envoy of the South Korean president-elect in Washington, D.C., on the 23rd, where they discuss ratification of the U.S.-South Korean free trade agreement signed last June. (*The Korea Herald*, 01/24/2008)

**February**

Negroponte discusses the new Merida Initiative for cooperation on drug enforcement with Mexico in an interview with Televisa, saying that the agreement will not involve any U.S. military presence. (Liebmann, p. 294)
On the 13th, Iraqi politicians vote across sectarian lines to pass a comprehensive package of legislation limiting de-Ba’athification, signaling national reconciliation between Sunnis and Shiites. (*The New York Times*, 02/14/2008)

Pakistan holds general elections on the 18th. Musharraf’s party is defeated as two opposition parties win the majority of seats in the National Assembly and form a new coalition government with Yosaf Raza Gillani as prime minister. The elections, originally scheduled for January, were postponed following the assassination of Bhutto.

**March**  
Negroponte and Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia Richard Boucher meet with Musharraf and leaders of the newly-elected civilian government on the 25th, including senior coalition leader Nawaz Sharif, who reportedly gives Negroponte and Boucher a tepid reception. Musharraf’s party had suffered a major defeat in the elections held last month. Yousaf Raza Gilani will be the new prime minister. (*The Guardian*, 03/27/2008)

**May**  
Negroponte travels on the 8th to meet with government officials in South Korea, Japan and China to discuss regional issues, including North Korea’s nuclear program. The Six-Party Talks have been stalled for months following a dispute over North Korea’s weapons declaration last December. Negroponte also has follow-up discussions in South Korea to last month’s summit meeting between Bush and Lee Myung-bak. (*The South Korea Herald*, 05/07/2008, 05/13/2008)

**June**  
Negroponte attends the signing of the 2008 supplemental appropriations act in the Oval Office, which provides funding for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. (http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov)

Negroponte heads the U.S. delegation at the annual meeting of the Organization of American States in Medellin, Colombia. (*The Washington Times*, 06/15/2008)

Responding to an Australian proposal to build a new regional organization of Asia-Pacific countries, Negroponte says the U.S. would be open to discussing new ideas but warns that the U.S. views its bilateral relations with its Asia-Pacific allies as the “bedrock” of its regional diplomacy. (*The Age*, 06/30/2008)

**August**  
Russian forces invade Georgia on the 7th. Rice later writes that, before the invasion, she had considered resigning her post in September, opening the door for Negroponte to become secretary of state. (Rice, p. 696)

**September**  
Negroponte meets with South Korea’s deputy foreign minister in Washington, D.C. to discuss North Korea’s nuclear program and to follow-up on Bush and Lee’s August summit meeting. The Six-Party Talks are stalled over how to set up a verification mechanism regarding North Korea’s weapons declaration. North Korea threatened in August to resume its nuclear program if the U.S. does not lift its sanctions. (*The Korea Herald*, 09/02/2008)
Negroponte attends a videoconference on the 26th with Bush and President Karzai of Afghanistan to discuss reconstruction and agricultural development.

**October**

Negroponte travels to Iraq to meet with Talabani and other government officials to discuss the country’s political and security situation. Negroponte also travels to Azerbaijan. The U.S. is reportedly pressing Azerbaijan to follow a more consistent, principled, pro-Western policy. (*BBC*, 10/05/2008)

The U.S. and India sign the civil nuclear agreement on the 10th. Bush and the Indian prime minister had agreed upon the framework for the agreement in 2005.

**December**

Negroponte travels to Israel on the 8th. (*The Jerusalem Post*, 12/09/2008)

**2009**

**January**

On the 1st, the U.S. officially transfers control of Baghdad’s Green Zone to Iraq.

Bush leaves office on the 20th. Before leaving the State Department, Negroponte helps to secure a substantial enlargement of the Foreign Service in the 2009 budget. (Liebmann, p. 302)
TIMELINES

- John Negroponte News Timeline, prepared by Rob Martin, Miller Center, University of Virginia, 08/17/2012.

- Timeline of the Bush Presidency, prepared by Justin Peck and Bryan Craig, Miller Center, University of Virginia, 04/30/2010.
SELECTED WRITINGS AND PUBLIC STATEMENTS OF JOHN NEGROPONTE


U.S. AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED NATIONS


U.S. AMBASSADOR TO IRAQ


DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE


DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE


JOINING THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION

- When did you first meet George W. Bush? Did you have any interaction with Bush when you worked in his father’s administration? Describe your initial impressions of Bush.

U.S. AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED NATIONS

- How did you come to serve as the U.S. ambassador to the UN? Why did you decide to leave the private sector and return to government work? Tell us about your relationship with Colin Powell. What role did he play in your recruitment? Were you Powell’s first choice to serve as UN ambassador?
- Tell us about your relationship with Bush during your time as UN ambassador.
- Comment on your confirmation process. How did 9/11 affect your confirmation?
- Tell us about your first few weeks on the job as UN ambassador in the aftermath of 9/11. Discuss your work building international support for the war on terror, such as gaining unanimous passage of UNSC Resolution 1373.
- How do you think Bush viewed the UN’s role in the world? Were you satisfied with the level of support you received from Bush and the Administration?
- Tell us about your relationship with your fellow ambassadors at the UN. With whom did you develop the strongest relationships?
- Comment on the formation of the “Negroponte Doctrine” regarding Arab-Israeli resolutions. Discuss the UNSC resolution endorsing Palestinian statehood, as well as the unanimous resolution endorsing the “road map” Middle East peace plan.
- Tell us about the Bush Administration’s decision in 2002 to seek a UN resolution on Iraq. Comment on the challenges you faced in your work to build support within the UNSC for a unanimous resolution.
- Tell us about your work trying to build support for a second UNSC resolution authorizing the U.S. to go into Iraq. Which UNSC members were you most concerned would block passage of the resolution? Who were the key swing votes? How did Bush’s decision to move into Iraq without a second resolution affect the country’s reputation in the world? Did it make your work more difficult?
- Comment on the reactions within the UN to some of Bush’s other controversial acts, such as the “Axis of Evil” and the Bush Doctrine speeches, the question of POW status for Taliban and al-Qaeda detainees, Kyoto and the ABM Treaty.
- On which issues did you tend to have the easiest time building support within the UN?

U.S. AMBASSADOR TO IRAQ

- How did you come to serve as the U.S.’s first ambassador to a free Iraq? Comment on Bush’s decision to give the State Department authority over the mission in Iraq.
- Tell us about the challenges of setting up the new embassy in Iraq, particularly given the security situation on the ground in Baghdad when you arrived.
- What were your biggest priorities as ambassador to Iraq? How did your approach differ from Bremer’s? Did Bremer have any advice for you?
Describe your relationship with Casey and the U.S. military in Iraq. Describe your relationship with Allawi and the Iraqi interim government.

Tell us about your work to strengthen security in Iraq, both on the U.S.-side and by increasing the role played by the Iraqis. Tell us about your work reducing corruption and waste in Iraq, as well as your work on reconstruction and preparing for the elections. Comment on the de-Ba’athification policy in Iraq.

Discuss your efforts to fight insurgent forces in places like Najaf and Fallujah.

Comment on Powell’s resignation. Tell us about your relationship with Rice.

Tell us about Robert Earle’s memo assessing how the U.S. should work with the Iraqi government and international community over the next five to ten years to improve the situation in Iraq. What kind of response did it receive?

Tell us about the decision not to postpone the Iraq elections in January 2005. In hindsight, was this the right call?

What were the biggest challenges you faced as ambassador to Iraq? Comment on your efforts fighting off calls for a rushed exit from Iraq. What did you see the dangers of leaving Iraq too early as entailing?

**Director of National Intelligence**

- How did you come to serve as the first director of national intelligence? Did you have any conversations with Bush about the role he expected you to play as DNI? Tell us about your relationship with Bush. How did your relationship change as DNI?

- Tell us about your work creating the new ODNI. Discuss the 2004 intelligence reform act that authorized the restructuring of the intelligence community. What was your assessment of the legislation? Were the recommendations of the 9/11 and the Silberman-Robb Commissions useful in your work reforming the intelligence community?

- What were the most important reforms that you wanted to make as DNI? Tell us about your work to improve information sharing and integration of the intelligence community, and to strengthen human intelligence and analytic capability. Tell us about the creation of new agencies, such as the National Counterterrorism Center and the FBI’s national security branch. Which reforms were the most effective? Which did not work as well?

- Discuss your work overseeing the U.S. intelligence community. Comment on the challenges of simultaneously serving as Bush’s top intelligence adviser and as honest broker in laying out competing policy options. Comment on your responsibility setting the intelligence budget and setting intelligence collection and analytic priorities. Comment on the president’s daily intelligence briefing. Was the access you had to the president useful in your work reforming the intelligence community?

- Comment on the informal role you played as liaison between the president and the intelligence community.

- Comment on your relationship with the other major players in the intelligence community, such as the DoD, FBI, NSA and CIA. Did you meet much resistance in implementing the reforms? Did having the power to set intelligence budgets help you overcome any resistance, or any bureaucratic inertia, you might have faced?

- Who did you work most closely with in the Bush Administration as DNI?

- Discuss your relationship with Congress, such as with the chairman of the house intelligence committee, Peter Hoekstra.
Tell us about the controversy surrounding the treatment of suspected terrorists in secret CIA prisons, and the Supreme Court ruling that the Geneva Conventions applied to the detainees. Discuss the Administration’s response and the subsequent legislation clarifying the rules regarding military commissions and the interrogation of prisoners.

Tell us about the controversy surrounding the NSA’s surveillance program.

Tell us about the intelligence community wide “lessons learned” review you conducted.

What role did you play in advising the president about the “surge”?

**Deputy Secretary of State**

- How did you come to serve as deputy secretary of state? Did you have any conversations with Bush or Rice about their expectations of you as deputy secretary of state?
- Tell us about your relationship with Rice. What were your primary responsibilities?
- Describe Rice’s “transformational diplomacy” initiative to reshape the State Department.
- Comment on the State Department’s relationship with the DoD and the NSC. How was it different from the Powell-Rumsfeld-Rice period?
- Which issues occupied most of your time? Tell us about your work with Pakistan dealing with Musharraf and the elections. Comment on your work with China on issues such as Taiwan and the strategic dialogues. Comment on the political and security situation in Iraq during your tenure. Discuss your work in Latin America on issues such as free trade agreements and drug control. Comment on your work in Africa on issues such as the situation in Sudan, Libya, and the fight against malaria and AIDS.
- What role did you play in the Six-Party Talks on North Korea’s nuclear program? Did you work on the Iranian nuclear issue or on the U.S. –India civil nuclear agreement?
- What role did you play in the “road map” Middle East peace process?
- Tell us about Bush’s relationship with foreign leaders. Did you frequently join the president on foreign trips?

**The Bush Presidency in Retrospect**

- What do you consider your greatest accomplishments during your time working in the Bush Administration? Which position did you find most rewarding? Which was the most challenging?
- What were the strengths and weaknesses of the Bush Administration in the realm of national security and intelligence?
- Evaluate Bush as a world leader. How did foreign diplomats and heads of state tend to view Bush? Were there any common misperceptions?
- How should the Bush Administration be viewed by future historians? What is the legacy of President Bush’s foreign policy?