Jobs and Freedom: The Black Revolt of 1963 and the Contested Meanings of the March on Washington

[Note to readers: Not for quotation or attribution without permission of the author. This paper has been formatted to save paper and to be comfortably read on your computer in the interests of a sustainable biosphere! Endnotes have been compressed. I tried to keep this article-length, but it will probably have to be a book. Readers pressed for time may skip the Birmingham section.]

Abstract: How was it that a March originally imagined as a mass protest by unemployed workers for higher wages and public sector jobs became transformed into a mass rally in support of John Kennedy’s civil rights bill, at least in the minds of most citizens? Why did original plans for militant civil disobedience at the Capitol turn into a one-day March to the Lincoln Memorial? In the context of widely covered mass protest in over 100 cities, and widespread official and media predictions of violence in Washington, DC, the Kennedy administration, mainstream media outlets, and moderate elements of the civil rights coalition reigned in the March’s tactics. Far-reaching demands for public works, increased and extended minimum wages, and a new federal Fair Employment Practices Commission, were widely but not entirely overlooked in press coverage. They were conspicuously absent from religious constituencies and leaders who broadened the coalition in the interest of passing the limited Kennedy bill. In the face of a clear campaign by the Kennedy administration to sell the March has an international advertisement for American democracy, many in the black freedom movement and interracial left struggled to assert that the March -- and the local mass mobilizations it celebrated and supported -- were the beginning and not the culmination of a revolution in economic as well as racial relations. 1963 was a crucial turning point in the development of a nuanced and varied agenda for racial and economic justice. But powerful institutions and ideological actors fixed the March -- and by implication the black revolution of 1963 -- in public memory as a joyous epitaph for American apartheid, instead of the radical challenge it remains.

They came from across the nation, but especially the big cities of the North, and the smaller cities, towns, and poor rural areas of the South. One roller-skated from Chicago and made news, as did actor Burt Lancaster and writer James Baldwin, who flew in from Paris. Others crossing from Virginia toward the Lincoln Memorial chanted in call and response:

Freedom, freedom, freedom, freedom. Going to take it to the President.
Yeah, man.
Going to take it to the Representatives.
Yeah, man.
Going to take it to the press.
Yeah, man.
Going to read it in the paper.
Yeah, man.¹
But what did they mean by freedom? With what hopes did they come? Why was media exposure so central to their strategy? Scholars have widely noted that the civil rights revolution and the revolution in electronic media became joined at the hip in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The black revolution of 1963 cracked wide open issues of poverty, housing, jobs, wages, voting and power central to the later 1960s. Why is the image of the March so moderate? Through their focus on the iconic Martin Luther King and his stripped down rhetorical vision of racial brotherhood, the press, much like the Kennedy administration, failed to educate the public and to promote more progressive civil rights, economic, and labor policies integral to black politics. The backdrop of increasingly violent confrontations evident most clearly in the Birmingham protests, saturated with ambiguity, uncertainty and fear, must account for the seeming paranoia with which so many politicians and journalists met plans for the March on Washington. So obsessed were journalists and politicians with a potential race-riot in Washington, that the injustices that brought 250,000 blacks, whites, and other minorities to DC became obscured. Out of 460 newspaper articles that mention the March in the New York Times, Wall Street Journal, and Washington Post between February 1963 and February 1964, the overwhelming majority focused on the potential threat of violence, the logistics of the March intended to prevent violence, and the March’s most limited achievements – proving that democracy worked in America, that Negroes and whites could peaceably assemble en masse on sacred civic ground and Negro self-esteem could soar. Constitutional as well as economic issues were much better represented in African-American and democratic left publications and through movement channels of communication, however. And in signal instances, individual reporters broke the ideological mold and addressed poverty and racism in more structural and critical terms.

A note on media theory and method. The telecommunications company Alcatel recently advertised its services by showing Martin Luther King’s “I Have a Dream” speech on August 28, 1963 in a tableau with the crowd digitally removed and the ambiguous slogan “Only Connect.” Modern political communication would be dead without corporate and technological mediation, the ad implied. In similar ways, we risk draining the march itself of much of its meaning if we remove it from the context of the black revolution of 1963. We need to view the media as one actor in a complex social and political drama affecting hundreds of locales. Scholars across the disciplines increasingly focus on political culture, discourse, and ideological framing in explaining how movements challenge structures of political and economic power, mobilize internal and external resources and support. The mass media has become “the major site in which contests over meaning must succeed politically,” William Gamson argues. But journalistic framing of political issues is only one way in which discourse becomes powerful, Marc Steinberg reminds us. Discursive power is “dialogical,” the product of conflict and communication between multiple actors. Dominant and oppositional voices speak through various channels of communication. "The media" is not unitary, but many sites of contested meanings.² As Todd Gitlin has noted, qualitative analysis of news frames, with careful attention to journalists’ habits of "selection, emphasis and exclusion" can reveal the “complexity and contraditoriness” of media coverage. We must also see through these texts into the contexts of institutional power and social struggle in which journalists reproduced interpretive frames. As Robert Entman notes, "the frame in a news text is really the imprint of power."³ If hegemonic power and popular consent is "manufactured," it is also fiercely contested.

In many ways our picture of this revolution is like a grainy photograph whose image is overexposed. So much of the variety, human texture, and contending political purposes are
relegated to shadows or omitted from the frame. Few lines connect the pixilated dots that compose the picture. Some historians continue to celebrate a powerful politics of crisis and legislative reform that played out on the national stage, with decisive consequences for the dismantlement of southern Jim Crow. As Michael Klarman has written, a highly publicized form of nonviolent protest paved the way for monumental reform: "The violence used by white law enforcement officers in the South against peaceful black demonstrators repulsed national opinion and led directly to the passage of landmark civil rights legislation." Birmingham, not the March on Washington, becomes central to this drama. "Televised brutality against peaceful civil rights demonstrators in Birmingham dramatically altered northern opinion on race and enabled the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Comparing the Kennedy administration's civil rights policy before and after Birmingham demonstrates the transformative effect of that episode."

But what is left out of this interpretive frame?

Birmingham was only one of over a hundred cities in revolt that spring and summer, and not the first to make news. Battles for implementation stretched long into the future. Blacks wanted much more than the Civil Rights Act. Not yet displaced by television, print media retained its power to persuade, to diminish or advance frames of interpretation. "Nonviolent theater" was never pure, nor its legitimacy uncontested, as a majority of the public and even the staunchest liberals persisted in believing that street protests unacceptably risked violent upheaval. "Violence erupted" became journalistic shorthand for conflicts whose blame devolved presumptively to black protesters. Public opinion was not magically converted to black protest or black freedom. Many whites, North and South, reacted to Birmingham with the same fury Southerners had denounced the Brown decision. And "civil rights" was itself an arena of contestation, where issues of jobs, housing, big city educational apartheid, and police brutality competed for primacy with issues of segregated public accommodations.

Linked as he is to a national narrative of political reform, Martin Luther King has been identified with a one-dimensional "master narrative" of civil rights achievement that ignores grass-roots sources of protest and sharp limitations of charismatic leadership and federal policy. Local studies have become indispensable to the understanding of racial challenge and change, but we ignore national and discursive developments at our peril if we seek to understand the dialectics of movement challenge and white response, local and national power. A linked study of the local black revolutions of 1963 and national politics promises to capture these dynamics of power.

Cauldron of Crisis: Birmingham

In the "Negro Revolution" of 1963, job opportunities, decent wages, federal protection for civil rights workers, voting and political power-sharing were central priorities of the black freedom movement in the South and North. But national and local white elites more readily conceded to movement demands for equal access to public accommodations than for jobs and power. Before any protests began in downtown Birmingham, Martin Luther King wrote in the New York Amsterdam News that desegregation would mean little if Negroes remained too poor to "buy the goods and pay the fees" in middle-class spaces of consumption and leisure. Blacks were victims of "political and economic exploitation," he wrote, so voting remained "the key that opens the door to economic opportunity." Political organizing and voter registration in the Deep South had already proved as dangerous as direct action. Northern movements for justice accelerated and drew new working class participants as they drew inspiration and a sense of sharpened grievance from Southern struggles. (Though historians and public memory have highlighted its importance, Birmingham was only the most publicized of these struggles). King’s annual report on black
America for the Nation in March also emphasized employment and political power. But he hinted at the practical strategy behind the coming Birmingham campaign. The government sent missiles into deep space. Why could it not “make the Constitution function for human rights” in southern luncheonettes?  

The Birmingham protests of April and May 1963 began at segregated luncheonettes, but their goals radiated outward to include jobs and power throughout the public and private institutions of the city. King initially hoped to win concessions on desegregation and hiring from downtown merchants, who might then pressure the “political power structure” on schools, parks, and city jobs. But the confrontation attracted positive and extensive media attention only when Commissioner of Public Safety “Bull” Connor brutally suppressed demonstrations in early May. SCLC filled the jails with high school students, and the TV and still cameras captured unforgettable images of children being attacked by police dogs and bowled over by fire hoses. As black “bystanders” retaliated violently against police brutality, the Kennedy administration intervened directly to broker negotiations. With its hold over popular violence rapidly slipping, SCLC succeeded in pushing the city’s business elite into negotiations. On May 10, SCLC and Fred Shuttlesworth’s Alabama Christian Movement for Human Rights (ACMHR) boldly announced a local victory over segregation and employment discrimination. White negotiators, afraid to be identified with protest, kept their version of the agreement secret, permitting SCLC to stage a public relations coup declaring victory for jobs as well as freedom. Birmingham accelerated a mass protest movement already under way across the nation, forcing the Kennedy administration to commit itself to major civil rights legislation in June. The Kennedy Administration’s highest priorities remained clearing the streets of potentially violent Negro demonstrators. Groping in the dark with an appalling lack of political information, the Kennedys put desegregated public accommodations at the top of their legislative agenda.

In Birmingham as elsewhere, college students initiated mass action against downtown merchants and city government. In January 1962, seven hundred out of eight hundred Miles College students began a boycott of downtown stores. Asserting their rights foremost as workers and then as consumers, they demanded the following: “I. Hiring of Negro clerks, salesmen, and upgrading Negro employees. II. Equal Opportunity. Hiring of Negro policemen. III. Desegregation of all rest rooms and all drinking facilities in stores.” Students marched with sandwich boards: “Don’t buy where you can’t be a salesman.” Their boycott collapsed in April under the weight of city reprisals. The city commission voted to block federal surplus commodity distribution to 20,000 poor families, almost all of them black. “A boycott can work both ways,” Connor stated. Shuttlesworth, King, and even the city’s black moderates concluded that only massive direct action would force concessions.

SCLC did not begin with a clear plan to provoke and publicize racist violence and compel intervention by the national government, though oral histories and memoirs can read these outcomes back into diverse intentions. Only after police brutality in mid-April attracted wide publicity did SCLC Executive Director Wyatt T. Walker start calling the campaign “Project C,” for confrontation. SCLC prepared for “Project X” in January, agreeing that boycotting, sit-ins, and picketing must focus on specific targets: segregated lunch counters and Birmingham’s business elite. SCLC could not expect Birmingham officials to violently suppress protests for the television cameras, because the structure of government itself was in question and Police Commissioner Connor had only a tenuous hold on power.

It proved impossible to keep the protests focused on specific targets. Lunch counter demonstrations began against private businesses on April 3, but Shuttlesworth also demanded the
city repeal all segregation ordinances and begin “merit hiring” of police and other public employees. SCLC and ACMHR demanded complete store desegregation, the immediate opening of “white-collar jobs” to qualified blacks, the reopening of city parks, and a biracial committee to plan school desegregation.\(^9\) Andrew Young, who had experience in television news production, advised King to craft concise visual messages dramatizing varied injustices “before the court of world opinion.” Praying in front of a bank that refused to hire Negro tellers would illustrate the need for national fair employment legislation, he thought. As they groped for a handle, Young coordinated arrests at voter registration offices with the announced intention to “get the Justice Department in on this.” But the Kennedys had just retreated from defending the civil liberties of voting rights activists in Greenwood, Mississippi, a decisive moment of missed opportunity before the Civil Rights Act of 1968 that was lost on the press when attention turned to Birmingham.

Legendary *New York Times* reporter Claude Sitton rushed from Greenwood to Birmingham after the first incident of violence. King was able to get civil liberties back in the papers only by suing in federal court to prevent city officials from arresting peaceful protestors for “breach of peace” and “parading without a permit.”\(^10\)

At the beginning, the media worked against the movement more than in its favor. On April 5, the day after the first arrests, the *New York Times* reported that Birmingham’s “full scale assault” had not yet begun, listing the demands at the end of the article. Over the next five weeks, the movement’s demands received scant coverage compared to dramatic confrontations, repressive violence and statements by major public figures. The *Times* made King the general, neglecting other leaders, demoting Shuttlesworth from the movement’s director to King’s ally and then “lieutenant” by the end of April. Connor threatened to rescind the press cards of “outside reporters.” “The white man is trying to black out our movement,” King told an April 5 mass meeting.\(^11\) The protests did not snowball like Albany, Georgia in December 1961: there were 4 arrests on April 3, 10 arrests on April 5, and 32 on April 6, when Shuttlesworth went to jail.

Settled routines of newsgathering hardly favored the movement. Journalists gave “both sides” equal time, quoting prominent Negroes opposed to direct action and believing the new Mayor Boutwell needed time to work reforms and ease Connor out of power. Boutwell denounced “outside elements and agitators,” explicitly asking reporters to deny protestors publicity. King publicized the consumer boycott that paralleled the marches. “We will wear our rags until Easter—our overalls—to show these downtown people we mean business,” he told reporters. Just what business they meant was often unclear in news reports. No surprise Robert Kennedy repeatedly commented to his brother that “they don’t know what they want.”\(^12\) Even after King’s arrest on Good Friday, April 12, journalists joined local moderates and the Kennedys in questioning the “timeliness” of protests. “New Birmingham Regime Sworn, Raising Hopes for Racial Peace,” Foster Hailey of the *Times* headlined his piece on April 16. “Most citizens of this Southern steel center—white and Negro—are believed to be hoping that the new, moderate group of city leaders will bring a diminution, if not an end, to racial tensions that have grown alarmingly.” King and the outsiders were clearly whipping up racial tensions against a democratic majority bent on “peace.” The next day, the *Times* featured the Department of Justice’s request to stop protests until Mayor Boutwell was in control of the city.\(^13\)

One white wrote from Florida on 30 April after reading in the papers about King’s peaceful arrest: "I do not think it dignifies the Christian Ministry when you put on a pair of dungarees and take part in an act that causes violence."\(^14\)

It would take a crisis compelling to the national press and the federal government to salvage the local movement, SCLC strategists realized, and Connor was still in power. Connor
released his police dogs on April 7, and pictures of them attacking Leroy Allen poured out of Birmingham. Nevertheless, when bystanders responded by heaving rocks and paving stones, the line between nonviolent protesters and crowds in a more retaliatory mood proved nearly impossible to redraw. King’s Good Friday arrest with sixty other marchers made front-page news. The New York Times called it King’s “most spectacular” march, and television crews and Jet magazine arrived to cover the arrest. But on Easter Sunday, when Young tried to dramatize attempts to integrate white churches, reporters covered a clash between the police and a crowd of up to 2,000 “onlookers” hurling rocks and bottles. Police waded into the crowd wielding nightsticks. Journalists praised Connor for his “restraint” and blamed the “violence” on "protesters." Ignoring the long history of police brutality and Connor’s flagrant violations of civil liberties, reporters echoed moderates who called for negotiations. Orderly processes would “ease racial tensions,” allowing for progress. The papers reported a plea from local white clergy for “law and order” and an end to “unwise and untimely” demonstrations. King composed his famous “Letter from a Birmingham City Jail” in response, though it only became celebrated later. Protesters were not responsible for the violent repression visited on them, King argued. But clearly, media coverage of repression was becoming central to SCLC expectations of effective nonviolence. And the ministers realized that the press was a key arena in which protest for redress of legitimate grievances would rise or fall.15

A close look at the police confrontation with Leroy Allen reveals the improvisational and highly interpretive core of nonviolent theater. If journalists were the chorus in this play, they spoke with contradictory and discordant voices. Violence was infinitely more newsworthy than the economic needs of demonstrators or the costs of their activism. In situations of great ambiguity, reporters were free to locate the initiative for “violence” and “racial tensions” wherever made sense to them. On April 8, the nation’s newspapers widely reprinted the picture of a police dog attacking Leroy Allen, as several blacks came to his aid. But lines between nonviolence and violence were already fuzzy, even in the reporting of simple “facts.” “Alabama Riot Broken Up by Police Dogs” was the Los Angeles Times headline of an AP story picturing of a cop and an attack dog assisting “in the capture of a Negro demonstrator.” The AP blamed the “riot” on Allen, who “took a swipe” at the dog with his knife. The New York Times claimed Allen was not a demonstrator and had only “reportedly” lunged at the dog. “War Declared On Segregated Birmingham,” the Pittsburgh Courier reported, framing protesters and onlookers as dedicated freedom fighters (led by Shuttlesworth, not King). The “only violence erupted when a Negro man, reportedly, warded off a police dog with a knife,” they reported.

Leroy Allen later claimed he had no weapon, and recalled Connor barking orders to sic the dog on him. “I was fired from my job,” he added. By then he was old news, and economic reprisals never got a tenth of the coverage violence received. Celebrities certainly helped frame the movement as a noble one, the New York Times reporting Harry Belafonte’s plea for the Kennedys to stop Birmingham’s “reign of terror.” The “brutal use of police dogs . . . shocks the conscience of America and reflects an ugly stain upon the United States throughout the entire world.” It took crises of colossal proportions, not only in Birmingham but in Tuscaloosa, Alabama, and Jackson, Mississippi, Cambridge, Maryland, and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania before John Kennedy echoed these words.16

Recent coverage in March 2008 of “clashes” between Tibetan monks and civilians and Chinese police and military forces follows this sad but understandable logic. Initial reports relied disproportionately on Chinese government accounts that stressed “rampaging mobs” of Tibetans, a term the New York Times used in the first paragraph of its first story on the uprising. Only toward
the end do we find a hint that nonviolent monks had been beaten by police. And only in later stories do we distinguish between various actors: nonviolent monks marching for freedom and for the return of the Dalai Lama; repressive Chinese police; Tibetan citizens committing property crime against Chinese owned businesses and suffering violent suppression; or the economic violence of displacement and segregation over 50 years of Chinese occupation.17

As the April Birmingham protests became old news, however, King feared it might be Albany all over again. "The press is leaving, we’ve got to get going," he told the ACMHR in late April. SCLC field secretary James Bevel arrived to work with Birmingham youth. Students were great assets, Bevel and Shuttlesworth agreed, because they were relatively immune from economic reprisals. On April 29, SCLC recruiters canvassed the black high schools, announcing mass protests for May 2, which Bevel called “D-Day.” Officials locked students in school and threatened to expel them, but over 1,000 young people broke free and marched to jail. Parents faced felony prosecutions for contributing to the delinquency of minors. A reporter from UPI dubbed King the “mastermind” of the protest, but he remained deeply ambivalent until the students’ mass arrests proved the strategy viable. The mass marchers made up the mastermind’s mind.18

May 3, “Double D-Day,” transformed the strategy of confrontation into international spectacle. Connor faced over 2,000 students in Kelly Ingram Park who were ready to march downtown. Firemen blasted children back toward the church with their hoses. “Negroes retaliated by hurling bottles, stones and chunks of concrete at the officers,” UPI reported. Connor loosed the dogs. AP photographer Bill Hudson photographed a police dog attacking the tender midsection of “bystander” Walter Gadsen. Police swung their clubs indiscriminately at protesters, onlookers, and newsmen. Charles Moore captured shocking images: firemen blasting children at short range, a police dog ripping the trousers off Henry Lee Shamby. Millions of Americans saw the savagery in their papers or on the evening news, and "the moral conscience of the nation was stirred,” King wrote. Leaders called off demonstrations in mid-afternoon as the crowd continued to heave projectiles. Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) national director James Farmer compared Alabama to “the racist police state of South Africa.” Robert Kennedy declared that “primary responsibility for peaceful solutions is with the leaders of business, labor and the bar, as well as the city officials themselves.” He sent the director of the civil rights division, Burke Marshall, to mediate negotiations. President Kennedy publicly declared the pictures made him “sick,” and that he was “dismayed” Birmingham’s whites could not settle the dispute.19

Public opinion tilted toward the protesters, but the rapidly blurring line between protesters and retaliating bystanders threatened to undermine the image of black nonviolence King deemed so essential to success. The constitutional legitimacy of nonviolent assembly was slamming up against the majority culture’s frame of interpreting nonviolent protests as inevitable preludes to "violent eruptions." On May 4, as smaller groups of protesters invaded the downtown area, a crowd of 3,000 gathered in Kelly Ingram Park, taunting police and firemen, ducking behind trees, dancing in the park, and daring the dogs. Some hurled rocks at the agents of their oppression. Bevel again called off the marches, having seen “several pistols and knives.” Total arrests from the three days amounted to 1,100. King announced the rocks came from "outsiders." Sights raised, he now said, "If we can crack Birmingham . . . we can crack the South.” They were heady with national publicity, but walking on a knife edge. “We had Huntley and Brinkley every night,” Walker remembered. Bayard Rustin later called Birmingham “television’s finest hour.” Police beatings and children felled by “water hoses, that’s news, that’s spectacularism,” Shuttlesworth later commented.20 Money poured in from trade unions, Jewish groups, churches, and people around the world.
White Americans consumed the news on their own terms. Almost half of King’s mail, which doubled in one month, decried the protests. “Thank God for television!” wrote a Louisiana woman on May 6. “The whole world got a glimpse of what a ‘Congo jungle’ is like when they saw the howling, screeching, frenzied mob of Negroes in Birmingham, even small children!” Another commanded King to “clean up the mess amongst your race first before you agitate race riots.” Many raised the old canard of profiteering and grandstanding. “You have made enough money out of your crusades,” charged one Birmingham “Colored Citizen.” Blaming the NAACP, an anonymous white Southerner wrote with a piece of twisted civil war memory: “Instead of gratitude the grandchildren of the white men who fought to free the slaves are being terrorized and condemned by the NAACP.” None of the protesters’ supporters mentioned the SCLC’s or ACMHR’s demands, which is understandable given the sparse press coverage of constitutional or economic issues. A San Francisco woman wrote to King, describing her shock at pictures of Birmingham’s riotous “white trash.” A New York fireman deplored the use of his Birmingham comrades to repress “American Negro citizens.” 21 “Audiences are in fact complex amalgams of cultures, tastes, and ideologies,” historian Lawrence W. Levine writes, and they respond to political events with preconceived ideas, expectations and values.22

By May 8, 3,200 protestors were in custody, filling the jails and the Birmingham fairgrounds. On May 7, merchant resistance gave way to serious negotiations. James Forman and CEP organizer Dorothy Cotton coordinated “Operation Confusion” in the morning. Three thousand black youths in small groups bypassed police lines into downtown, staging “guerilla” sit-ins and protests in stores, in restaurants, and on the streets. But the afternoon convinced most SCLC leaders (except Shuttlesworth) that they could no longer prevent bloodshed. Two thousand students wanting to join Operation Confusion were bottled up in Kelly Ingram Park by police, dogs, and firemen. Again the crowd pelted Connor’s forces with rocks. Bevel and Walker took police bullhorns and tried to herd them back into the church. Connor turned on the hoses and sent out his white armored car to intimidate the crowd. Governor George Wallace sent six hundred state troopers armed with submachine guns, carbines, sawed-off shotguns, and tear gas to the city, commanded by Alabama’s pill-popping state police chief Al Lingo.

“Rioting Negroes Rout by Police at Birmingham,” read the New York Times headline. Though he later corrected himself, Claude Sitton conflated the morning’s jubilant nonviolence with the afternoon’s near riot. Birmingham’s blacks were protesting on their own terms with weapons of their choosing, unwilling to “fill the jails” and outraged by police brutality and murder that had been occurring for decades. But King, Walker, and Young began to smell the smoke of discrediting defeat for the intertwined local and national movements. Nonviolent mobilization was meant to coerce whites while denying them their historical justification for repression: the public specter of riotous Negro mobs. Young admitted to Claude Sitton, “It’s too hot. We couldn’t have controlled this crowd.” “We wanted to get out of it, as bad as Birmingham was,” Walker later acknowledged. 23

Just in time. The Senior Citizens Committee, eighty-nine of Birmingham’s most prominent businessmen, agreed to negotiate May 3. On May 7 they considered asking for martial law, then broke for lunch and walked into streets dominated by 3,000 jubilant protesters participating in Operation Confusion. The jails were full, and Sheriff Mel Bailey conjured pictures of protesters crammed into a makeshift prison at the football stadium, surrounded by a barbed wire fence, telling them it would not “look nice” in the media. President Kennedy had already instructed his cabinet to call CEOs of corporations with Birmingham offices. So the committee made a “dollar-and-cents” decision to avoid risking the “black eye” of federal intervention, Smyer recalled.
Merchants were reporting that business was off by 30 percent. They came to the bargaining table, determined to concede as little as possible. White negotiators’ records of the settlement they hammered out in the small hours of the morning on May 8 reflected their desire for a “timetable for delay” of all desegregation and employment demands until at least thirty days after the Alabama Supreme Court settled the question of Connor’s tenure. SCLC was unable to push jobs as vigorously as desegregation because merchants stubbornly resisted the demands and more pressing issues intruded. King was desperate for money to bail protestors out of jail. Shuttlesworth disparaged the “timetable of delay” and the weakness of the jobs agreement. His greatest regret, after months of pursuing the issue, was the sacrifice of solid employment concessions. If he could do it again, he said, he would “fight until a certain percentage of the clerical [workers] both in the local city and the State Capital were black.” In the end, however, Shuttlesworth deferred to King, because the “man with the marbles dominates the game.”

The silence of the Senior Citizens Committee gave SCLC a public-relations advantage, however. On May 10, SCLC released a substantially different version of the agreement, claiming that in addition to desegregating the downtown stores, the city’s business leaders promised to offer “equal job opportunities [and] equal access to public facilities, and equal rights and responsibilities for all of its people.” They did not mention waiting for the Alabama Supreme Court’s pending decision on Bull Connor’s tenure. Businessmen purportedly agreed to upgrade and employ blacks “throughout the industrial community of Birmingham,” promising to hire “Negroes as clerks and salesmen within the next 60 days.” A biracial committee would immediately implement “an area-wide program” to upgrade job opportunities. Even the moderate politicians denounced the agreement, which was nevertheless widely circulated in the media.

On May 11, bombers targeted King’s hotel room and the house of his brother, A. D.. Neither man was injured, but hundreds of furious black people poured into the streets, throwing rocks at police, smashing windows, looting, and setting fires in stores. Rioting raged for three hours, subsided, and flared again after state troopers continued indiscriminately clubbing people on their porches and in the street. King waded into the melee counseling nonviolence. Celebrating the courage of nonviolent black civil defense workers and ministers such as King’s brother A. D. in the dark streets, Claude Sitton detailed the full extent of Al Lingo’s provocation both in the New York Times and to Robert Kennedy. Irregulars accompanied by state troopers armed with double-barreled shotguns had rushed into the Gaston Motel parking lot and beat people with gun butts and nightsticks, including Wyatt Walker’s wife, Anne. Sitton blamed the anonymous Senior Citizens Committee, cowardly men who “turned their backs on police brutality [and] allowed white supremacists to speak for their communities, thus encouraging the lawless fringe element.”

Initially, the Times and Newsweek framed the confrontation as an outbreak of “black violence” in simple response to the bombings. Hedrick Smith downplayed the double assassination attempts against the King brothers and the brutal crowd control tactics of the state police. "Two racist bombings set a Negro mob running riot in the streets," Newsweek reported. Lester Hardy of the Pittsburgh Courier, on the other hand, highlighted police provocation in a “night of terror.” “Negro leaders just couldn’t hold the unleashed anger of MEN in check any longer.” The violence expressed long-standing resentments of Negroes “buffeted, insulted, castigated, jailed, abused and taunted for weeks on end.” Lingo’s troopers moved “in with epithets, night sticks, drawn guns. . . so they can murder, LEGALLY!” Hardy lacked the “objective” tone of mainstream papers, but captured as did no white journalist local black anger at years of brutality and murder. Hedrick Smith managed to quote a Negro: “They started it!”
The Kennedy administration sent troops to a military base just outside Birmingham. Robert Kennedy wanted to denounce the bombings, convinced by Claude Sitton’s accounts that the credit for averting a race war in Birmingham belonged to King. Corrected by Bobby in his initial suspicion that “Black Muslims” were behind it all, the president still wanted Negroes “off the street” and insisted on “law and order” and peaceful negotiations. Mentioning neither the bombings nor its explicitity, he publicly denounced “extremists” on both sides -- as the fence he was sitting upon collapsed beneath him. If Claude Sitton wrote in the Times what he told Bobby Kennedy about Al Lingo’s troopers, it might become “a very inflammatory story up in New York,” the president worried. Northern powder kegs made him even more anxious. On the other hand, JFK determined that if white Birmingham reneged on its agreement, he would “send legislation up to the Congress this week.” Burke Marshall warned that if the agreement collapsed, blacks would be “uncontrollable,” which they might become anyway if Lingo’s troops provoked more violence.

Kennedy’s neutral stand and his stress on “restoring” border betrayed a subtle bias toward the forces of white supremacist order. FBI snoops heard King advisor Stanley Levison tell Jack O’Dell that “a little violence is good” in order to wake Kennedy up to the danger to his “image around the world.” King did not share Levison’s assessment of violence, fearing more bloodshed and a demolished agreement. He drew a crowd of fifty into a pool hall, explaining that bombers were trying to “sabotage” all their achievements by provoking violence and looting. Preventing “further retaliatory violence was one of the finest accomplishments of our campaign,” Andrew Young recalled. But watching the news, an anonymous white man from Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: “you are pitching citizen against citizen and causing blood to flow. He withheld his name, fearing retaliation from one of King’s ‘henchmen.’”

With troops in the area, the city simmered down, and the businessmen did not disavow the agreement. From New York came an audible sigh of relief. The Times editorial board praised “patience and goodwill on both sides,” calling on the Mayor, Governor and Mayor-elect to endorse the agreement. Sitton now pronounced it a great victory for Shuttlesworth and the militants. Columnist Anthony Lewis’ column turned Birmingham into a personal victory for Burke Marshall, who “made the dialogue possible,” mentioning neither King, Shuttlesworth, nor the demonstrators.

Mass Activism and the Civil Rights Bill

“In city after city where the spirit of Birmingham has spread, the Negroes are demanding fundamental social, political and economic changes,” Bayard Rustin wrote in June. Birmingham’s drama accelerated a wave of demonstrations across the country, many of which had already begun. To obtain decent jobs, good wages, and opportunities to advance, Rustin urged “nonviolent resistance . . . against local and federal governments, the labor unions, against the AFL-CIO hierarchy and any construction plant or industry that refuses to grant jobs.” A truly mass movement had emerged nationwide, incorporating thousands of working-class African Americans pursuing a broad agenda. Activists staged over a thousand boycotts, sit-ins, and marches in two hundred cities and towns across the South that summer. Hundreds of actions in northern and western cities supported desegregation and focused attention on the national problems of unemployment and urban disempowerment.

At a huge Los Angeles rally in May 1963, King thanked western SCLC affiliates for supporting Birmingham’s protestors. More important for them, King declared, was ridding Los Angeles of discrimination in housing and jobs. Dr. Christopher Taylor, president of the local NAACP, agreed, breathlessly urging the crowd to act on its own grievances: “police brutality,
unequal administration of justice, ghettoization of Negroes in Los Angeles, de facto segregation of schools, lack of adequate housing, great numbers of unemployed, lack of job opportunities and discrimination in employment not only in private industry but in city, county, state and federal levels, despite a state FEPC law and a presidential executive order.”

Legendary sites of struggle pushed the envelope on civil rights and nonviolence, risking mass confrontation for tangible gains. In Danville, Virginia, marchers demanded desegregation of the downtown stores and jobs in municipal agencies, including the police and fire departments. On June 10, police bloodily suppressed peaceful prayer marches. After withering legal and financial reprisals from the city, activists turned to voter registration. Cambridge, Maryland, a working-class city on the Eastern Shore, set the template for broader protests and a more systemic analysis linking civic and economic grievances. Gloria Richardson led a movement that pressed for desegregation in schools and public accommodations and demanded low-rent public housing, job-training, public and private jobs, and an end to police brutality. On June 14, a complex cycle of violence escalated to the point where local authorities declared martial law, and the Justice Department intervened. "Desegregated schools are irrelevant to families who cannot afford to buy their children school books,” Richardson declared. Social welfare policy was piecemeal, discriminatory, and abstracted from the interlocking needs of poor communities. “Federal housing projects are irrelevant if the rest of the ghetto conditions—faulty education and lack of employment—remain,” she said. Explicitly including poor whites and poor blacks in a revolutionary coalition, she argued that middle- and upper-class whites must share power with more than a few middle-class blacks. “The people as a whole really do have more intelligence than a few of their leaders.”

Working-class blacks poured into CORE chapters, pushing the jobs agenda from the grassroots across the nation. In New York, police battled demonstrators demanding jobs at a Harlem Hospital construction site where only 10 percent of the workers were black. A broad cross-section of blacks and Puerto Ricans forced the mayor to address “cronyism and nepotism” in the building trades. In Philadelphia, protesters marched on city hall and picketed construction sites to oppose “discrimination by unions and contractors on public building projects.” White workers’ hostility was rising, as they attacked black picketers at construction sites and the American Nazis organized counterdemonstrations. “The pie of decent jobs, good low-income housing, and good education is too small in this city to be shared with the Negro community, which now demands a proportionate slice,” Martin Oppenheimer commented in the Socialist newspaper New America. “Only an increase in the employment pie for everyone combined with a major effort by labor to end discrimination within its ranks” could solve the problem.

Unquestionably, many protesters across the South and urban North in 1963 did not have the philosophical or perhaps even tactical commitment to nonviolence that characterized early SNCC and the freedom rides. Tensions beset Detroit's civil rights coalition as critics of nonviolence like the Reverend Albert Cleage asserted leadership. Malcolm X received widespread coverage, though journalists wondered whether his popularity matched his publicity. Time magazine sensationalized the boastings of Philadelphia NAACP leader Cecil Moore: “My basic strength is those 300,000 lower class guys who are ready to mob, rob, steal and kill,” he reportedly stated. The urban powder keg was a rhetorical device, an overblown fear, and in some places, an imminent reality. “Who started it” was often beyond anyone's power of discernment. Up North, Wyatt T. Walker was unafraid of mixing powder. He wrote King from Newark, New Jersey, expecting big changes, because Birmingham came "just short of inciting the populace of Newark to riot. We are
demonstrating. We are being heard,” precisely because of the incipient threat of violence, he implied.  

As the NAACP escalated its challenges to unionized job niches in the construction trades, some whites flipped the logic of historic victimization in distorted but portentous frames. One vented his resentment in a letter to King: “The Negroes are living better than your Brothers in Africa . . . the Negroes are employed by white businessmen at the expense of 2 million unemployed white people.” 

Not for a month of crises and confrontations in the North and South after the Birmingham agreement did the Kennedys unveil their civil rights package on June 11. Civil rights, Kennedy began on television, was a “moral issue” as ancient as Scripture and clear as the Constitution. A full century after emancipation, Negroes still struggled against “bonds of injustice” and “social and economic oppression.” He endorsed their rights to “equal service” and to vote without “fear of reprisal.” Kennedy also revealed his overriding political imperatives to preserve domestic tranquility and international prestige. Demonstrations “threaten disorder, and threaten lives,” he said. As the president improvised, he also revealed the limits of the cold war liberal imagination. Preaching freedom to the world and cherishing it at home, he asked, “are we to say to the world—and much more importantly to each other—that this is the land of the free, except for the Negroes; that we have no class or caste system, no ghettos, no master race, except with respect to Negroes?” Did Kennedy really believe racial equality would erase classes from American society? Kennedy abandoned racial innocence but maintained a sunny optimism about the equal opportunity society. 

As clouds of conflict lowered upon the White House, the administration proposed much less than what civil rights activists sought. The Kennedys decided to defer the issue of voting rights, downplay jobs, and put desegregated public accommodations at the top of their legislative agenda. Title II on public accommodations would crown the Kennedy bill, the Kennedy brothers and Burke Marshall agreed on May 20 and June 1. It was a way to get activists “into the courts and out of the streets,” Robert Kennedy insisted. Demonstrations were "bad for the country" at home and abroad. The president feared that “Negroes are going to push this thing too far.” Northern Negroes grew militant watching police brutality on television, Marshall explained. But the lunch counters made southern Negroes "maddest." Marshall had concluded Negroes "didn't know what they wanted," he told the Kennedys, but King had explained to him the goals of desegregation and hiring in the downtown stores. Still, they knew the civil rights leadership wanted much more. Black leaders hoped to revive Title III of the 1957 bill, authorizing the attorney general to bring suit in federal court on behalf of anyone deprived of the rights routinely trampled in the South, including assembly, speech, petitioning, and voting. Fearful that clearing the field for nonviolent protest would precipitate violence, Marshall and the president agreed that anything strengthening “the right to demonstrate” would backfire politically. Protection for civil rights workers did not pass Congress until 1968, after disillusioned activists had retreated from organizing and lost faith in the government. 

Public accommodations may indeed had been riskier than other issues. Georgia’s Democratic senator Richard Russell attacked Title II on the Senate floor, charging Jack Kennedy with threatening “mass violence” so he could trample on “property rights” and create a “special right for Negroes.” For Russell, “demonstrations, law defiance and civil disobedience” were indistinguishable from insurrection and communism. The federal government could just as well compel whites to admit Negroes to their bedrooms, he charged. Kennedy told Congress on June 19 that in regulating private business practices, he saw no conflict between “human rights and
property rights." The public interest often trumped private property, as when the government limited "the property rights of slaveholders" and intervened in the market in cases of "zoning, collective bargaining [and] minimum wages."

But beneath their differences, both Kennedy and Russell agreed that street demonstrations invariably led to bloodshed. Kennedy could not understand southern white resistance to Title II. "Public accommodations is nothing," he later implored Birmingham businessmen. Negroes would not be seeking access to Birmingham’s expensive hotels. "They will have the right to, but they won’t have the money," he insisted. Class could segregate just as effectively as race. Kennedy thus spin the movement’s cruelest dilemma into smooth reassurance for segregationists. 40

Blacks wanted jobs more than they wanted hotel rooms or hamburgers, a July Harris-Newsweek poll revealed. Burke Marshall may have thought Birmingham blacks were “maddest” about lunch counters. But from a list of sixteen gripes about “discrimination,” three times as many Negroes chose to say that it "Prevents my getting a job and wages I want” than blacks whose chief grievance was that they "Could not eat and be served." Since the end of World War II, civil rights activists had lobbied for reestablishing a Fair Employment Practices Commission (FEPC) with authority over all private employment. But Title VII called for the creation of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) with jurisdiction only over government hiring and contracting. Speaking to Congress, Kennedy conceded how small an achievement it was to admit the Negro to "hotels and restaurants if he has no cash in his pocket and no job." Economic growth was the key to shrinking black unemployment, he said, and Congress should pass his $11 billion tax cut, expanded manpower training, youth employment, vocational education, area redevelopment, basic adult education, and work relief programs. But aside from the tax cut, these were all piecemeal measures. The economic weaknesses of the Kennedy bill were the black leaders’ most common grievances that summer. The civil rights lobby and House Judiciary Committee chairman Emanuel Cellers extended the jurisdiction of the EEOC to private business in September, and Lyndon Johnson shepherded the whole bill past the Senate filibuster in the spring. Nowhere in the original 1963 bill was there an equal employment agency with enforcement authority or jurisdiction over major employers. 41

That-standing dreams of marrying fair employment to full employment policies — embodied in bills sponsored by Senator Hubert Humphrey and Joseph Clark, and supported by Secretary of labor Willard Wirtz — died in the Senate that fall. Without support from the administration, or fuller black inclusion in the policy process, the government again failed to integrate economic policy and civil rights policy. 42

Moderating the March on Washington

Collective memories and historical interpretations of the 1963 March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom run the spectrum from liberal triumphalism to radical disillusionment. Both views distort the multiple meanings of the march. Explanations for the moderation of the March tactics and occlusion of its economic goals have stressed the role played by the Kennedy administration, the liberal-moderates in the well-funded civil rights organizations, the NAACP, the National Urban League, the white churches, and Martin Luther King. Often the media is lumped with these forces, but never has "the media" been examined for the arena it is -- an arena in which contending "frames" originating from various publics -- social movements, public officials, ordinary citizens -- compete for news consumers’ attention. By playing into the equation of militancy with violence, journalists and leaders stressed the urgency of liberal action but reinforced stereotypes about civil disobedience and the inherent violence of militant Negro crowds. Jobs,
wages, poverty, affordable and integrated housing, protection of civil rights workers from brutal police and violent white citizens -- in all of these areas, the civil rights leaders found the Administration’s bill wanting. But they were loath to find many journalists or editors eager to publicize that fact.

The March on Washington emerged from long-range planning by A. Philip Randolph and the Negro American Labor Council (NALC) and was energized by the direct actionists of CORE, SNCC, and SCLC. The introduction of Kennedy’s civil rights bill altered activists’ agendas, as the coalition widened to include mainstream civil rights groups, white churches, and progressive labor unions. Many who dreamed of militant civil disobedience or a dramatic demonstration of the economic crisis of black America saw only fatal compromises of the march’s methods and goals. King has been unfairly blamed for moderating both tactics and goals, allegedly handing the Kennedy administration the staged spectacle of freedom it demanded, rather than the militant confrontation it deserved. Though in the end King stole the show, he was never powerful enough to direct the march’s agenda or as inclined to moderate its methods as were the Kennedys, Whitney Young and Roy Wilkins. Organizers rejected calls for massive civil disobedience in favor of an interracial rally at the Lincoln Memorial. But the march had no single “original” plan; it represented a convergence of several streams of expectation and hope. Especially in the media and the moderate organizations, the freedom goals did loom larger than the economic demands for jobs, higher wages, and decent housing. But many involved in the march still loudly affirmed economic demands that went beyond the Kennedy bill. The entire March on Washington leadership wanted Kennedy to extend his promises to combat employment discrimination, unemployment, and disfranchisement.43

The March on Washington was a long-deferred dream for A. Philip Randolph. In December 1962, Randolph had asked his socialist friends Bayard Rustin, Norman Hill, and Tom Kahn to sketch plans for protests. They returned in January with a document outlining the democratic socialist agenda for the next five years. The government had done nothing since abolishing slavery to end black “economic subordination,” they wrote. Automation, unemployment, and persistent income inequality would severely limit any benefits accruing to blacks from integrated housing, schools, or public accommodations. A century of discrimination and joblessness had made black people’s “cumulative handicaps” so serious that the nation needed to go beyond equal opportunity. But the democratic socialists subordinated affirmative action to the more politically feasible universal goal of creating “more jobs for all Americans.” The black struggle might catalyze “all workers behind demands for a broad and fundamental program of economic justice,” they hoped. Tactically, they recommended two days of direct action and lobbying: on the first, “a mass descent” onto the floor of Congress by “labor, church, civil rights delegations” would occur; on the second, a “mass protest rally” would gather to hear their reports and demand a second Emancipation Proclamation. Nowhere did they mention mass civil disobedience.44

In March, the NALC endorsed Randolph’s plans for a “Jobs Rights March and Mobilization in Washington for Negroes.” Randolph invited all the civil rights groups, suggesting a Lincoln Memorial rally, a march down Pennsylvania Avenue, an address by Kennedy, and visits to the House and Senate. “A million and one half of the black laboring masses are jobless!” Randolph wrote in a labor appeal. Thousands must join in a “mighty thrust of revulsion, resentment, rejection and resistance to this blight of black second-class economic citizenship.” “Negro laborers” would lead a march on Washington “for their own liberation.”
Rustin won SNCC and CORE to the idea in April, and on May 6 King signed on. By the end of May, only the National Urban League and the NAACP held out.45

Excited, King was ready to throw “real force” against Kennedy and Congress, telling New York advisors Stanley Levison that he looked forward to seeing “Negroes sitting all over them in Washington.” Perhaps King might also call for a national “work stoppage.” Levison refused to endorse King’s militancy. Mass pressure might force Kennedy to change policy, but only if he could be guaranteed a “controlled situation” that would not humiliate him on the international stage. King made clear he cared little for Kennedy’s image. Moderates would have to join the march as “pressure builds from the bottom.” Looking for allies, he was thrilled that the National Council of Churches had openly endorsed “direct action.” He did not suspect the religionists might dilute the radicalism of the March tactics and demands.46

Kennedy’s announcement of his bill changed their calculations. King hashed out the options on the phone with his advisors. King did not try to blunt the jobs thrust or moderate the tactics to serve the Kennedy administration, as has been argued. He wanted a broad agenda, and he expected Randolph not to object. The FBI recorded King’s priorities: “1. desegregation of public facilities, 2. jobs, and 3. to vote.” Advisors agreed King should really drop plans for “work stoppages” and “passive civil disturbances, etc.” Pull in all the civil rights organizations and mobilize white churches, they recommended. King had little to do with Rustin and Randolph’s formal definition of goals or with the recruitment of most marchers, who were predominantly northerners mobilized by the March on Washington Committee, the NAACP, CORE, churches, and unions. This was a show directed from New York, which King ended up stealing.47

Talk of militant civil disobedience persisted, and King did nothing to discourage it. On June 9, King had announced a possible mass march on Washington, including congressional sit-ins to “help the President” redeem his “miserable” civil rights record. On June 11, Rev. George Lawrence of SCLC’s New York office and King’s new aide and attorney Clarence Jones announced “massive, militant, monumental sit-ins on Congress” if the Senate filibustered the civil rights bill. Lawrence and Jones left vague the relationship between a filibuster (whose date could not be predicted) and the impending March on Washington (whose date must be set). The furor over tactics designed to overcome the filibuster threatened to overwhelm the broad economic goals of the March in the media, however. Levison rebuked them for using King’s name to “shoot their mouths off” about civil disobedience. But even after Kennedy’s speech, King included himself among those willing to present “our bare bodies in a nonviolent creative protest in case of a filibuster.” On the floor of the Senate, Virginia Senator Wills Robertson warned his colleagues about the coming Negro invasion of demonstrators “whipped into a frenzy by Martin Luther King.”48

Rustin used militant talk to recruit Howard University SNCC activists long after the official March on Washington Coalition disavowed civil disobedience. SNCC’s John Lewis recorded the buzz in militant circles: “A protest rather than a plea. Stage sit-ins all across Washington. Tie up traffic. Have ‘lie-ins’ in local airport runways. Invade the offices of southern congressmen and senators. Camp on the White House lawn. Cause mass arrests. Paralyze the city.” Lewis’s subsequent disillusionment was deep.49

Not since John Brown’s martyr speech from the gallows in 1859 had the South shuttered with such paroxysms of dread. But now the fear overwhelmed northern Democrats and ordinary citizens from Philadelphia, Mississippi, to Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
Demagogic predictions of mob rule on the right reached back in time and across the seas. Representative William Jennings Bryan Dorn of South Carolina on the floor of Congress two days before the March:

Mr. Speaker, the Government of the French Congo was overthrown last week by a howling mob in the streets of its capital city. Reports from Saigon, South Vietnam hourly bring incredible tales of mob violence and demonstrations. This friendly government on which we are spending $1 million a day is in grave danger of being overthrown by mobs. The March on Washington this week will set a dangerous precedent. It is reminiscent of the Mussolini Fascist blackshirt March on Rome in 1922. It is reminiscent of the Socialist Hitler’s government-sponsored rallies in Nuremberg.\(^5\)

The national newspapers did not give prominent voice to segregationist denunciations such as this, but King’s mailbox was filled with them.

Multiracial economic populism came to King’s mailbox in unpredictable forms. A retired Army General from California wrote accusing King of racial chauvinism for ignoring the poverty of whites, Puerto Ricans, Mexican Americans, Jews, “and above all the American Indian.” Had King ever spoken up for those “whose lands you occupy -- as do the whites?” King was demagogic, corrupt, and ego-inflated in assuming that Negroes held “a monopoly on disaster,” to the point King had been willing to “throw your own innocent children as lighted torches” into the Birmingham conflagration. “As the fires of racial emotionalism spread, favored by the hysterical press, I, as a responsible citizen and public servant, call you to account for your self-cast role as arsonist setting the blaze . . . You, your self, are the Negro’s worst enemy.”\(^5\)

Populists turned racists when they perceived black protest as special pleading that might disadvantage them. “You can get more publicity by parading children and getting them thrown in jail than you can buy trying to see that they have enough to eat and a place to live that is clean” wrote an Alabama coal miner. “I don’t need anyone to tell me how the poor and downtrodden feel. I also know why the coal miners in this country worship John L. Lewis next to God.”\(^5\)

How to avoid mass violence in the nation’s capital indeed became the most pervasive and constraining news “frame” that movement organizers had to accommodate and overcome if the March were to play any role in educating the American people about economic racism and the need for national action. The “protest produces violence” frame was not merely a weapon of segregationists to beat back the new and powerful language of protest blacks had reinvented. Liberals reacted with alarm when they heard that some of the tactics pioneered in the North would be directed straight at Congress.

The bigger the coalition, the more moderate the tactics and the less likely all of its participants would look beyond the Kennedy bill to remedies for poverty and unemployment. By the end of June, the White House, NAACP, NUL, and UAW had effectively quashed any hopes for more than a one-day rally with speeches. Corporate co-optation and Kennedy connivance were uppermost in the imagination of Malcolm X, but not without justification. On June 19 ninety-six foundation and corporate leaders in New York pledged $1.5 million to the civil rights organizations. “Prevention of mayhem” seemed their highest priority, journalist Reese Cleghorn wrote in the New Republic. A Taconic Foundation official confided to him that “Bull Connor and the police dogs” had helped open the capitalists’ wallets. The new Council on United Civil Rights Leadership (CUCRL) met concurrently with the “Big Six” civil rights organizations--CORE, NAACP, NALC, NUL, SCLC, and SNCC--to plan a moderate march. On July 2, Rustin and Randolph assembled the Big Six in New York to plan the newly named March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom. The NAACP had the troops and the money to stage “a really mass
demonstration,” Norman Hill recalled, and Randolph preferred a broad coalition with the NAACP to a small militant march. King then joined Wilkins in disavowing any “civil disobedience” or congressional “sit-ins [even] in case of a filibuster.” Rustin’s “Organizing Manual No. 1” issued in mid-July did not mention direct action but promised state delegation visits to Capitol Hill and a "massive demonstration" at the White House. “Organizing Manual No. 2” in early August dropped both actions.53

King’s hopes for strong support from white churches bore fruit in July when the Big Six became the Big Ten, expanding to include Reuther of the UAW, Matthew Ahmann of the National Catholic Conference for Interracial Justice, Eugene Carson Blake of the United Presbyterian Church, and Rabbi Joachim Prinz of the American Jewish Congress. Walter Reuther and the United Auto Workers (UAW), fearing that militancy might feed the racist backlash, moved the rally to the Lincoln Memorial but paid for the sound system and brought thousands to Washington. King invited the masses to demonstrate the “propaganda value of numbers” in an appeal to Amsterdam News readers.54

Although many liberals, religious leaders, and reporters ignored the economic justice goals, the March on Washington Committee, under Rustin’s deputy directorship, pushed the jobs agenda aggressively. Rustin’s “Organizing Manual No. 1” fleshed out the specifics: a “massive Federal Public Works Program to provide jobs for all the unemployed”; a Federal Fair Employment Practices Act covering all employers; a $2 minimum wage; and the broadening of the minimum wage to include job categories such as domestic and agricultural labor, “where Negroes and other minorities work at slave wages.” The March on Washington Committee’s July 12 “Call to Americans” beckoned everyone to march against the “twins evils of discrimination and economic deprivation.” Blacks still bore “the brunt of economic exploitation, the indignity of second-class citizenship, and the ignominy of slave wages.”55

It is remarkable in my data base of 460 news articles how infrequently the economic goals figure. One reason is the density of coverage of religious support. Religionists uniformly identified the March with support for the Kennedy bill. Understandably, reporters were not going to challenge religious authorities like Robert Spike, director of the National Council of Churches Commission on Religion and Race, when he highlighted how important Sunday sermons would be in converting Midwestern legislators to the "great moral crusade." Entertainers like Burt Lancaster also assumed they were marching for the Kennedy bill. Business reporters openly worried a March gone terribly awry might reverse a bull market on Wall Street reaching new heights.56 After the March proved peaceful, one business reporter looked beyond the exciting spectacle to profound long range trends toward prosperity and inclusion. Kennedy’s historic meeting with the leadership “symbolized the Negro has emerged from a social and economic ghetto in America.” Efficient use of human resources and technology was now possible "unhampered by picket lines or color lines.”57

Journalistic profiles of A Philip Randolph and Bayard Rustin included the economic goals, but frequently they were lost in biographical detail or in Rustin’s case, speculations about communist affiliations. Elite channels widened some space. In a New York Times Magazine roundtable, King demanded federal help in establishing "untrammeled opportunity.” Appearing on National Education Television with Whitney Young and Roy Wilkins, King called for an economic “crash program” to attack the root “conditions that produce so many social evils.” Whitney Young plugged his “Marshall Plan for the Negro” to general acclaim. Wilkins, the tactical moderate, argued that the “real power and obstacle” in the ghetto was the nation’s “property rights structure,” whose agents cared little for slum overcrowding or “how many kids are bitten by rats.”
SNCC’s James Forman complained that Kennedy’s voting rights provision granting the franchise to anyone with a sixth-grade education did not address the relationship between educational deprivation and powerlessness. Would the government ensure that poor black families would be able to earn more than $2.25 a day so that young children would not have to quit school to help feed the family? SNCC’s most eloquent Marxist and the “moderate” Wilkins came off to public TV viewers as equally adamant about the revolution.

The AFL-CIO Executive Council voted overwhelmingly not to endorse the march. The split in the Negro-labor coalition became hugely newsworthy, as discourses of racial militancy and social democracy diverged. March organizers could count only on progressive unions. President George Meany supported the FEPC and Humphrey’s full employment bill but opposed mass marches and any hiring preferences for blacks that might undermine union seniority systems. Randolph, Rustin, and King appealed to progressive laborites for full and fair employment in a language of interracial social democracy. “Job competition in a shrinking labor market” would simply pit black and white workers against each other, Randolph argued. Automation threatened everyone, not just the unemployed. Randolph advocated creating millions of new jobs through federal investment in “new hospitals and schools, public health facilities,” and decent housing.

But SNCC activists like Cleveland Sellers saw big labor as simply reactionary. Sellers became embittered as “white liberals were brought in to act as cosponsors” and the emphasis "shifted from disruption and confrontation [toward] a coalition demonstration by workingmen -- black and white." He denounced the March’s "vague demands" as "basically unrelated to the dominant thrust of the movement." SNCC’s John Lewis knew there was nothing vague about a $2 minimum wage. But Sellers’ disillusionment was widely shared.

By August, the March committee had expanded the demands. “Organizing Manual No. 2” called for a comprehensive executive order banning discrimination in all federally subsidized housing, desegregation of all schools in 1963, and reduction of congressional representation in states where citizens were disfranchised. As long as southern Democrats kept blacks “voteless, exploited, and underpaid,” white workers’ low wages and poor working conditions would remain the same. Rustin held the helm against winds blowing from the right. Several white church officials wrote the committee to complain that a massive ”witness” for civil rights should not include any economic demands. Rustin modified the wording of the minimum wage demand without altering its substance and told them to come anyway. A New York couple resisted marching that promoted “more socialism.” Rustin responded that when millions were poor, ”‘free enterprise’ and ‘equal opportunity’ are hollow platitudes.” Thomas Kilgore of the March on Washington Church Committee made sure all the religious leaders knew that since “millions are deprived of the right to earn their bread, this will be a crusade also for jobs.”

As word spread through channels other than mainstream media, promises of jobs and freedom attracted diverse marchers to Washington. Working-class people came by the thousands. At least 250 unemployed workers came from Chicago, organized by the United Packinghouse Workers of America (UPWA) and the National Urban League. The National Domestic and Migrant Workers Association brought two busloads of “domestic workers, unemployed and employed” people with banners reading “Freedom Now.” White miners from Hazard, Kentucky, came “to petition President Kennedy for Jobs, their Hospitals,” and local protection for “trade Union conditions.” Mobilization for Youth on New York City’s Lower East Side, which was being rebaited for organizing the poor to protest against the schools, the police, and the welfare department, reserved a train. “And the Lower East Side went to Washington,” Frances Fox Piven recalled. Nine train cars carried five hundred black and Latino people. Their “physical presence”
had a “radical impact” on the march, raising poverty and civil rights policy to equal status on the national agenda, Piven commented.\(^63\)

Despite the formal demands, the march included fewer unemployed and poor people than many had hoped for. Local groups had to raise money to pay for their passage after the Taconic Foundation turned down Randolph’s request to subsidize transportation for the unemployed. Cleveland Robinson of District 65 criticized New York’s middle-class black churches for sluggish organizing. SNCC activist Jane Stembridge wrote Tom Kahn that Mississippi’s “sharecroppers and jobless Delta folk should really lead the parade!” But they were too poor to afford a ride on the “Freedom train.” One NUL official shed no tears: “no one will know anyway, on TV at least, because people will all look pretty much alike on parade.” But Whitney Young was glad to welcome thousands of the “most victimized” black Americans to Washington, “the residents from the south, the poor people, functional illiterates.” The March on Washington Committee dropped plans for two unemployed workers to speak, however. Researchers revealed that the marchers were more educated and affluent than average blacks, disproportionately northern urbanites who paid their own way, and already members of civil rights organizations. Equal employment and school desegregation topped their list of goals. Asked specifically, they doubted whites would welcome them into their neighborhoods.\(^64\)

Militants later criticized Rustin for tightly controlling the “approved” signs printed in bulk in uniform black letters by the UAW. Though some tried to moderate the slogans, Rustin stayed with jobs and freedom. Seven slogans dealt explicitly with jobs, housing, wages, the FEPC, police brutality, and federal funding. Seven more called for equal rights, voting rights, civil rights laws, integrated schools, an end to bias, and first-class citizenship. A final slogan incorporated the synthesis Rustin, Randolph, and King advocated: “CIVIL RIGHTS, PLUS FULL EMPLOYMENT EQUALS FREEDOM.”\(^65\)

SNCC’s Michael Thelwell deplored the “officially approved words,” all designed to stage "a mass protest against injustice without offending anyone.” James Lee Pruitt marched with the sign, “STOP CRIMINAL PROSECUTION OF VOTER REGISTRATION WORKERS IN MISSISSIPPI.” A March marshal nearly disallowed the sign, until he realized Pruitt was a freedom fighter straight out of Mississippi prison.\(^66\)

But Rustin also prevented moderates from entirely hijacking the message. An Urban League official deplored the narrow “jobs and freedom” appeal. “Power elite members,” he argued, would look on TV for people like them “carrying solid signs instead of strangers with clichés.” Put nuns and priests in the front of the March, with signs stressing the morality “of investing in persons,” and “renewal rather than revolution.” The MOW Committee just did not understand the power of TV, he concluded. But Rustin ignored all calls to move to the center.\(^67\)

Class and political-strategic tensions spilled out of the coalition into the public eye in New York, and made national television news through King’s burgeoning celebrity. On August 20, Mayor Robert Wagner accepted the Committee’s invitation to Washington, and he offered paid leave to city employees to support the “peaceful purposes” of the march. One thousand employees of the Welfare Department took him up on it. Militant members of CORE had been sitting-in for 44 days outside Wagner’s office, protesting the Mayor’s inaction on housing rehabilitation. The next day, eight CORE members dumped a truckload of trash, including a large and well-publicized dead rat, onto City Hall plaza. “Wagner, stay home!” they chanted, insisting he find jobs for minority unemployed workers rather than take the day off. Randolph urged CORE to “lay off” the Mayor, welcoming him at the March. No "social revolution" can be "neat and tidy at every point,” King commented on Meet the Press.\(^68\)
The “Radiant Day” and the Speeches

The March on Washington was jubilant, tightly controlled, and far bigger than anything organizers expected. CBS broadcast the speeches live. Most speakers sounded the themes of jobs and freedom. Harkening back to the 1940s when fair employment and full employment were linked, Matthew Ahmann called for “civil rights legislation which will guarantee every man a job based on his talents and training.” Rabbi Joachim Prinz chastised the “blindness of decent Americans” who failed to see or feel “the shame of millions of opportunities lost, millions of hopes denied, millions of lives wasted.” Whitney Young declared Negroes “must march from the rat-infested, overcrowded ghettos to decent, wholesome, unrestricted residential areas dispersed throughout our cities.” Roy Wilkins called for FEPC legislation to secure the “responsibility and self-respect that goes with equal access to jobs.”

Randolph, Reuther, and James Farmer of CORE voiced more radical perspectives on civil rights and economic justice. Randolph defended Title II against businessmen’s belief in the absolute “sanctity of property rights” over human rights, reminding the crowd that access to public accommodations meant “little to those who cannot afford to use them.” The FEPC would also be useless if automation continued to “destroy the jobs of millions of workers.” The Negro’s enemies were also “the enemies of Medicare, of higher minimum wages, of Social Security, of Federal aid to education.” Walter Reuther doubted the nation would solve racial problems of "education or housing or public accommodations” as long as blacks remained "second-class economic citizens." “If we can have full employment and full production for the negative ends of war, then why can’t we have a job for every American in the pursuit of peace?” he asked. CORE’s Floyd McKissick read Farmer’s letter from a Louisiana jail, which called for direct action “until we can work at a job befitting our skills in any place in the land ... until our kids have enough to eat and their minds can study.”

SNCC chairman John Lewis spoke militantly with vivid word pictures from the fields of Mississippi. Of all the speakers, Lewis most clearly denounced the lack of Title III protections, the weak and paternalistic voting rights provisions, the lack of any FEPC, and the absence of redistributive employment policies. At the behest of an irate archbishop O’Boyle, moderates successfully pressured Lewis to change his original text. But the speech retained most of its force and content. And the dispute ironically drew most reporters’ attention to the original uncompromising draft that threatened a nonviolent “march through the heart of Dixie” like General Sherman. Lewis cut the reference. American politicians allied themselves “with open forms of political, economic and social exploitation,” he charged. Lewis spoke for thousands who could not come to Washington because they earned “starvation wages” or “no wages at all.” What would the Kennedy bill do for the “homeless and starving people of this nation?” Sharecroppers making less than $3 a day in the fields needed legal protection from economic reprisals. Where was Kennedy’s legislation that would guarantee “the equality of a maid who earns five dollars a week in the home of the family whose income is $100,000 a year?” Only King received more cheers and applause than Lewis that day. The Washington Post called the speech the march’s one “bitter, discordant note.” Anna Arnold Hedgeman called it the only relevant speech of the day. The New York Times omitted Lewis from its page of excerpted speeches, though the frame of “internal movement dissension” kept one front-page story riveted on the tussle with O’Boyle.

King’s “I Have a Dream” speech was for many the climax of the day. He left out his customary call for a wide distribution of privilege and property and an end to class suppression of “the masses.” King spoke of interracial brotherhood and the full citizenship rights due the Negro. But he also defended the movement’s “whirlwinds of revolt,” denouncing the “unspeakable
horrors of police brutality” and the cruel confinement of Negroes to ghettos, demanding “the riches of freedom and the security of justice.” He borrowed a metaphor from Wilkins, insisting America had bounced a check, a solemn promissory note issued to all citizens at the nation’s founding. After King, Rustin read the March demands to general acclaim. Michael Thelwell remembered how SNCC cynics who mocked the “bullshit and rhetoric” of the other speeches listened to King’s “lyrical and rhythmic cadence” and his climactic repetition of “Let freedom ring!” Despite their “stubborn, intemperate hearts,” they leapt to their feet in tears, “laughing, shouting, slapping palms.”

“Pass the Bill” was not the banner the Big Ten brought into their Oval Office meeting with the president right after the march. Instead they gave Kennedy a seminar on his civil rights bill’s economic shortcomings. Whitney Young insisted the bill was pointed at the South, whereas the “big problems” were northern. Randolph reiterated his arguments for job creation. Wilkins and Reuther tried to persuade Kennedy to support the FEPC. “A job is really basic,” Reuther said, because it determined the housing, neighborhoods, and schools Negroes could afford. JFK tried to deflect the heat by changing the subject to black family values. Jews overcame discrimination and gave their children discipline and education. Why couldn’t black ministers preach similar strategies, even though black families were “split and all the rest”? McKissick responded that parents could not supervise children when they worked all the time. Job discrimination killed black children’s aspirations, and the many injustices producing black poverty were “interrelated and interlocking.” Eugene Blake added that inner-city schools had the lowest budgets and the worst paid, least qualified teachers. “If thirteen percent of the general population were unemployed like the Negro, you’d have a shooting revolution,” Young interjected. The leaders relentlessly pressured Kennedy to heed black people’s economic needs.

The next evening, all Big Ten went on Washington, DC television with the long-winded moderator Jay Kennedy, a novelist and Catholic interracialist. This Kennedy steered the discussion to themes of religious racial brotherhood and sang hosannas to John Kennedy, talking more than his interviewees. Randolph referenced the unprecedented pressure of the “masses” that made the march possible, warning about the “powder keg” of youth unemployment. John Lewis could only talk about white student contributions to the beloved community. The white churchmen spoke at length in glorious abstractions. Rabbi Prinz praised “religion in participation.” Kennedy deferred more to King. King defined the “great social revolution” as a peaceful “revolution to get in, not to destroy the existing government or to destroy property.” It was a movement not of despair, but of “rising expectations” for democracy and access to the “mainstream.” When Kennedy repeatedly stated that the march had disproved all the predictions of violence, King responded that repeated white warnings of violence and riots were “consciously or unconsciously creating the atmosphere for violence.” This was a constant refrain throughout the summer. People standing up for constitutional rights could not be held accountable for the violent response of private or official bigots, he said. Except for Randolph and Wilkins, there was no talk of economic justice or the shortcomings of the bill. Anyone watching might safely assume all they wanted was a hamburger and an integrated church pew.

Liberals packaged the march as an international advertisement for American democracy. Kennedy immediately lauded the “fervor and quiet dignity” of marchers who showed “faith and confidence in our democratic form of government.” Hubert Humphrey wrote NALC president Troy Bailey: “Televised as it was around the world,” it was “a turning point in American international relations [which] rest ultimately on morality, not power.” The U.S. Information Agency commissioned a film to be shipped abroad that included dignified images
of interracial marchers and little reference to what brought them to Washington. Kennedy offered no new civil rights or economic proposals, and he let Congress take its time. Only when Congressman Emanuel Cellers reported the civil rights bill to the full Senate with the FEPC attached to title VII did Kennedy accept it. Though he publicly endorsed full and fair employment and publicized his modest proposals for new job training programs, Kennedy ignored all the March’s structural demands for an increase and extension of the minimum wage, public works employment, an executive order on home loan discrimination, and protection for civil rights workers.

Militants saw a sellout by the middle class civil rights leadership and a public-relations victory for Kennedy. "This exploitation of so many angry and sincere people, whose indignation was misrepresented as some kind of testimonial for the system that had oppressed them, and against which they were protesting, must qualify as one of the greatest and most shameless manipulations of recent years," Thelwell wrote.75

The news media scarcely registered the economic issues after the March. Journalists most consistently reported the violence that did not happen. “Police Precautions and Festive Spirit of Capital Keep Disorders at a Minimum” was the New York Times headline. A “gentle army” occupied the city, not “the emotional horde of angry militants that many had feared.” The Wall Street Journal wondered whether a tactic “so laden with potential violence” had been worth the risk and answered, "This nation is based on representative Government, not on Government run by street mobs, disciplined or otherwise." The Pittsburgh Courier hailed the march as proof that Negro violence resulted from police repression, burying the myth that Negro crowds were violent by nature.76

Moscow’s afternoon daily Izvestia devoted its entire front page to the march, describing its goal of “economic as well as political equality.” Ironically, in the Times coverage of Izvestia, Americans could learn of some of the March’s economic dimensions. The Kennedy bill was an advance, Izvestia reported, but it contained no provisions for “equal pay for equal work for whites and Negroes.” Racism was “extremely profitable,” Izvestia noted. “Monopolies, plantations,” big and small businesses reaped an estimated $14,000,000 in extra profits out of black and white wage differentials. No one claimed this at the March, of course. But Americans could learn from communist propaganda. The Soviet press agency Tass declared the march showed the “sores of American society, the repulsive picture of racial oppression,” but did not explain why it cancelled TV coverage carried over Telstar (no doubt, the pictures didn’t bear them out that day).77

Despite the invisibility of the economic demands in the press and Kennedy’s transparent effort to “expropriate a revolution,” Tom Kahn saw a widening recognition of Reconstruction’s great lesson: “there can be no political or social freedom without economic security.” All the major civil rights organizations united around a set of radical economic demands for “social reconstruction,” and the crowd roared its approval, he reported in the socialist New America.78

In an exception that proves the rule, Reg Murphy of the Atlanta Constitution detailed the economic demands. Would the administration adopt an FEPC law, “the one thing that most speakers at this giant rally stressed the most”? There was real radicalism in the minimum wage demand and the demand for Title III protections, Murphy reported. But his editor Eugene Patterson praised Atlanta’s hometown hero. King redeemed the whole day by preaching patriotism and the healing balm of capitalist "plenty." In Patterson’s odd reading, King preached to the black middle class about their duties to enlighten and uplift Negroes who remained in darkness to close to the “the cabin to comprehend the ways that are open to them.” He spoke as if opportunity was dropping like peaches from New South trees. In Patterson’s
encomium, Malcolm X could find the “house Negro” he took King to be. Patterson would go on to serve on Lyndon Johnson’s Civil Rights Commission, after his heroic denunciation of southern politicians after the bombing of Birmingham’s 16th St Baptist Church. But like John Kennedy, his paternalism etched the limits of 1960s racial liberalism.79

Journalists highlighted King’s charisma, downplayed the goals of the march, favored logistical coverage, and breathed an audible sigh of relief that the day had been nonviolent. The Times put the goals in a tiny box on the bottom of page 19 on August 29. Most papers published a play-by-play of the speakers and the March logistics. As with Jay Kennedy’s television program, the newspapers’ most recurrent theme was the violence that did not happen. “Police Precautions and Festive Spirit of Capital Keep Disorders at a Minimum” was the New York Times headline on page 20. A “Gentle Army” occupied the city, in one account, not “the emotional horde of angry militants that many had feared.” But the Wall St. Journal still wondered whether a tactic “so laden with potential violence, however worthy the goal,” was worth the risk. They answered their own question. "This nation is based on representative Government, not on Government run by street mobs, disciplined or otherwise." 80

After the fact, there was room for humor. One populist gaudily, George Dixon of the Washington Post, heaved a sigh of relief when 550 business executives descended on the Capitol to lobby for the $11 billion tax cut: "no violence, and no incidents" marred the effectiveness of their visit, he reported. 81

Coverage in the Negro Pittsburgh Courier approached violence, logistics and charismatic leadership from a different angle. The peaceful march was proof that mass violence only happened when provoked by police repression, one reporter claimed. The main legacy of the march was to bury the myth that Negroes collected in crowds were violent by nature. Reporter Harold Keith argued that the mass nonviolent turnout proved “that if police were fair there would be no racial incidents.” 82

King took pride in the fact that the March on Washington brought white America "closer into harmony with its Negro citizens than ever before." During a steamy July heat wave, Newsweek had sent out black and white survey researchers to gather reams of statistics on Negro and white attitudes. King celebrated their findings: "overwhelming majorities favored laws to guarantee Negroes voting rights, job opportunities, good housing and integrated travel facilities . . . exactly the changes that the nonviolent demonstrations present as their central demands." Yet Newsweek revealed schizoid splits in America’s conscience over implementation, not principles, and over black bodies, not Negro citizens. A minority of southern whites and a bare majority of whites nationwide approved of federal fair employment practices legislation. Regarding stereotypes about Negroes, most whites agreed that “Negroes tend to have less ambition” and "Negroes want to live off the handout.” Politicians exploited stereotypes of the work-shirking, welfare-cheating, tax-eating Negroes dependent on honest, working whites. Democrats had exploited these stereotypes in the election of 1868. Republicans would follow suit in every election after 1868. King kept hearing from Americans seeking to persuade him that blacks needed to demonstrate themselves worthy of equality. A Cleveland citizen sent King some doggerel: “To white folks must labor from sun to sun / to pay welfare taxes, while we has the fun. / Dey pay us to vote, dey reward us for sin / And the sweet Democrats keep the checks rollin in.” 83 A Louisianan sent King a mock application to the NAACP containing a pledge for Negro sit-in recruits: "I will sit down because we has not worked, the world has fed us. . . With the Government, the Northern Press, the Army and the Communist Party on your side, and the Welfare Department paying your way, we is running the country.” 84
Notes

1 Virginia protesters “call and response” quoted in Hansen, The Dream, 40. [FBI? Check FOIA materials pending – for identities.]

2 In Gamson’s view, the media can also become a “mediation system,” with its own interests to maintain. I think this has become especially distorting as news organizations follow the dictum “when it bleeds it leads.” William A. Gamson, "Social Movements and Cultural Change," in From Contention to Democracy, ed. Marco G. Guigni, Doug McAdam, and Charles Tilly (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998), 62. According to Steinberg, discourses “have meaning only as they are used in relation between people in communication.” Marc Steinberg, "Toward a More Dialogic Analysis of Social Movement Culture," in Social Movements: Identity, Culture, and the State, ed. David S. Meyer, Nancy Whittier, and Belinda Robnett (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 211. Nancy Whittier has called most succinctly for a multifaceted approach to social movements, in which “individual, cultural, and structural transformations . . . are inseparable . . . External constraints and opportunities, both cultural and structural, influence movement identities and discourses.” Nancy Whittier, “Meaning and Structure in Social Movements,” in Social Movements: Identity, Culture, and the State, ed. David S. Meyer, Nancy Whittier, and Belinda Robnett (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 303. The contribution of the field of communication to the interdisciplinary study of political culture is well represented by Carolyn Bronstein, "Representing the Third Wave: Mainstream Print Media Framing of a New Feminist Movement," Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly 82, no. 4 (2005): 783-803; Kevin M. Carragee and Wim Roefs, "The Neglect of Power in Recent Framing Research," Journal of Communication 52, no. 2 (2004): 214-33; Robert M. Entman, "Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm." Journal of Communication 43, no. 4 (1993): 51-58. Evidence for these broader dynamics of cultural power can be found in scholarship and in archival collections as diverse as presidential libraries, FBI surveillance logs, public opinion polls, and King’s treasure trove of 10,000 letters to him from the general public. [Quantitative content analysis is in the future, probably with a collaborator, because the qualitative analysis and narrative is going to be aimed at the sweet spot in the trade press market].


4 Klirman, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights, 435, 441, follows interpretive lines established by David Garrow, who relied upon Wyatt T. Walker for his conclusions. According to Julian Bond, The movement "furnished the media with a cavalcade of vivid confrontations, tragic setbacks, stirring victories, charismatic heroes, and demonic villains. This was just what was needed to keep the civil rights struggle at the forefront of public consciousness." “The mainstream press may have been broadly sympathetic to the fundamental moral and constitutional issues at stake in the early southern Struggle, but it could only put out so many earnest statements of principle and editorials on the subject before losing the interest of readers, viewers, and listeners. What the media craved was a steady diet of both mass action campaigns in the streets, ideally faced by violent white resistance, which would dramatize the issues at stake and make good print or electronic copy.” Julian Bond, "The Media and the Movement: Looking Back from the Southern Front," in Media, Culture and the Modern African American Freedom Struggle, ed. Brian Ward (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2001), 32-34. Bond exaggerates the influence and friendliness of reporters, as do Roberts and Kilbanoff, The Race Beat, 314

5 One school of historians has been content to tell national stories of liberal reform and dramatic Southern transformation, generally according great power to liberal legislation, King’s strategy of dramatic protest, the federal judiciary, and the moral authority of John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson. Other historians see little racial progress other than through black people’s own struggles, and concern themselves with local change, women’s local leadership, black power movements, severe limitations on federal policy, and deferred economic and political dreams. See Charles Payne and Steven F. Lawson, Debating the Civil Rights Movement (Lanham Maryland: Roman and Littlefield, 1996).


8 The misconception has ramified through the literature: “King himself would be the media relations machinery, the magnetic draw, and Connor, they hoped, would be the foil whose actions would trigger the cameras.” Roberts and Kilbanoff, The Race Beat, 305.


11 Apr 5. NYT: “4 Negroes Jailed In Birmingham As the Integration Drive Slows” Foster Hailey. On one occasion the Times referred to Shuttlesworth as the campaign director, but by April 11, the paper demoted Shuttlesworth to just one of local leaders “allied with” King, and by April 20 the paper was reporting that King “opened the current desegregation drive in this city 17 days ago.” Apr. 20 NYT: “Birmingham Curb Asked In U.S. Suit,” Black newspaper editor Emory Jackson called SCLC the “upside down civil rights crew.” McWhorter, Carry Me Home, 237. king, Why We Can’t Wait, 66. Press cards: Young, An Easy Burden, 205. King, Why We Can’t Wait, 53 Eskew, But for Birmingham, 224–5.


13 “We shall not submit to the intimidations of pressure,” Boutwell was quoted to say. 4/16. NYT, and McWhorter survey p. xx. Apr. 17 NYT: “3 In Birmingham Face Ouster Suit,” by Foster Hailey.


18 Garrow, Bearing the Cross, 247; Bevel in Voices of Freedom, ed. Hampton and Fayer, 131; Shuttlesworth interview with Mosby, 60-61, RJB; A. Young, An Easy Burden, 236; “Fire Hoses, Dogs Quell Alabama Racial Protest,” LAT, 4 May 1963; Manis, A Fire You Can’t Put Out, 368-70; King, Why We Can’t Wait, 99.

19 McWhorter, Carry Me Home, 373–76; Eskew, But for Birmingham, 268; King, Why We Can’t Wait, 100; A. Young, An Easy Burden, 240; “Bob Kennedy Warns City on Negro Rights,” LAT, 4 May 1963; Garrow, Bearing the Cross, 250.


27 “Birmingham’s Choice,” Newsweek May 27, 1963. Hedrick Smith, “Bombs Touch off Widespread Riot at Birmingham,” NYT 630512. Police Chief Jamie Moore had challenged “you’re going to get someone killed with those guns.” Lingo answered, “I damn sure will if I have to.” Sitton had substantially the same story. Hardy further reported that Lingo and his men just before daybreak “began clubbing Negroes sitting on their porches.”5/18, PC: “B‘Ham Explodes; JFK Must Act!” Lester K. Hardy. Among the newspaper sources surveyed for this study, the Pittsburgh Courier was the only news organization to refer to the long history of Birmingham’s police force record of brutality and murder. 5/11, PC: “Indiscriminate’ Use of Dogs, Fire Hoses Questioned”

28 For Robert Kennedy’s account of the riot, John F. Kennedy’s tougher approach, and relevant Oval Office conversations of 12 and 21 May, see Kennedy, Johnson, and the Quest for Justice, ed. Rosenberg and Karabell, 96-99, 102-3, 109-10; Anthony Lewis, “U.S. Sends Troops to Alabama,” NYT, 13 May 1963; Stanley Levison and Jack O’Dell, 14 May 1963, FBI Levison
Logs; Philip Benjamin, “Dr. King Visits Pool Halls,” NYT, 14 May 1963; A. Young, An Easy Burden, 250.
20 Anonymous to King, 14 may 1963, SCLC microfilm 5:676.
26 Sugrue, Sweet Land of Liberty; Cecil Moore quoted in Bryant, the bystander, 2.
27 Rev. Wyatt T. Walker to MLK, 15 May 1963, SCLC microfilm 6:5
30 Oval Office Meetings, Presidential Recordings, 20 May 1963, tape 88.4, and 1 June 1963, tape 90.3, JFKL; Kennedy, Johnson, and the Quest for Justice, ed. Rosenberg and Karabell, 116–20. Title VI promised to cut off federal dollars to any government agency or contractor that practiced discrimination. Titles IV and V allowed the Community Relations Service to mediate disputes and extended the tenure of the Civil Rights Commission. Sundquist, Politics and Policy, 263.
32 Brink and Harris, Negro Revolution in America, 190; Sundquist, Politics and Policy, 263; “Text of the President's Message to Congress.”
34 Pfeffer, A. Philip Randolph, 266–67; Garrow, Bearing the Cross, 265–81; Fairclough, Martin Luther King, 89.
38 Conference call between Levison, Jones, King, Abernathy, and Andrew Young, MLK-Levison FBI Micro, 10 June 1963, 4:147-52. By stressing the resiliency of the economic agenda, I differ with Fairclough, To Redeem the Soul of America, 150-52, Pfeffer, A. Philip Randolph, 266–67, and D’Emilio, Lost Prophet.
40 Sellers, River of No Return, 62-63; Lewis and D’Orso, Walking with the Wind, 202–3.
41 Congressional record, 26 August 1963, 15818, quoted in Hansen, 29.
42 Brigadier General US Army retired Laguna Beach California to King 19 June 1963 SCLC microfilm 6:804
43 John L. Fikes, Miami, Florida to King, 23 may 1963, 7:599.
45 Gentile, March on Washington, 65–71, 259; Abner Willoughby to A. Philip Randolph, 28 June 1963, BR, 27:10; King,
“March on Washington,” NYAN, 24 Aug. 1963; The Justice Department insisted on a sound system large enough to keep the whole crowd drawn close around the Lincoln Memorial, where behind Lincoln’s statue sat Kennedy emissary Jerry Bruno holding “the cutoff switch in his hand,” in case the crowd turned too militant. Lichtenstein, Most Dangerous Man in Detroit, 536n47.

56 630728 NYT Catholics; 630805 NYT rights panel here. 630826 WSJ abreast;
57 630901 WP business
60 Sellers, River of No Return, 62-63.
63 Frances Fox Piven, interview by Noel Cazenave, War on Poverty Oral History Project, CUOH; Richard Cloward and Frances Fox Piven, personal communication with the author, 4 Apr. 2000.
66 Thelwell, “The August 28th March on Washington,” 71
67 Alexander Allen to Young, 7/17/63, Thomas Hanlon to Young, 8/13/63, [2 memos], NUL II, 1, 25, SNCC radicals worried about liberal-moderate “take-over,” but Hanlon wanted to “use this ‘take-over’ behavior, not reject it and lose its resources.” Rustin retained tight control over the approved signage. See Malcolm, “They told them, etc…

75 “Transcript of March on Washington.…Report by the Leaders” in Kennedy to Kennedy, 10/25/63, CRKA, Part 1 [micro], reel 3, Taped in Washington D.C. for Metropolitan Broadcasting Television. I have not been able to determine the markets in which the program was run.
78 Soviet press agency Tass declared the march showed the “sores of American society, the repulsive picture of racial oppression,” but did not explain why it cancelled TV coverage carried over Telstar (the pictures didn’t bear it out).
80 NYT, 8/29/63, 20 “Gentle Army,” “Marcher from Alabama,” 8/29/63, 17. Powledge, *Free at Last?* 539-540 DC Department of Corrections officials gave all prisoners half of the day off to watch on TV. “It took the steam off,” Director Donald Clemmer noted; the prisoners reacted with “gentlemanly behavior and appreciation.”

81 630918 WP Washington

82 In addition to inflating estimates of the crowd turnout (the largest demonstration in history, they announced), the *Courier* emphasized the importance of supporting unemployed people seeking to attend. PC, 8/9/63, 8/31/63, 9/7/63, passim.


84 Anonymous, Mindon Louisiana, 3 July 1963, SCLC microfilm 6:966 “Rules for Conduct in Sit-In Demonstrations - (as directed by the NAACP, on suggestions by Brother Shuttlesworth and on the advice of attorney general Robert Kennedy, and sanctioned by the Communist Party)”